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Executive Summary
The federal government’s substantial fiscal investment in higher education recognizes that postsecondary
education is a linchpin in the nation’s social and economic strength. Through that support, the government
helps ensure that colleges and universities continue to contribute broadly to the fabric of American society.
To ensure prudent stewardship of federal support for higher education, the Department of Education1 is
charged with developing procedures to carry out laws passed by Congress in regard to higher education and
with overseeing institutional compliance. Institutions of higher learning recognize the important role regulations play in the oversight of federal investments.
Over time, oversight of higher education by the Department of Education has expanded and evolved in ways
that undermine the ability of colleges and universities to serve students and accomplish their missions. The
compliance problem is exacerbated by the sheer volume of mandates—approximately 2,000 pages of text—
and the reality that the Department of Education issues official guidance to amend or clarify its rules at a
rate of more than one document per work day. As a result, colleges and universities find themselves enmeshed
in a jungle of red tape, facing rules that are often confusing and difficult to comply with. They must allocate
resources to compliance that would be better applied to student education, safety, and innovation in instructional delivery. Clearly, a better approach is needed.
In 2013, a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators recognized that the pending reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA) creates an opportunity to consider these issues in depth. They established a task force of
college and university presidents and chancellors to study federal regulation of higher education broadly and
identify potential improvements.
Looking at the landscape of regulation of colleges and universities writ large, the Task Force on Federal Regulation of Higher Education identified a number of challenges that are particularly problematic. As described
in Section II of this report, we concluded that many rules are unnecessarily voluminous and too often ambiguous, and that the cost of compliance has become unreasonable. Moreover, many regulations are unrelated to
education, student safety, or stewardship of federal funds—and others can be a barrier to college access and
innovation in education.
Based on extensive discussions, consultations with experts, and site visits to campuses, the Task Force identified specific regulations that are of major concern to higher education institutions. Section III details those
concerns, which include problematic financial responsibility standards, confusion and inconsistency in
reporting requirements for campus crime, overreach in authorization of distance education programs, inefficient rules concerning verification of financial aid eligibility, counterproductive micromanagement of the
accreditation process, and policies that result in consumers being inundated with information of questionable
value.
The Task Force also reviewed the processes by which higher education regulations are developed and implemented, and offers several specific ideas for improvement. Section IV outlines recommendations that include
asking the Government Accountability Office to review the Department of Education’s methodology for
1
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estimating institutional costs of compliance with regulations; the creation of clear “safe harbors” for institutional compliance; the recognition of “good faith” efforts to comply; and several proposals for better practices by the Department.
To help policy makers think about the most effective and efficient way to regulate higher education, the Task
Force developed the following Guiding Principles to govern the development, implementation, and enforcement of regulations by the Department:
• Regulations should be related to education, student safety, and stewardship of federal funds.
• Regulations should be clear and comprehensible.
• Regulations should not stray from clearly stated legislative intent.
• Costs and burdens of regulations should be accurately estimated.
• Clear safe harbors should be created.
• The Department should recognize good faith efforts by institutions.
• The Department should complete program reviews and investigations in a timely manner.
• Penalties should be imposed at a level appropriate to the violation.
• Disclosure requirements should focus on issues of widespread interest.
• All substantive policies should be subject to the “notice-and-comment” requirements of the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act.
• Regulations that consistently create compliance challenges should be revised.
• The Department should take all necessary steps to facilitate compliance by institutions.

The Task Force believes that adherence to these principles would help improve regulation of higher education, and urges their adoption.
Again, to be clear: Regulations serve an important role in ensuring institutional accountability. But requirements that have an excessive reach, or that are unnecessarily costly and difficult to implement—or worse still,
that hinder student access to college and drive costs up—are counterproductive. Smarter rules are needed. In
the context of the forthcoming reauthorization of the HEA, this report from the Task Force on Federal Regulation of Higher Education proposes many specific avenues to improve the regulation of higher education.
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The Task Force on Federal Regulation of Higher Education
The pending reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA) provides an opportunity for Congress to
examine how institutions of higher education are regulated and to identify ways to streamline and simplify
regulatory policies and practices. With that goal in mind, a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators—Lamar Alexander (R-TN), Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Richard Burr (R-NC), and Michael Bennet (D-CO) created the
Task Force on Federal Regulation of Higher Education in the fall of 2013 and directed it to consider these
issues in depth.
The Senators articulated a three-part charge for the group:
1) Provide specific recommendations to consolidate, streamline, and eliminate burdensome, costly,
and confusing regulations, laws, and reporting requirements;
2) Review and quantify the extent of all federal requirements with which institutions must comply,
including estimates of the time and costs associated with specific regulations; and,
3) Provide recommendations for reform to ensure future regulations are promulgated in a manner that appropriately considers existing law and accurately examines the costs and benefits to
taxpayers, institutions, and students.
The Senators appointed Task Force members representing institutions from across all sectors of higher
education, and named Chancellors William E. Kirwan of the University System of Maryland and Nicholas S.
Zeppos of Vanderbilt University (TN) as co-chairs. In addition to Chancellors Kirwan and Zeppos, the Task
Force includes these members:
• William L. Armstrong, President, Colorado Christian University
• Bruce D. Benson, President, University of Colorado
• Molly Corbett Broad, President, American Council on Education (DC)
• Thomas V. Chema, President Emeritus, Hiram College (OH)
• Margaret L. Drugovich, President, Hartwick College (NY)
• Dana G. Hoyt, President, Sam Houston State University (TX)
• Brice W. Harris, Chancellor, California Community College System
• Jonathan A. Kaplan, Chief Executive Officer, Laureate Online Education (MD)
• Cornelius M. Kerwin, President, American University (DC)
• J. Michael Locke, Former CEO, Rasmussen College (IL)
• Harold L. Martin Sr., Chancellor, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University
• Claude O. Pressnell Jr., President, Tennessee Independent Colleges and Universities Association
• Thomas W. Ross, President, University of North Carolina
• Robert G. Templin Jr., President, Northern Virginia Community College
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In addition, the Senators asked the American Council on Education (ACE) to support the work of the Task
Force.

Scope of Work and Task Force Activities
The word “regulation” can be viewed broadly or narrowly. Narrowly defined, federal regulation means only
a requirement imposed on institutions through the Code of Federal Regulations, the codification of all the
regulations promulgated by federal agencies. Considered more broadly, it means any requirement placed on
colleges and universities in order to participate in the federal student aid program. For the purposes of this
Task Force and our report, we use “regulation” in this broader sense.
The Task Force engaged in extensive consultations for this project and solicited insights from higher education associations, campus officials, and other organizations and stakeholders. To gather input from individuals on campuses who are responsible for implementing regulations, ACE staff conducted extensive site visits
and met with representatives from more than 60 institutions around the country.2
Our aim was not simply to reduce the number of regulations imposed by the Department of Education, but
rather to foster more effective and efficient rules that still meet federal objectives. To that end, we sought to
accomplish these goals:
• Summarize the increasing burden of federal regulation on higher education.
• Identify regulations of particular concern to institutions of higher education, explain why they are

problematic, and recommend changes to ameliorate them.
• Offer longer-term process improvements that would minimize similar concerns about regulations in

the future.
Section I of this report frames the current regulatory landscape for higher education. Section II describes specific current challenges. Section III details 10 regulations that colleges and universities find especially problematic, and recommends solutions.3 Finally, Section IV proposes ways to improve the regulatory process.
Effective oversight can help colleges and universities keep costs down, keep students safe, focus on educating students, and be good stewards of federal funds. In that spirit, the Task Force developed the following
Guiding Principles to help govern the development, implementation, and enforcement of regulations by the
Department:
• Regulations should be related to education, student safety, and stewardship of federal funds.
• Regulations should be clear and comprehensible.
• Regulations should not stray from clearly stated legislative intent.
• Costs and burdens of regulations should be accurately estimated.
• Clear safe harbors should be created.
2

3

Our review was limited to regulations currently in effect, and not to those that were still in development. Since the Task Force
began its review, however, the Department has released major rulemaking packages for gainful employment, the Violence Against
Women Act, and teacher preparation, as well as hundreds of pages of new sub-regulatory guidance.
These regulations are derived from a lengthy matrix of problematic rules, appended to this report, that have been identified by the
broader higher education community.
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• The Department should recognize good faith efforts by institutions.
• The Department should complete program reviews and investigations in a timely manner.
• Penalties should be imposed at a level appropriate to the violation.
• Disclosure requirements should focus on issues of widespread interest.
• All substantive policies should be subject to the “notice-and-comment” requirements of the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act.
• Regulations that consistently create compliance challenges should be revised.
• The Department should take all necessary steps to facilitate compliance by institutions.

We believe that these principles would help improve the regulation of higher education, and we urge their
adoption.
While the primary focus of this report is on requirements imposed by the Department of Education, institutions of higher education are also regulated by every Cabinet-level agency, as well as many sub-Cabinet-level
agencies.4 In that regard, we acknowledge the important work by other groups and organizations, including
the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Board, to
examine regulations stemming from other agencies, particularly in connection with federally funded research.

4

6

The Higher Education Compliance Alliance, http://www.higheredcompliance.org/matrix/.

Recalibrating Regulation of Colleges and Universities

Section I: The Increasing Burden of Federal Regulation of Higher Education
The increasing size and reach of the federal government is an unmistakable sign of our times. In 1970, the
federal budget totaled roughly $200 billion; today it stands at $3.5 trillion. The number of agencies in the
president’s Cabinet has grown from 11 to 15. The total number of individuals receiving benefits from Social
Security and Medicare alone has jumped from 46 million to 100 million.
Federal aid to help students and families finance a college education has grown apace. In 1970-71, what was
then the U.S. Office of Education awarded roughly 1.6 million grants and loans to low- and middle-income
families. In 2013-14, the U.S. Department of Education reported nearly 20 million such awards. The amount
of money disbursed grew from $1.6 billion to more than $160 billion. Over that same time period, federal
support for research at the National Institutes of Health increased from approximately $1 billion to roughly
$30 billion, while funding for the National Science Foundation rose from about $465 million to nearly $7
billion.
As the activities and scope of the federal government have expanded, so have its rules and directives. Between
1970 and 2014, the Code of Federal Regulations grew from 55,000 pages to 175,000.5 At one level, this expansion is not surprising. Increased federal support necessarily precipitates more oversight. Federal funding of
higher education is not exempt, nor should it be.
At the same time, however, the cost and compliance burdens imposed by federal rules and the disincentives
created by regulatory practices have become a significant matter of public concern. Indeed, a recent poll by
The New York Times concluded that a clear majority of Americans now believe that over-regulation is a problem that may interfere with overall economic growth.6
While that survey focused on all federal regulation, it parallels a strong sense among college and university
leaders that federal oversight of higher education has become too costly and complex and often creates
negative incentives, and that significant streamlining of rules could protect the public and consumers while
simplifying compliance and reducing its associated costs. From procedures institutions must follow to return
“unearned” federal student aid funds when a student withdraws to the collection of crime statistics from
foreign law enforcement agencies, colleges and universities face a daunting and ever-growing list of detailed
federal requirements. According to an analysis of data provided by the Mercatus Center at George Mason
University, the number of federal requirements placed on colleges and universities grew by 56 percent
between 1997 and 2012.7
Most college and university leaders believe that the rate of increase in government-issued regulations has
grown significantly in the last five years. Indeed, in 2013 and 2014, the two years since the Mercatus Center
5
6
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The George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center, http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats.
Sorkin, Andrew Ross, & Megan Thee-Brenan, “Many Feel the American Dream is Out of Reach, Poll Shows,” The New York Times,
December 10, 2014, available at: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/many-feel-the-american-dream-is-out-of-reach-pollshows/?_r=0.
Mercatus Center, George Mason University: http://www.regdata.org.
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study, the U.S. Department of Education has released new rules or directives addressing 10 new sets of issues.8
Two examples highlight the increasing complexity of the Department of Education’s reach. First, in the
early 1950s, accrediting agencies qualified for recognition by the U.S. Office of Education by meeting five
straightforward criteria. Today, however, statutory requirements fill nine pages of the HEA, and the Department’s application for agencies seeking recognition has expanded to 88 pages. Any agency that seeks initial or
renewed recognition must expect to devote several person years to filing the appropriate federal paperwork.
Another example is the expansion of data collection mandates imposed on colleges and universities. The
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Survey (IPEDS) was first implemented as a voluntary activity in
1985-86. Today, participation in IPEDS is mandatory and requires completion of nine separate surveys that
together exceed 300 pages.
Given the amount of federal money spent on higher education, the government has an unambiguous responsibility to ensure that it is well spent. Concomitantly, colleges and universities have a clear obligation to be
accountable for those funds. When conducted the right way, government oversight provides essential protections for students and taxpayers. But there are no benefits to unnecessary and excessively complex regulations.
To the contrary, such rules impose a costly and unwelcome burden. At best, institutions must hire additional
staff to comply with federal mandates. At worst, compliance consumes resources that would be better spent
educating students and supporting innovative research that can help drive U.S. economic competitiveness.
While much of this report examines the Department’s approach to regulation with a critical eye, there are
areas where the Department performs its oversight responsibilities well. For example, the Department is
charged with the monumental task of processing millions of financial aid transactions every year and overseeing the distribution of more than $160 billion in grant and loan funds to students. In general, it manages
those responsibilities effectively, carefully distributing federal dollars to students and institutions in a timely
and accurate way. The Department’s Office of Federal Student Aid regularly engages campus financial aid
administrators in online and in-person training opportunities that enhance knowledge of financial aid processes and help facilitate compliance by school officials.
Equally important, there are cases where the Department of Education has used a regulatory process that
has led to sound oversight of complex topics. The Satisfactory Academic Progress regulations issued in 2010
are one such example. Those rules outline the academic progress that students must achieve to continue to
receive Title IV assistance and the steps that schools must take to document it. As a result of regulations
developed through an effective negotiated rulemaking process, the Department developed standards that met
the agency’s objectives while giving institutions the flexibility necessary given the huge variation in academic
programs across the thousands of institutions now participating in federal student aid programs.
These examples illustrate that the Department has the capacity to ensure that federal policy objectives are met
8

8

The 10 issues are: final regulations for the Violence Against Women Act/Clery Act, program integrity/direct loan (DL) PLUS
credit check, and gainful employment; proposed rules for teacher preparation programs; and sub-regulatory guidance on program-level reporting for the 150 percent interest subsidy limit on Stafford loans, the effect of budget sequestration on annual DL
and TEACH grant amounts for students, additional Net Price Calculator requirements and guidance, specific requirements for
FAFSA verification, implementing the Supreme Court ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act, and a 53-page Q&A on Title IX
and campus sexual assault.

Recalibrating Regulation of Colleges and Universities

in a way that facilitates campus understanding and compliance. Unfortunately, the fact that examples like this
are rare underscores the infrequency with which it does so.
The overarching goal of the federal government with respect to regulation of higher education should be the
creation of a regulatory framework and specific mandates that ensure full institutional accountability in a way
that facilitates campus compliance. Rather than treating regulatory requirements as a “free good,” the Department should accurately analyze compliance costs and seek to minimize them. The system should provide
important and accurate information for students and families without imposing enormous data collection
burdens on institutions. Rather than impeding institutional productivity and innovation, federal regulation
ought to be facilitating it.
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Section II: Challenges to Higher Education in the Current Regulatory Environment
At the start of its review, the Task Force gathered information to develop a comprehensive understanding of
the impact of federal regulations on colleges and universities. Based on our analysis, we have identified a number of broad problems confronting institutions.

Regulations Are Unnecessarily Voluminous
Higher education institutions are subject to a massive amount of federal statutory, regulatory, and sub-regulatory requirements, stemming from virtually every federal agency and totaling thousands of pages.9 Focusing
solely on requirements involving the Department of Education, the HEA contains roughly 1,000 pages of
statutory language; the associated rules in the Code of Federal Regulations add another 1,000 pages. Institutions are also subject to thousands of pages of additional requirements in the form of sub-regulatory guidance
issued by the Department. For example, the Department’s 2013-14 Federal Student Aid Handbook, a guidebook for administering student aid that amplifies and clarifies the formal regulations, is more than 1,050
pages. The Department’s Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting10 (also known as the “Clery
Handbook”) contains approximately 300 pages, and will soon expand significantly in light of new regulations
issued in 2014. In 2012 alone, the Department released approximately 270 “Dear Colleague” letters and
other electronic announcements—this means that more than one new directive or clarification was issued
every working day of the year.
Among the many federal rules with which colleges and universities must comply, information disclosure
mandates are particularly voluminous. Section 485 of the HEA, which details institutional disclosures on
a host of issues, runs some 30 pages of legislative text and includes 22 separate “information dissemination”
requirements. Of course, information disclosure is not limited solely to Section 485 and can be found
throughout the law and the Department’s rules. The Federal Student Aid office at the Department publishes
a summary chart of the various consumer information disclosures. Although this chart is designed to provide
consumer disclosures “At-a-Glance,” it is currently 31 pages long. Between crime reporting and policy disclosures, the Clery Act and related departmental guidance require more than 90 separate policy statements and
disclosures. In sum, the sheer number of regulatory provisions that affects institutions of higher education
constitutes a voluminous and expanding burden.11

Compliance with Regulations Is Inordinately Costly
While government regulation can confer significant benefits and protections, the costs associated with heavyhanded and poorly designed regulations can be enormous. Unfortunately, calculating the precise benefits
and costs of regulation is both difficult and time-consuming. One reason for this is that duties and functions
associated with a new regulation are usually absorbed by staff who already perform other duties, simply
9
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The Higher Education Compliance Alliance Compliance Matrix, http://www.higheredcompliance.org/matrix/, provides a comprehensive look at key federal laws and regulations affecting colleges and universities. The matrix identifies more than 80 different
federal statutes.
The handbook provides departmental guidance for complying with the requirements of the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus
Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, commonly known as the Clery Act.
Colleges and universities are also subject to a host of state and local laws and regulations, which add significantly to the volume of
regulation, but are outside the scope of this report.
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adding to their workload. Similarly, estimates of the cost of complying with a new regulation may fail to take
into account the complicated interplay between new and existing requirements. Regulations do not exist
independently of each other, and the interplay of multiple requirements can add exponentially to the cost of
compliance.
For these and other reasons, attempts to systematically quantify these costs have been few and far
between. One early effort to estimate costs was undertaken by Stanford University in 1997. It estimated that
even by a conservative accounting, the university incurred about $29 million yearly in ongoing regulatory
compliance costs. Stated another way, Stanford spent 7.5 cents of every tuition dollar on compliance.12 Given
the increased volume of federal mandates, those costs are undoubtedly higher today.
A more comprehensive and recent effort to quantify these costs was undertaken by Hartwick College in
2011-12. A self-audit prepared over the course of a year at the direction of Hartwick’s president revealed
that for a modestly sized institution, compliance-related activities cost the college $297,008 annually13 and
required more than 7,200 labor hours for data collection and filing of required reports and forms.14 Hartwick
estimates that the actual cost of compliance could be as much as 7 percent of its non-compensation operating
budget. This study provides an important model that other colleges have used in their efforts to estimate the
costs of regulation.
Another far-reaching analysis was launched by Vanderbilt University in 2014. Initial findings reveal that
approximately 11 percent, or $150 million, of Vanderbilt’s 2013 expenditures were devoted to compliance
with federal mandates.15 Nearly 70 percent of these costs were absorbed into different offices, affecting a
broad swath of faculty, research staff, administrative staff, and trainees in academic departments. Vanderbilt is
currently working with other institutions to test its methodology on different campuses.
In addition to these institution-specific efforts, other research shows that the cost of institutional compliance
with regulations is rising, both monetarily and in terms of time. A recent publication by the American Action
Forum found that the number of individuals in higher education with the title of “compliance officer” has
grown by 33 percent in the past decade. Using publicly available data, the Forum also determined that institutions spend 26.1 million hours annually completing Department of Education-mandated forms.16 This figure
did not include regulatory burdens that go beyond completing forms, meaning, for example, that efforts like
the time required to develop and implement compliance policies were not considered.
Cass Sunstein, a former senior official in the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
observed that it is too easy to assume that regulations are a free good:
12

13

14

15
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Casper, Gerhard, “A Discussion with Members of the National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education,” October 16, 1997,
available at: http://web.stanford.edu/dept/pres-provost/president/speeches/971016collegecost.html.
See Zack-Decker, Kelly, “Compliance at Hartwick College: A Special Report to the President of the College,” Dec. 2012, pg. 4,
available at: http://www.naicu.edu/docLib/20130315_Compliance-HartwickColl-12-12.pdf.
It is important to remember that small to moderate size colleges and universities must create the same data collection, monitoring,
and reporting structures and mechanisms as larger institutions, even though this burden is spread over a smaller number of financial aid staff, institutional researchers, and other key administrators.
These estimates did not include regulations related to clinical activities, such as hospital-related expenditures at the Vanderbilt
University Medical Center.
Batkins, Sam, Chad Miller, & Ben Gitis, “Rising Tide of Education Rules Increases Costs,” April 30, 2014, available at: http://
www.americanactionforum.org/research/rising-tide-of-education-rules-increase-costs.

Report of the Task Force on Federal Regulation of Higher Education

11

“[W]e recognized (and this is a critical point, sometimes overlooked by progressive
groups) that when high costs are imposed on the private sector, it is not only some
abstraction called ‘business’ that pays the bill. Consumers may pay too, in the form
of higher prices…”17
Unfortunately, in the case of higher education, Sunstein’s observation has proven axiomatic. The costs
imposed by federal regulations are almost always passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. And
when costs are not passed on, there is likely to be a loss of services as resources are redirected toward compliance mandates.

Regulations Are Overly Complex
Regulatory complexity causes great uncertainty for colleges and universities. Lack of clear guidance is one
factor. Frequent issuance of sub-regulatory guidance by the Department, although intended to clarify, often
leads to further confusion. In addition, as a result of this uncertainty, and out of an abundance of caution,
institutions sometimes go beyond what is technically required in an attempt to avoid negative audit findings.
Every year, the Department identifies the most frequent problems encountered by institutions of higher
education in complying with student financial aid regulations. These findings have been consistent for several
years. Between 2010 and 2013, the top problems included the return of Title IV funds when a student withdraws (“R2T4”); verification of information provided by students and families on the Free Application for
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form; Pell Grant over- or underpayment; failure to resolve issues with student
credit balances; and errors associated with student loan exit counseling. These same errors occur on a regular
basis, year after year, even after frequent training and guidance from the Department. The consistency in the
list over time strongly suggests that these regulations are overly complex and present difficult compliance
challenges.
In at least one case, a guidance document meant to clarify uncertainty only led to more confusion. A 2011
“Dear Colleague” letter on Title IX responsibilities regarding sexual harassment contained complex mandates and raised a number of questions for institutions. As a result, the Department was compelled to issue
further guidance clarifying its letter. This took the form of a 53-page “Questions and Answers” document
that took three years to complete. Still, that guidance has raised further questions. Complexity begets more
complexity.18
In another case, Congress passed a law in 2012 that limited the eligibility for subsidized federal student loans
to 150 percent of a given program’s length. The concept is straightforward enough—a student enrolled in a
traditional four-year bachelor’s program would only be eligible for six years of subsidized loans. However, in
practice, implementation has been challenging. In particular, institutions must now track student borrowing
at an extremely granular “program” level. Unfortunately, it appears unlikely that the problems associated with
the implementation of this provision, including the resources necessary to comply, will be resolved anytime
soon.
17
18
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Sunstein, Cass. Simpler: The Future of Government, 2013, p. 8.
As another example of complex regulations leading to more complexity, since the issuance of the original regulations on “gainful
employment” in 2010, the Department has already issued more than 45 “Dear Colleague” letters, electronic announcements, and
other clarifications.
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Some Regulations Are Unrelated to Education, Student Safety, or Stewardship of Federal Funds
As leaders of institutions of higher education, we expect to be regulated in relation to the expenditure of
financial aid funds and for the health and safety of our students. However, an increasing amount of federal
oversight has little to do with these responsibilities and has more to do with pursuing broader governmental
goals.
To cite several obvious examples, Selective Service registration, detailed voter registration requirements, peerto-peer file sharing, and foreign gift reporting are unrelated to the central areas of federal concern in higher
education. While the policy objectives are worthwhile, the responsibility for pursuing them should not fall
to institutions. We believe, for example, that individuals should be held accountable for whether they register
with the Selective Service, not the college or university where they happen to be enrolled. Further, while
some rules may be tangentially related to higher education, such as disclosing institutional policies on candles
in dormitories and student vaccinations, they are not of sufficiently widespread interest to warrant a federal
mandate.
Such mandates can have a tangible economic impact. Compliance requires colleges and universities to
become expert in unfamiliar topics or to hire outside consultants with such expertise. That means redirecting
funds that could be better devoted to student success. Moreover, for some of these regulations, colleges and
universities must already meet state and local requirements on the same topic, making the federal requirements redundant.

The Department of Education Has an Increasing Appetite for Regulation
In recent years, the Department of Education has been especially active on the regulatory front. The significant growth in the volume and velocity of regulations at the Department has led some to question whether it
has exceeded its authority. The fact that this increase comes at a time when there have been very few statutory changes from Congress only heightens concerns about possible overreach. In recent years, negotiated
rulemaking sessions have addressed topics as varied as accreditation, college teacher preparation programs,
PLUS Loans, debit cards, gainful employment, state authorization, and the credit hour—all undertaken
solely at the Department’s initiative without any prior Congressional action. In several recent cases, federal
courts have ruled that the Department’s regulatory zeal had, indeed, exceeded its legal authority.
The creation of a federal definition of “credit hour” and the “gainful employment” regulations illustrate this
point. In the case of the credit hour, the Department created by fiat the first-ever federal definition of this
term. “Credit hour” is an academic term that varies by necessity across campuses and continues to evolve as
new learning modalities emerge. Recognizing the academic nature of this determination and the need to
preserve flexibility, Congress and previous Departments have wisely declined to specify a uniform federal
mandate. Nonetheless, and despite the unanimous opposition of higher education institutions, the Department imposed its definition in 2010.
Similarly, with respect to gainful employment,19 the Department first issued a complex and lengthy set of
rules on this topic in 2010. However, following a court challenge that struck down the Department’s pro19

Typically, “gainful employment” programs are certificate programs and other non-degree programs at public and nonprofit institutions and virtually all programs at for-profit institutions.
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posed metrics for judging gainful employment programs, it began a new negotiated rulemaking session. Final
regulations stemming from this second effort were issued in October 2014. The 2014 final rule is almost 950
pages long, including a 610-page preamble and more than 50 tables and charts. In deciding to proceed with a
second rulemaking on this topic, the Department was undeterred by both a federal court decision and by the
passage of legislation in the House of Representatives blocking further regulation in this area until Congress
considered the issue. We strongly support the goal of ensuring that programs of a vocational nature prepare
students for employment in the fields in which they study. However, in this case, the Department has used
the regulatory process to set its own policy agenda in the absence of any direction from Congress, and in the
face of clear opposition to that policy from one house of Congress.
The Department has also made frequent use of sub-regulatory guidance to impose requirements on institutions. Such guidance is extremely helpful when it provides needed clarity around technical issues and
addresses unintended consequences of various policies. However, it should not be used to create new mandates. And because sub-regulatory guidance lacks the formal opportunity for stakeholders to comment on
the proposed guidance, it is doubly important that this process be used sparingly.
For example, the Department of Education has opted to rely almost exclusively on sub-regulatory guidance
on Title IX as its preferred method for its oversight of institutions, a process that does not ensure robust feedback on and consideration of its proposals. In fact, the Department has not issued formal regulations on this
law in more than eight years.
In addition, the Clery Handbook instructs institutions to report crimes that occur during institutionsponsored stay-away trips. Practically speaking, this means that if an institution sends an intercollegiate sports
team out of town, it must report on all crimes that occur in rooms rented by the institution and in common
areas of the hotel during the students’ stay, regardless of whether the crimes affect students. Similar mandates
are placed on trips to international destinations, requiring institutions to obtain crime statistics from foreign
law enforcement agencies. The obligation to report on these trips cannot be found in any statute or formal
rule—instead, it comes from the handbook and a “Help Desk” email issued by a Department of Education
contractor.
These and other examples show that the Department uses regulation and sub-regulatory guidance to introduce changes in long-standing practices and, in doing so, impose new mandates. By operating in a vacuum,
with no guidance from Congress, it is unlikely that these requirements will reflect Congressional intent. Congress, of course, creates policy, and it is then incumbent on the Department to use regulations to effectuate
those policies—but not to use those processes to pursue its own policy objectives that go beyond the statute.

The Department of Education Does Not Act in a Timely Fashion
The Department has a challenging set of responsibilities, seeks to fulfill a broad mission, and serves a remarkable diversity of stakeholders. However, none of this is adequate justification for the Department’s inability or
unwillingness to act expeditiously. This problem presents itself in two ways.
First, the Department often fails to provide rules and guidance in a timely fashion, even when directed to do
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so by statute. For example, the HEA explicitly requires the Secretary of Education to issue final regulations
within 360 days of the date of enactment of any legislation affecting these programs.20 The Department
almost never meets this deadline.
As part of the Higher Education Opportunity Act, Congress mandated that the Department produce a
“compliance calendar” to assist institutions in complying with the Act’s various requirements. After six years,
the Department still has not published this calendar. We can only speculate what sanctions the Department
might apply to an institution that failed to make any effort to comply with the law for six years.
Second, the Department often takes years to resolve enforcement proceedings. Several examples are telling:
• In May 2013, Yale University was ordered to repay financial aid funds based on a Department of

Education audit undertaken in 1996. The University of Colorado received a similar demand based
on a 1997 audit. Even though the universities appealed in a timely fashion, it took 17 and 16 years,
respectively, for the Department to take action.
• In 2004, the Department investigated Yale for Clery Act reporting violations in 2001 and 2002—but

did not issue a fine until 2013.
• Following the mass shooting at Virginia Tech in April 2007, the Department conducted a program

review to determine whether the institution had complied with federal requirements under the Clery
Act. It was not until 2011—four years later—that the Department levied its first fines against the
institution. It is unclear what took the Department so long to conduct its investigation, especially
since it did not consult with a single institutional representative about the tragedy, nor did it ever visit
the campus.

Regulation Can Be a Barrier to Innovation
Excessive regulation can limit the ability of institutions to innovate in ways that benefit consumers. The
Department’s definition of credit hour, discussed above, is one such example. By relying on the concept of
“seat time,” the Department's definition has discouraged institutions from developing new and innovative
methods for delivering and measuring education, such as competency-based models.21
Another example is the Department’s policy regarding state authorization, which has discouraged institutional efforts to expand distance education offerings. Although the specific regulation was vacated by a
federal court, the Department continues to insist that institutions must meet state requirements in any state
where students reside as a condition of federal aid eligibility.22 This has led some institutions to restrict their
educational offerings in certain states, creating barriers for students in accessing higher education.
When Vanderbilt University attempted to expand its online programing, it encountered extensive authorization requirements in several states. The demands of North Carolina, for instance, were so onerous that
Vanderbilt simply stopped enrolling students from that state. Other institutions have discontinued out-of20
21

22

See 20 U.S.C. §1232(e).
Historically, credits for courses were assigned based on the assumption that students would spend two hours preparing for each
hour of in-class work. So a three credit-hour class assumed that, in the institution’s judgment, the student would spend six hours on
the class outside the classroom every week.
See question 7 in the Department’s July 27, 2012 “Dear Colleague” letter at http://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/attachments/
GEN1213Attach.pdf.

Report of the Task Force on Federal Regulation of Higher Education

15

state internship programs rather than seek costly state authorization.
Departmental actions have led some states to use the authorization process to generate revenue. For example,
in Minnesota, state regulators attempted to require Coursera—a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC)
provider—to register and pay a fee in order to provide free non-credit courses to Minnesota residents. After
significant public backlash, the state reversed its decision.
Finally, the Department’s failure to approve new programs in a timely way is also a barrier to innovation.
Publicly, the Department encourages the development of new programs that are relevant to current market
needs, and institutions are eager to respond. In practice, though, new program applications to the Department can languish for months even after earning necessary accreditation approvals. Even more frustrating,
the Department does not allow institutions to submit more than one new program request at a time, so one
pending application creates a complete bottleneck.
The bottom line is simply that many of the Department’s recent actions have had a chilling effect on institutions’ ability to respond creatively and flexibly to meet the evolving educational needs of their students and
surrounding communities.

The Department of Education Appears Indifferent to the Regulatory Burden It Imposes
It is easy for the Department to view regulation as a free good and overlook the costs that federal mandates
impose.23 While the Department is required to estimate the burden for every regulation, these estimates
rarely reflect the actual impact of a given rule.
An analysis prepared for the Task Force confirms these concerns.24 A sample of financial aid administrators
was asked to estimate the time spent complying with federal requirements in two areas: enrollment verification and satisfactory academic progress. Comparing their calculations to those of the Department suggested
that official estimates could be inaccurate by as much as 2.2 million hours.
A recent example can be found in the pending notice of proposed rulemaking on teacher education programs, published on December 3, 2014. According to the Department of Education, the total cost to states
and institutions to implement the proposed regulation over 10 years is between $42.0 and $42.1 million.
These estimates—given the extent and detail of the information being demanded—are almost certainly low.
The California State University, for example, extrapolating from its estimate of the costs to implement the
requirements at its own campuses, projected the nationwide 10-year costs at $312 million—or roughly eight
times the Department’s national estimate.25 Meanwhile, the state of California projected the cost of developing and implementing the new data system required to meet the regulatory requirements at $233 million for
the Golden State alone.26
The process by which the Department arrives at its estimates is totally opaque. While intimating that it
consults professionals in the field in developing its calculations, we have been unable to locate a single
institutional official who has ever been contacted by the Department for this purpose. Even more telling, we
23
24
25
26
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Congress can also be guilty of underestimating compliance costs.
See Carlo Salerno, The Challenges of Information Collection Burden in Higher Education, located in Appendix V.
See https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/BYoung_Teacher%20Prep%20NPRM_12-29-14.pdf.
See https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/Title%20II%20CA%20Memo.pdf.
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have been unable to locate any institutional official who has heard of anyone else ever being contacted for this
purpose. The Department has never publicly explained how it arrives at these costs in a fully transparent and
comprehensive fashion. It needs to do so.
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Section III: Specific Regulations of Concern
Some Department of Education regulations present much greater challenges for colleges and universities
than others. This section highlights some of the most problematic regulations according to campus officials.
We have grouped them into four broad categories: The first deals with student financial aid programs; the
second addresses institutional eligibility requirements to participate in the federal aid programs; the third
examines the complexity of rules surrounding student safety; and the final category deals with disclosures
provided to consumers. A more comprehensive list of problematic regulations that surfaced during our deliberations is included in an appendix to this report.

Verification of Student Eligibility for Financial Aid
Summary: Making sure that financial aid is awarded to students who are genuinely in need of such assistance
is of paramount importance, but current regulations, particularly in terms of verifying student eligibility, are
problematic. The process could be greatly streamlined if the Department moved with greater speed to fully
align verification with a targeted student-by-student approach, and if aid eligibility were based on “priorprior” year financial information.
Background: Ensuring the accuracy of student aid applications is a joint responsibility between the Department and the postsecondary institution where the student is enrolled. Under a heavily regulated process,
some data elements reported on the FAFSA that determine the student’s expected family contribution
must be verified. The Department of Education selects the applicants and specifies the data elements to be
confirmed. Then the institution verifies the accuracy of the data by collecting additional information from
families. This approach places primary responsibility on colleges and universities to ensure the accuracy of the
financial and household information submitted by students and their parents.
The Department extensively overhauled the regulations governing verification of student aid application
information in 2010, effective with the 2012-13 award year. The new process, focused on individual data
elements rather than forcing a review of entire applications, is designed to reduce the burden on applicants
and institutions. However, even under the new system, institutions continue to be responsible for ensuring
the accuracy of FAFSA data.
Many of the other problems associated with verification are related to timing and stem from the fact that
students and families are applying for federal aid while they are in the process of filing or finalizing their tax
returns for the prior tax year. Consider the following example: A student who applied for aid in early 2014
for the upcoming school year used tax filing records for 2013 that were not officially due until April 15, 2014,
and perhaps not actually finalized until well after that date. This timeline is very common, but student financial aid packages cannot be completed until the tax records are finalized. This means that those decisions may
be made very late in the enrollment process. The combination of these circumstances creates a situation that
might lead to errors or incomplete applications and would, therefore, generate a verification demand.
Recommendations: Modifying existing policy to use financial information from the “prior-prior” year would
minimize the need for a complex verification process. Such a move would allow applicants, the government,
and the institution to all use financial data already deemed accurate. Based on the above example, use of
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“prior-prior” financial data would have been based on 2012 income tax returns, and that information would
be in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) databases by the start of 2014, obviating the need to ask applicants
for their tax returns and creating more certainty about the aid package much earlier in a student’s decisionmaking process.
Alternatively, absent such a policy change, the Department could leverage its experience interacting with
the IRS in the online FAFSA process (acquiring tax return information from IRS systems via the IRS Data
Retrieval Tool) to reduce the administrative burden of verification on institutions and families. Indeed, the
federal government has the capability to ensure the accuracy of FAFSA data much more efficiently than the
current system, which requires an applicant to respond to his or her institution’s request for information.
Congress should consider whether verification should be done directly by the Department of Education.

Return of Title IV Funds (“R2T4”)
Summary: Title IV funds not "earned” by a student who withdraws must be returned to the government.
Unfortunately, the regulations needed to implement this simple mandate are extraordinarily complex. They
need to be simplified and clarified and individual institutions should be given more discretion in several
related areas.
Background: A student who withdraws from college before completing the period for which Title IV aid was
awarded is entitled to only a portion of those funds, based on the time that the student was actually in the
classroom. The remainder of the money must be returned to the federal government based on the percentage
of time the student was enrolled prior to withdrawing.
The most fundamental problem in the R2T4 process is determining whether and when the student actually
has withdrawn. Although some institutions take attendance, most do not. Existing rules make determining a
student’s withdrawal date and “last date of attendance” tremendously complicated for institutions that do not
take attendance. When attendance is not taken, a withdrawal date can be identified for students who follow
institutional procedures to officially withdraw. However, a date is more difficult to determine for students
who drop out without notifying the institution.
After a withdrawal date is determined, the institution can calculate the percentage of the enrollment period
that the student attended, and in turn, the percentage of aid “earned.” If a student received less aid than
“earned,” the college or university must determine whether any undisbursed aid is permitted to be disbursed.
But if a student received more aid than earned, the institution must determine who bears liability for returning the excess, or “unearned,” funds to the Title IV programs.
While summarized above in the simplest terms, the rules around R2T4 are tremendously complex, requiring
more than 200 paragraphs of regulatory text, supplemented by over 200 pages in the Federal Student Aid
Handbook. In 2011, two changes related to R2T4 required 25 additional “Q&As” on the Department’s website. While some of the guidance is a result of questions asked by institutions and their representatives, the
degree to which guidance has increased restrictions and decreased institutional discretion and flexibility has
made the R2T4 process extraordinarily complicated and prescriptive.
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Recommendations: While the basic concept underlying a prorated approach is certainly valid for R2T4, the
details need to be simplified, the meaning of “required to take attendance” needs to be more realistic, and
universities should be given more discretion. Students who simply leave without notifying the institution
should be subject to institutional policy, as long as that policy has been made clear to students.27
Given the complexity of this issue, we recommend that the Department of Education be required to report
to Congress on ways to make the R2T4 process less burdensome. The Department should also be required to
hold a dedicated R2T4 negotiated rulemaking session—limited to only that topic—with a view to starting
over and striving for simpler interpretations and more discretion for schools.

Financial Responsibility Standards
Summary: The Department of Education is responsible for making accurate assessments of institutions’
financial well-being. However, the agency has incorrectly interpreted and implemented the accounting definitions and standards used to calculate the financial responsibility composite scores for private nonprofit, and
for-profit institutions. It has also failed to follow the statutory requirement to consider the overall financial
health of an institution and has deemed institutions as failing based solely on these composite scores. These
policies need to be revised to promote greater transparency about the method by which the Department
reaches its determinations and a process that allows institutions to challenge them. This would include allowing schools to submit additional evidence of their overall financial health.
Background: The federal government has an obligation to ensure that colleges and universities that receive
student aid are financially healthy. The primary purpose of Section 498(c) of the HEA is to guard against the
harmful effects of the precipitous closure of postsecondary institutions for financial reasons. It was enacted
following the unannounced closure of several for-profit institutions in the late 1980s that damaged students
and taxpayers.
The current financial responsibility regulations were developed in 1996-97 with input from knowledgeable
accountants and support from the broader higher education community. The composite score formulas
remain, but the Department has not kept up with recent changes in accounting practices in applying them.
The failure to update these rules has forced colleges and universities to take costly and unnecessary steps to
demonstrate appropriate levels of financial responsibility.
Problems with the Department’s accounting methods were dramatically brought to light with the economic downturn that began in 2008. At that time, more than 100 private nonprofit institutions failed to
receive passing financial responsibility composite scores. A 2012 analysis of the reasons for the failure by the
National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU) found that Department of Education regulators were not using generally accepted accounting standards, as required by law, in calculating
the financial ratios from nonprofit institutions’ audited financial statements.28 As a result, well-performing
and financially stable institutions were subject to administrative and financial penalties, including having to
purchase expensive letters of credit to ensure their ability to receive financial aid.
27

28
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We should also note that federal statutes on this issue should be limited to undergraduates, and universities should be given flexibility to address problems that may arise for graduate students.
Report of the NAICU Financial Responsibility Task Force, November 2012. Available at: http://www.naicu.edu/docLib/20121119_
NAICUFinan.Resp.FinalReport.pdf.
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While the NAICU report identified several specific problem areas with the Department’s accounting practices, the one that became the most obvious amid the economic crisis was the mischaracterization of endowment losses. Financially viable schools failed because the Department treated the decline in endowment value
as an annual operating expense. As a result, some schools with significant endowments received lower scores
than schools with little or no endowments.
In a 2011 example, the Department did not take into account the “spendability” of one college’s temporarily
restricted net assets. The Department held that the college did not have access to endowment earnings to
cover current expenses because board approval would have been required.29 Despite the fact that its endowment was triple the size of its operating budget, the college had to spend $56,000 on a letter of credit to
address the situation. The institution in question has an operating budget of only $25 million and an enrollment of approximately 500 students.
In this case, the 200-year-old private liberal arts college, which had received passing financial responsibility
composite scores continually from the time that the current regulations took effect in the late 1990s, was
surprised to learn it had received a failing score from the Department of Education in 2011. It was even more
surprised when the Department retroactively changed the college’s 2010 score from passing to failing. Using
the Department’s own formula, the college’s independent auditor’s calculation showed the college actually
earned passing scores in both cases.
We are concerned that the financial responsibility standards are not meeting their statutory purpose. Moreover, in some instances, they are, in fact, harming well-performing and stable institutions by imposing financial costs associated with letters of credit and provisional Title IV eligibility status requirements, while failing
to help the Department identify financially unstable institutions that the standards are meant to target. For
example, in 2014, the Department failed to identify Corinthian Colleges’ financial weaknesses in a timely
fashion, resulting in the precipitous need to sell or close its campuses and creating massive uncertainty for
70,000 students.
Recommendations: The statutory language and the regulations for determining financial responsibility need
to be reviewed and, where needed, revised to ensure they clearly meet their intended purpose—that is, to
protect students and taxpayers against an institution’s precipitous closure.
Correcting problems with the financial responsibility process may require Congressional action. The actions
Congress can take include: requiring that institutions receive their composite scores in advance, creating a
process to appeal the Department’s determinations, establishing an advisory board of objective accounting
experts to provide technical assistance to the Department, and ensuring that the Secretary of Education is fully
implementing the legal requirement under Section 498(c)(3)(C) of the HEA to examine the “total financial
circumstances” of institutions that fail the ratios test before requiring letters of credit or taking other actions.
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Changes to the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act eased access to such assets, a development overlooked by
the Department.
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Institutional Accreditation
Summary: The Department has increasingly used the process by which it “recognizes” accrediting agencies as
a lever to insert itself into details of the accreditation process. This development greatly complicates accreditation’s quality assurance role and increases costs for institutions. Congress should reestablish proper boundaries for the Departmental oversight of institutional accrediting agencies and limit its interference in activities
that fall outside the authentic purposes of accreditation.
Background: Accreditation is a voluntary, non-governmental process designed to promote and enhance
student learning, improve institutional performance, and encourage educational innovation. It protects institutional autonomy and academic freedom while providing valuable information for self-improvement and
quality assurances for the public. Because accreditation is centered on the mission of each individual school,
it preserves the diversity of campuses that is a hallmark of American higher education.
Ever since the HEA was enacted in 1965, accreditation has played a gatekeeping function in federal financial aid eligibility; institutions must be accredited in order to participate in federal student aid programs. In
turn, accreditors must be recognized by the Secretary of Education on the basis of the standards and review
processes they apply to institutions.
Over the years, as public interest in institutional accountability has grown, the federal use of accreditation has
evolved in ways not always consistent with its fundamental characteristics and purposes. The Department has
increasingly imposed unnecessarily bureaucratic procedural requirements on accrediting agencies as part of
the recognition process. Rather than focusing on agencies’ reviews of activities related to educational quality,
the Department has created a checklist approach, often giving even the most mundane paperwork requirement almost the same weight and consideration as an accrediting agency’s overall ability to judge student
learning and academic quality.
Under current rules, accrediting agencies are tasked with reviewing activities and issues completely unrelated
to educational quality and student learning. For example, the Department requires accreditors to review
institutional compliance with fire safety codes, regardless of the fact that they have no expertise on this
matter. The Department also requires accreditors to review institutional compliance with Title IV regulations, even though the Department clearly has better tools and greater expertise for this purpose. Recent
regulations require accreditors to ensure that institutional credit hour determinations are consistent with
both a newly created federal definition and with commonly accepted practices. Tasking accreditors with these
additional functions leaves them less time and fewer resources to focus on institutional quality and student
learning.
Along with the Department, the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity
(NACIQI) reviews applications from accrediting organizations for recognition and offers recommendations
to the Secretary of Education. Many of the concerns about the Department’s intrusion into the accreditation process are manifested in its micromanagement of NACIQI, a body created by Congress to serve as an
independent advisory committee. The Department’s over-involvement in the everyday activities of accrediting bodies and of the accreditation process as a whole has bled over to NACIQI: The Department expects
NACIQI to follow equally extensive processes when reviewing accreditors for recognition.
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Recommendations: First, Congress and the Department should use accreditation primarily to hold institutions accountable for educational quality, student learning, and institutional innovation, the fundamental
purposes of accreditation. Clear boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate tasks for accreditors
should be re-established. For example, accreditors should not be tasked with things such as reviewing institutional compliance with fire codes and Title IV regulations.
Second, Congress and the Department should restore proper boundaries for the oversight of institutional
accrediting agencies through the recognition process. Over the years, the terms of recognition by the federal
government have become increasingly specific and compliance-oriented. The Department’s current tendency
to micromanage institutional and programmatic accreditors is unnecessary and undesirable. The bureaucratic,
prescriptive regulations surrounding recognition distract accreditors from the larger goals of accreditation
and undermine the ability of institutions to innovate.
Finally, the capacity of accreditors to conduct “differentiated reviews” needs to be clarified. There is disagreement as to whether accreditors have the legal authority to allow institutions that have records of exceptional
quality and performance to undergo a less arduous set of procedures and processes. Clarification of this
capacity would enable accreditors to focus on those institutions that need additional assistance and minimize
the burden on high-performing institutions. Congress should ensure that accreditors have the explicit authority to conduct differentiated reviews.30
Although it may be feasible to resolve many of the specific accreditation problems with a set of targeted fixes,
the role and place of accreditation in the federal eligibility process would benefit from a careful rethinking.
Over time, Congress and the Department have both assigned more tasks to accreditors, some of which they
are not well suited to perform. Educational quality, student learning, and responsible innovation are the areas
where accreditors can and should play the greatest role.

State Authorization of Distance Education Programs
Summary: On October 29, 2010, as part of its program integrity rulemaking package, the Department
issued final rules that inappropriately altered state authorization requirements on distance education programs. The regulations were scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2011, but were blocked by a federal court.31
Undeterred, the Department still seeks to implement policies that would fundamentally shift longstanding
procedures with respect to distance education. Congress should clarify that requirements on institutions to
meet state authorization requirements apply only to states in which an institution is physically located.
Background: Prior to the issuance of the 2010 regulation, it was considered well-settled law that federal
requirements for state authorization were limited to the state where the institution was physically located.
The Department’s 2010 plan would have required institutions to be authorized by every state in which a
single student was located.32 This marked a fundamental shift in policy, and one that has since proven to be
enormously controversial and burdensome.
30
31
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This is an example of a “risk-informed” regulatory approach that is discussed in more detail in Section IV.
Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities (APSCU) v. Duncan, D.D.C. July 12, 2011.
See 34 C.F.R. 600.9 (c): “If an institution is offering postsecondary education through distance or correspondence education to
students in a State in which it is not physically located or in which it is otherwise subject to State jurisdiction as determined by
the State, the institution must meet any State requirements for it to be legally offering postsecondary distance or correspondence
education in that State.”
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Even though the rule was blocked, it nonetheless has had an effect. Many states now regard federal Title
IV state authorization requirements as a revenue generator, and the cost to institutions can be quite high.
A public institution with a well-established online program estimated the costs at nearly $800,000. One
private institution has estimated that it will cost $290,000 and take up to 2,000 hours annually to deal with
the changes. The regulation has led some schools to restrict both online offerings in certain states and critical
experiences, such as internship opportunities, clinical rotations, and student teaching—all of which hurt
students.
This fundamental shift in policy was done without any guidance from Congress. In 2012, a federal appellate
court upheld the original decision to vacate the regulation due to the Department’s failure to properly give
notice of this issue in its pending notice of proposed rulemaking and provide stakeholders with a meaningful
opportunity to comment on the policy.33 Despite the court’s ruling, the Department continues to pursue this
policy.34
For example, state authorization for distance education was included as a topic for its 2013-14 program
integrity negotiated rulemaking. At the session, negotiators were shocked to see that the Department’s
distance education rules had ballooned from the two sentences originally proposed in 2010 to more than 14
paragraphs. It is unclear when a proposed rule will be published for comment.
Recommendation: Consistent with long-standing interpretation, Congress should clarify that federal
requirements on institutions to meet state authorization requirements apply only to the state in which
an institution is physically located. States may elect to place additional requirements on institutions that
serve students in their state through distance education, and indeed several states have already done so. The
Department should be prohibited from publishing regulations on this topic.

Uniform Definitions of Clery Crimes
Summary: The Clery Act requires institutions to report incidents using definitions that can conflict with
the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) definitions and the updated National Incident-Based Reporting
System (NIBRS), creating confusion for campus law enforcement. To improve uniformity and effectiveness in reporting crime statistics under the Clery Act, the Department should rely on the expertise of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to establish common definitions for crimes, and Clery Act reporting should be
consistent with these definitions.
Background: The Clery Act, enacted in 1990, has an important goal: to improve safety on campus. The impetus for the law was the rape and murder of Jeanne Clery, a Lehigh University freshman, in her dorm room by
a fellow student. Under the law, colleges and universities must, among other things, count and report crimes
that occur on campus and publish an Annual Security Report to advise students accordingly. We support the
dissemination of this important safety information. Over time, however, burgeoning reporting requirements
and policy disclosures added to this legislation have become onerous and confusing, diverting institutional
resources away from student safety and toward compliance reporting.
33
34
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See question 7 in the Department’s July 27, 2012 “Dear Colleague” letter at http://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/attachments/
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The Clery Act has been expanded to require institutions to report on a number of incidents that are not
"crimes" under the DOJ’s UCR program or NIBRS. Without a single and consistent form for reporting,
campus officials spend significant time attempting to determine whether and how a particular incident
should be reported in the Annual Security Report required by Clery. In addition, conflicting definitions and
determinations, based on incidents that are not crimes outside of Clery reporting requirements, result in
inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data and mean that campus crime statistics cannot be compared with
crime statistics gathered from other state and local law enforcement agencies across the country, as the law
intended.
For example, both the Clery Handbook and the UCR handbook define “burglary” and “larceny-theft” over
a number of pages by the use of examples. However, because the guidance varies in important ways, incidents
with particular fact patterns are classified as burglary under one system and larceny under another. Adding to
the confusion, under Clery, institutions do not report larcenies unless they occur as part of a hate crime. They
are only required to report burglaries.
Task Force staff visited with safety officials from several campuses to discuss this confusion. The police officers were asked, “If someone were to come into the room and steal a laptop, would that be a burglary or a larceny under Clery?” Intense debate ensued, and no consensus was reached among the various campus security
officials about how it should be classified for the Department of Education. By contrast, there was instant and
unanimous agreement that the theft would be classified as a larceny for purposes of the UCR.
In addition, the 2013 amendments to the Violence Against Women Act require institutions to report on
stalking, domestic violence, and dating violence, none of which are defined in the UCR as crimes. As a result
of this statutory change and the 2014 regulations issued by the Department, universities must deal with two
issues: Reporting on incidents that are crimes only under the Clery Act, and using Department of Education definitions for crime reporting that vary significantly from state law. Stalking, for example, is normally
defined as a crime in state statutes, but the definitions vary across jurisdictions and do not match the definition in the new regulations released by the Department. Domestic violence is referenced in many state laws
but not normally as a standalone crime. Dating violence is absent from virtually all state criminal statutes.
Thus, campus safety officers must now interpret incidents not listed in the UCR as crimes for Clery purposes,
and they must use federal definitions that can conflict with their own state laws. Given this complexity,
reporting errors are inevitable.
Campus law enforcement officials rely on training they receive regarding UCR/NIBRS crime reporting and
their home state’s definitions of crimes. When the Clery requirements for reporting crimes stray from these
conventions, campus officials must spend substantial extra time trying to determine how to report the crime
properly for the Department’s purposes. Each time the Department or Congress deviates from the UCR/
NIBRS framework, Clery crime reporting becomes less consistent and less accurate, statistics become more
difficult to compare to local and national crime data, and the time officials need to spend on compliance—
instead of patrolling—increases.
Recommendations: The federal government should rely on the expertise of the Department of Justice in
creating the standard definitions for crimes, and the Clery Act should require reporting on crimes as they
are defined in the UCR or NIBRS. This would allow for statistics that are comparable across institutions
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and provide useful information to consumers, while also ameliorating the need for campus police to juggle
competing definitions of crimes.
If Congress believes campuses should report on other “crimes” that are not currently a part of the UCR or
NIBRS, it should instruct DOJ to modify the UCR/NIBRS to include these definitions. This would ensure
that new crime definitions would be developed by experts in law enforcement and crime reporting protocols,
and would provide a common definition for both local police and campus security officials.

Timely Warnings About Threats to Campuses
Summary: The Clery Act mandates that colleges and universities send out Timely Warnings to the campus
community to notify students and employees about “serious or continuing” safety threats based on reported
crimes. However, in order for these warnings to be most effective, institutions need greater deference about
when they are appropriate and what information they should include.
Background: Each school must have a Timely Warning notification process for Clery crimes considered by
the institution to be a serious or continuing threat to other students and employees that occur anywhere in
the boundaries defined by the Clery Act. To aid in the prevention of similar occurrences, such warnings must
be issued “as soon as the pertinent information is available.” Warnings are typically issued via email or text
message and are posted on campus web pages.35
The Timely Warning notification process can be an important tool for helping ensure safety on campus.
Unfortunately, however, the Department’s regulations and guidance surrounding Timely Warnings has created substantial confusion, which can undercut the student safety purpose they were designed to serve.
Two specific points in this area are important. First, there is lack of clarity about the conditions constituting a
“continuing threat” that would warrant a Timely Warning. As a result, many institutions issue Timely Warnings in an abundance of caution, concerned about a retrospective audit finding. That can render certain notifications moot—some Timely Warnings are issued even if the perpetrator of the event in question has already
been apprehended or has been suspended and banned from campus. Furthermore, it can be nearly impossible
to issue a warning that is truly “timely” when a reportable crime happens on noncampus property—often,
institutions do not learn of these incidents for several days or weeks. Because institutions are concerned about
the Department issuing fines in hindsight, seemingly without acknowledging the circumstances at the time,
they often send out notices they feel are not necessary, such as the instances noted above. Campus security
officials fear that too-frequent issuance of Timely Warnings creates “warning fatigue,” a condition where
students and staff become somewhat inured to these alerts because they receive so many of them.36
Second, the rules around timing are not clear: How quickly must the warnings be released in order to be
35

36
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The Clery Act requires institutions to have two separate procedures to notify a campus community of potential dangers. In
addition to the Timely Warning process, each institution must also have an Emergency Notification procedure, used for dangerous
situations that may threaten the health or safety of the campus community. Such notifications are issued “immediately upon confirmation that a dangerous situation or emergency exists or threatens” and are sent via text, email, siren or alarm systems, and campus
bulletins. This discussion only relates to the Timely Warning requirement.
For example, see “Students, Faculty Don’t Always React Quickly to Emergency Alerts,” by Jake New, Inside Higher Ed, December
9, 2014, available at: https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/12/09/students-faculty-dont-always-react-quickly-emergency-alerts.
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compliant with the rules? Despite good faith efforts on the part of colleges and universities to get important messages out to the campus community expeditiously, the Department second-guesses the judgment of
campus officials and appears to have unreasonable expectations. Virginia Tech’s Timely Warning was issued
two hours after the initial shooting on campus in April 2007, as soon as the university was able to verify the
relevant facts, and the Department found the university in violation of the Clery Act because that was not
fast enough.37 Sometimes, there can be negative consequences when notifications are released too quickly. In
at least one case, a Timely Warning tipped off a potential perpetrator of a sexual assault on campus that an
investigation was under way, thereby interfering with an investigation by local police. In that case, the Timely
Warning strained the relationship between campus police and local law enforcement authorities. Another
institution sent a Timely Warning after a tragic incident involving the death of a student in an off-campus
homicide. Even though the primary suspect was in custody, a notification including the name of the deceased
was released so quickly that family members had not yet been informed. By forcing institutions to issue warnings before they are ready, the Department undermines standards of good police work.
Recommendations: Campus law enforcement should have clear authority to use their own expert judgment
to determine when a serious or continuing threat exists and when they have the appropriate information to
issue a Timely Warning. The Department, except in cases of clear negligence, should give deference to the
judgment of the law enforcement professionals who implement these rules on campus day in and day out, and
it should acknowledge good faith efforts by institutions to protect their campus communities by appropriately informing them of safety threats.

Definition of “Noncampus Property”
Summary: The definition of "noncampus property" is unclear and overly broad, and should be narrowed to
make it more meaningful and useful.
Background: The Clery Act requires colleges and universities to report the crimes that occurred on campus
in an Annual Security Report. They also must report incidents occurring on “noncampus property,” defined
as a building or property owned or controlled by an institution and used in direct support of or in relation to
the institution’s educational purpose. However, this broad definition has created enormous confusion, and
guidance from the Department has created many instances where institutions have had to spend considerable time obtaining information from third parties, such as hotels abroad and police departments across the
country and around the world.
Guidance from the Department both in the Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting and subsequent directives indicate that colleges and universities must report crimes that happen in any building or
property they rent, lease, or have any written agreement to use (including an informal agreement, such as one
that might be found in a letter, email, or hotel confirmation). Even if no payment is involved in the transaction, any written agreement regarding the use of space gives an institution “control” of the space for the
time period specified in the agreement. The handbook requires colleges and universities to disclose statistics
for crimes that occur during the dates and times specified in the agreement, including the specific area of a
37

That determination was ultimately overturned and Virginia Tech was fined under a different, albeit equally flawed, rationale. Please
also note that the Emergency Notification requirement was not included in the law until 2008, largely as a result of these tragic
events.
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building used (e.g., the third floor and common areas leading to the spaces used, such as the lobby, hallways,
stairwells, and elevators). Department guidance mandates that schools report on study abroad locations
when the school rents space for students in a hotel or other facility, and on locations used by an institution’s
athletic teams in successive years (e.g., the institution uses the same hotel every year for the field hockey team’s
away games).
As a consequence, institutions must attempt to collect crime data from dozens, if not hundreds, of locations
where students may reside or study for short periods of time if the institution uses the space in successive
years or if students are present there for what the Department calls a “stay of long duration.” (While advising
campuses that they must report stays of “long duration,” the Department has not offered a definition of this
term.)
The result is that institutions expend significant time and resources tracking these myriad locations and
gathering crime data annually, only to have to settle for incomplete data. One institution has indicated that
it requests data from 69 police departments, covering 348 locations in 13 states and five countries, including
police at airports and on military bases. The mandate that colleges and universities must collect data from
foreign entities is particularly troublesome. Apart from the administrative burdens that such regulations
create, many foreign law enforcement authorities often simply ignore requests from institutions. In response
to one such request, a foreign government accused a U.S. institution of espionage.
Because noncampus crime statistics are reported in the aggregate (a single number), the data provide little
useful information for consumers. For example, when the Annual Security Report states that “four burglaries” took place in a noncampus location last year, a prospective student or parent has no way of knowing
whether that crime occurred in a research facility on an island in the South Pacific, at a building the institution rents across town, at a study abroad location, or at an off-campus sorority house. Clarification of what
data must be collected—and, particularly, why they are important to collect, what value they will provide and
to whom, and how they should be reported—could improve current practices.
Recommendation: The definition of "noncampus property" should be clarified and narrowed to focus more
directly on property that is a core part of a college or university. At a minimum, it should exclude all foreign
locations38 as well as short-term stays in domestic hotels.

Consumer Information
Summary: Institutions of higher education overload consumers with an enormous amount of federally
mandated information. Some of it is useful, and some of it is relatively trivial. Congress and the Department
should ensure that the required information is of interest to a significant number of consumers.
Background: Institutions of higher learning are required to collect and disclose increasing amounts of
information to students and prospective students. The goal is admirable—to equip students and families with
valuable information about an institution. Too often, however, meeting current requirements means that
institutions provide considerable information that is of marginal value or very limited interest.39
38
39
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Some universities have branch campuses overseas. Clery Act reporting is appropriate for those foreign locations.
Ben-Shahar, Omri. More Than You Ever Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 2014.
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A few examples from the current list of requirements illustrate this point. Universities must disclose the number of supervised fire drills they hold in a given year. They must publish more than 30 gainful employment
disclosures for each program they offer. In addition, institutions must counsel departing student borrowers on
any of the seven different federal loan repayment programs applicable to them, even though the vast majority
of borrowers use either the standard 10-year or the extended 30-year program. Despite the extensive counseling they receive, few borrowers understand the differences among the various income-based repayment
programs.
Even well-intentioned efforts by the government to provide information may overload consumers. The
Department has encouraged colleges and universities to adopt the Financial Aid Shopping Sheet, which was
designed as a consumer tool to simplify the data that incoming students receive about costs and financial
aid. Unfortunately, this initiative has proven extremely confusing for students, and the material provided is
largely irrelevant for graduate and professional students.
In addition to sometimes receiving too much information, consumers are also often given information that is
not very accurate or meaningful. For example, the “graduation rate” of an institution as defined by the federal
government takes into account only first-time, full-time students who remain at their initial institution. This
means that part-time students and transfer students are not counted. Most beginning college students are not
first-time, full-time students, especially at community colleges and for-profit institutions. Even at four-year
institutions, the federal graduation rate may not be meaningful—as one example, IPEDS graduation data do
not capture approximately one-third of all graduates from the University of North Carolina system.
Recommendation: Congress and the Department should make sure that information and data being collected from institutions and provided to consumers will actually be useful before imposing additional
information and data requirements. We encourage Congress and the Department to carefully test any new
disclosures before they are imposed.
Focus group testing, for example, might help distinguish information that consumers really need from that
which is merely trivial. However, the OMB has interpreted the use of focus groups with 10 or more persons
as an information collection request, meaning that each time an agency seeks to use such a focus group, it
would require a lengthy OMB approval process. Congress should encourage the OMB to grant categorical
approvals for such requests to prevent unnecessary delays in the use of focus groups.
Finally, institutions should not be subjected to new information collection requirements from Congress
or the Department when the same or substantially similar information is already in the possession of other
federal agencies. Instead, the Department should be required to work with other federal agencies to obtain
the necessary information.

Regulations Unrelated to Education, Safety, or Stewardship
Summary: Many federal regulations have little or nothing to do with educating students, protecting them
on campus, or ensuring proper stewardship of federal funds. These requirements should be reviewed with an
eye to determine whether they should be struck so that limited resources can be focused on more important
efforts.
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Background: Policy makers have increasingly relied on colleges and universities and, in particular, eligibility
for federal student aid, as a way to pursue policy goals that are entirely outside of higher education’s purview.
While these goals may be desirable, the question remains whether it is appropriate to use colleges as the
means to achieve them and whether the purported benefits outweigh the costs imposed on institutions and
ultimately students. Although the demands of any one requirement may be modest, as a collection they divert
attention and resources. Among many other examples that we could cite, the following list is representative:
• Selective Service. In order to be eligible for federal financial aid, male applicants must have registered

with the Selective Service before the age of 26. If there is a discrepancy in terms of whether an applicant has met the registration requirements, the burden falls on institutions to reconcile the difference.
Student financial aid officers should not be tasked with enforcing this requirement.
• Link between drug convictions and Title IV eligibility. Under the HEA, a student convicted of some

drug offenses while receiving federal student aid can lose eligibility to receive aid.40 At its core, this
provision represents an inappropriate attempt to address an unrelated broader social issue through the
student financial aid process. Moreover, while drastically increasing the complexity of the application
process for those individuals involved, the provision has very little impact and affects only a handful
of students every year.
• Voter registration. Institutions are required to distribute a voter registration form, in a federally spec-

ified timeframe and format, to each student enrolled and physically in attendance at the institution.
We strongly support civic participation, especially voting. However, this is an overly prescriptive
requirement with a modest benefit at best.
• Foreign gift reporting. Under a provision added to the HEA in 1986, institutions are required to

report gifts or contracts from a foreign source (government, company, or individual) that total more
than $250,000 or that are conditional gifts of any amount.41 While there may be some who take a
keen interest in such donations, this information is not of widespread interest. In many cases, there are
other ways to locate this information, such as through public information and open records laws.
• Peer-to-peer file sharing. Colleges and universities are required to have institutional policies concern-

ing illegal file sharing, educate students on the laws and the penalties of such actions, and have explicit
plans to combat unauthorized distribution of copyrighted material.42 Advances in technology, such
as the prevalence of legal and low-cost options for downloading music and movies, have made this
requirement obsolete.
• Vaccination policies. Institutions must disclose their vaccination policies in order to be eligible for

Title IV funding.43 While arguably related to student health, information about an institution’s policy
does not make students any safer, and is unlikely to be a consideration for any prospective students or
parents when they select a college.
Recommendations: Congress should use the upcoming HEA reauthorization as an opportunity to review
all the Act’s provisions, identify the federal purpose behind their inclusion, and strike requirements that are
40
41
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See 20 U.S.C. §1091(r)(1).
See 20 U.S.C. §1101f.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(P); 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(29).
See 20 U.S.C. §1092(a)(1)(V).
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not clearly related to the core mission and responsibilities of higher education. Congress and the Department
should refrain from regulating in these areas and give colleges and universities more latitude to determine the
most effective way to deliver information to students and families.
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Section IV: Recommended Improvements in the Regulatory Process
Effective and efficient regulations are critical to ensuring that federal resources for higher education are used
in the intended manner and that students and taxpayers are protected. How those rules are framed, implemented, and enforced is of critical importance. Effective regulatory systems are predicated on several elements, including clear and comprehensible rules, accurate estimates of costs and burdens associated with the
regulations, clear safe harbors, and recognition when institutions have made good faith efforts.
In Section III, we highlighted some of the regulations we find most problematic and suggested solutions.
However, even if the problems with individual rules are addressed, higher education will continue to face
problems with the Department of Education’s efforts absent further action to change the processes by which
those regulations are created and enforced.
The regulatory process can be divided into three distinct phases: development, implementation, and enforcement. The Task Force believes that changes are needed in each of these areas. Accordingly, we have identified
a number of different ways to improve each phase. We discuss these ideas further in this section, and we
provide other process reform ideas in a chart appended to this report.44

Development of Formal Regulations at the Department
All federal agencies must follow the processes prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in
developing formal regulations.45 Among other requirements, the APA mandates that an agency provide the
public an opportunity to participate in its rulemaking activities, a step known as “notice and comment.”46
Once a rule is in place, agencies often provide supplemental, sub-regulatory guidance when they believe more
clarification is needed but does not require public participation.
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 provides agencies the option to supplement (but not replace)
APA requirements for rulemaking by conducting a process known as “negotiated rulemaking.”47 Negotiated
rulemaking is a way to bring an agency together with various interest groups affected by its regulations for
the purpose of discussing—and ideally reaching agreement on—the text of a proposed rule before it is issued.
While the use of negotiated rulemaking by agencies is typically optional, the HEA requires the Department
of Education to use it when proposing modifications or establishing new regulations for programs authorized
under Title IV of the HEA. The Department of Education is the only federal agency that must routinely use
this process.
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We noted at the beginning of the report that “regulations” should be viewed broadly, inclusive of requirements beyond those emanating from formal regulations issued by the Department. While we are deeply appreciative of Congress’ long history of support
for higher education, we must acknowledge that it shares responsibility for creating some of the regulatory problems faced by
institutions. In the process reform discussion that follows, therefore, while most of our recommendations are framed in the context
of the Department, some apply equally well to Congress.
See 5 U.S.C. §§500 et seq.
See 5 U.S.C. §553.
See 5 U.S.C. §§561–570a.
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Recommendations to Improve the Development of Regulations
• The methods by which individuals are selected to participate as negotiators and the use of facilitators

in the negotiated rulemaking process should be improved.
As noted above, negotiated rulemaking is a mandatory step in the process through which regulations related
to student financial aid programs are developed and issued. When first adopted by the Department of Education during the 1990s, the process was less controversial than it has become in the last decade. More recently,
the process has devolved to a point where the Department uses it as a lever to pursue its own policy objectives
rather than as a channel to work with relevant stakeholders and to achieve workable regulations.
One of the most pressing problems with the Department’s current approach is the process through which
it selects negotiators. The original intent was that stakeholders would select their own representatives, and
when negotiated rulemaking was first implemented, this is what happened. In recent years, however, the
Department has been more involved in the selection process, choosing individuals to serve, including both
a primary and alternate member for each constituency represented. This has proven problematic in several
respects. First, this approach tends to create either double representation or, in some cases, incompatible representatives. Second, constituencies too often feel ill-represented. For example, a staff member who happens
to work at a four-year public institution should not be chosen by the Department to represent the views of all
public four-year institutions unless the individual has the clear authority to represent the views of that sector.
By handpicking individuals it would like to talk with, the Department simplifies its workload but also undermines a key premise of negotiated rulemaking—that those parties with a clear interest have their own voice.
At a minimum, the Department of Education should return to its original practice for selecting negotiators.
Another problem with the Department’s approach to negotiated rulemaking is the selection and role of facilitators. As the individuals charged with running the negotiating sessions, facilitators should serve as guardians
of the process. Unfortunately, that is not the case. In recent years, the Department has given facilitators a
limited role, with little authority to resolve differences that arise. This part of negotiated rulemaking should
also return to its original purpose, which involved facilitators who served as arbiters of fairness and who use
their skills to help achieve consensus not by encouraging a particular substantive outcome, but by being more
active in exploring areas of agreement.
• The “bundling” of unrelated issues into a single negotiated rulemaking should be discontinued.

The “bundling” of unrelated issues for consideration during a single negotiated rulemaking has become a serious problem. More specifically, the Department has too often grouped a host of unrelated issues into a single
panel, choosing negotiators on a disparate set of issues and thus creating situations in which only a small
number of negotiators are knowledgeable enough to engage on any given issue. In such cases, a very small
number of negotiators may determine the outcome of rules with broad public policy implications.
The February-May 2014 negotiated rulemaking on “Program Integrity” illustrates this point. A single negotiating committee was tasked with reaching consensus on, among other issues, “cash management” of Title
IV funds; state authorization of distance education programs; state authorization of institutions with foreign
locations; “clock-to-credit-hour” conversion; the definition of “adverse credit” for borrowers in the PLUS
Loan Program; and the retaking of courses. Given the range of individuals needed for such a panel, it was not
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surprising that most negotiators were knowledgeable about a limited number of these issues. It was even less
surprising that no consensus was reached on the regulatory package.
The upshot of these practices is that the Department exercises an extremely high degree of control over the
entire process, not only selecting all the committee members and limiting the role of the facilitators, but
also doing all the drafting and taking a very strict view of what constitutes a consensus. These and additional
concerns about the Department’s process for negotiated rulemaking and other ways to improve the process
are explored in a white paper appended to this report.
• Congress should ask the Government Accountability Office to review the Department of Education’s

methodology for estimating the burdens and costs that institutions will incur in meeting the requirements of regulations, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act, and make recommendations for
improvement.
By law, any federal agency that proposes a new regulation or revises an existing one must estimate the burdens
and costs the rule will impose on the regulated entities. The higher education community believes that the
Department of Education consistently and substantially underestimates the costs and burdens of its rules.
Various groups, including the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators and the Congressionally created Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, have raised concerns about the
processes through which the Department derives estimates associated with its regulations.
The Government Accountability Office should be asked to examine the Department’s processes and make
recommendations that at least would make them less opaque. It should also retrospectively review the
Department’s estimates for a sample of regulations after implementation. Assuming such a review would
identify areas for reform, the Government Accountability Office should make appropriate recommendations.
Additional ideas about how to address concerns about the burden- and cost-estimating processes at the
Department are explored in a white paper appended to this report.
• Clear regulatory safe harbors should be created in order to ensure a level of certainty for institutions.

The Department’s requirements are so complicated in many areas that it is impossible for colleges and universities to be certain they are in compliance, even when they take carefully considered steps they believe are necessary. Clear safe harbors—provisions in the law that will protect institutions from liability as long as certain
conditions have been met—should be established to help institutions meet their compliance obligations.48
Safe harbors currently exist in other areas of law that apply to institutions of higher education. For example,
colleges and universities hiring foreign nationals through the H-1B visa program must pay those individuals wages that are equal to or higher than the prevailing wage in the occupations for which they were hired.
If an institution uses Department of Labor-determined prevailing wage levels, it has a safe harbor against
challenges to its prevailing wages. The federal “deemed export” rules prohibit certain individuals from
receiving controlled information and/or controlled technologies without the required license(s), exception,
or exemption, even if those individuals are otherwise authorized to work within the United States. However,
48
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Definition adapted from Black’s Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary, 2nd ed., available at: http://thelawdictionary.org/
safe-harbor/.
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the “fundamental research exclusion” creates a safe harbor from such requirements.49 In addition, under the
terms of a government-wide policy, entities that receive federal funds above a certain amount must undertake
an independent audit annually. This process, commonly referred to as an A-133 audit, was designed as a safe
harbor against excessive audits by federal agencies.
Congress should instruct the Department to make use of safe harbors whenever possible.
• The Department should not exceed legislative language or Congressional intent when issuing regula-

tions.
According to the basic tenets of administrative law, Congress passes laws, and it is up to the agencies to
implement them. However, in recent years, the Department has increasingly used the regulatory process not
in response to any specific legislative change enacted by Congress, but rather as a means to achieve its own
policy objectives. Some of the increase in agency activity may result from gridlock in Congress. But regardless
of its cause, without clear guidance from Congress about the policy direction to be pursued, the resulting
regulations are often poorly designed.
As noted earlier, in 2010, absent any legislative mandate, the Department created a regulatory definition of
“credit hour.” Not surprisingly, the definition has proven problematic. “Credit hour” is an academic term
that varies somewhat across campuses and continues to evolve as new learning modalities emerge. Congress
has recognized the danger of having the Department define such concepts and explicitly prohibits it from
intruding into academic matters.50 The Department simply ignored the views of non-federal participants at
the negotiated rulemaking session—all of whom opposed this step.
A second example is the Department’s attempt, starting in 2010, to implement a new and very complicated
set of regulations designed to enhance accountability for “gainful employment” programs. We share the goal
of ensuring that taxpayer money supporting these programs is well spent. However, based on a two-word
phrase that has been part of the HEA for more than 40 years, the Department has created a highly complex
set of new reporting requirements and metrics. We believe that by failing to regulate based on clear direction
from Congress, the resulting process has been fundamentally flawed and has unnecessarily created heavy
regulatory burdens.
The problem of agency overreach is not limited to rulemaking—it also appears in sub-regulatory guidance.51
“Dear Colleague” letters and similar guidance may provide technical assistance to institutions and assist
them in their compliance efforts, but they should not be used to create new substantive legal obligations. For
example, guidance from the Department has created a new obligation on institutions to report Clery crimes
that occur during overnight trips, even though there is nothing in statutory or regulatory language to suggest
this expansive reading is warranted.
49
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Fundamental research means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published
and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development,
design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security
reasons. See: http://www.ucop.edu/ethics-compliance-audit-services/compliance/international-compliance/on-campus-research-with-foreign-nationals.html.
See 20 U.S.C. §1232a.
As discussed in the following section, the use of sub-regulatory guidance to achieve agency policy goals is doubly problematic since
it prevents stakeholders from commenting on the new policy before it is issued.
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• The Department should not make significant changes in policy without following the APA’s notice and

comment procedures.
The APA’s notice and comment procedures are a valuable, time-tested tool for developing good regulations.52
Soliciting public comments and incorporating this feedback ensures that the agency has considered a wide
range of viewpoints and allows for the opportunity to address unanticipated consequences before the regulation is finalized. When developing formal regulations, the Department is usually careful to follow the APA’s
requirements. However, as it increasingly turns to sub-regulatory guidance to pursue its policy goals, the
agency often imposes significant new requirements without the benefits afforded by the notice and comment
process. The Department should always use the notice and comment process. If, in rare circumstances, it
determines it cannot, it should articulate a reasonable basis for dispensing with it.
The history of Title IX regulations at the Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is illustrative. In the
more than 40 years since passage of Title IX, the Department has promulgated formal regulations on only
three occasions: once, in 1975, when it issued the first set of regulations implementing the statute, and on
two other occasions, in 2000 and 2006, when it issued technical clarifications on discrete issues. Since 2006,
the Department has relied exclusively on OCR sub-regulatory guidance to create new Title IX requirements
for institutions, with the 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter being the most frequently cited example. While OCR
strenuously maintains that the letter does not add requirements to applicable law, the reality is that these
standards impose serious additional responsibilities and break new policy ground. To be clear, the issue is not
the substance of the requirements—colleges and universities must maintain a safe learning environment for
all students free from discrimination. Rather, it is that OCR, through sub-regulatory guidance, has created
new enforcement standards without any opportunity for public comment.
The Department’s policies would be better informed and more effective with the benefit of formal comments
from all interested parties. Therefore, it is critical that Congress ensure that agencies follow the procedures set
forth in the APA so that the public is given a meaningful opportunity to comment before new mandates are
imposed.

Implementation of Regulations at the Department
Once the regulations have been finalized, colleges and universities implement them. The Department uses
many tools, including “Dear Colleague” letters, electronic announcements, handbooks, FAQs, and help desks
to further explain its interpretation of the rules and provide assistance as institutions come into compliance.
As noted earlier, when sub-regulatory guidance exceeds legislative intent and creates new standards and
requirements without public comment, the result can be problematic. However, when used properly, subregulatory guidance can be an important aid to institutions in their implementation efforts.
For example, the Office of Federal Student Aid offers technical advice to financial aid administrators via
hotlines. This provides a valuable resource for institutions regarding the complex administration of federal
student aid. Because the hotlines are not used for enforcement purposes, campus officials are more likely to
52
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The “notice and comment” process has been adopted by a number of other countries, including China. Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
“Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Comes to China,” Administrative and Regulatory Law News 32(1): 5-6, fall 2006, available at:
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/ch_Lubbers-Administrative_comment.pdf.
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seek out this assistance, which leads to better compliance. We believe that this type of technical assistance is
an important way to assist institutions with their implementation efforts.

Recommendation to Improve the Implementation of Regulations
• Congress should require the Department to publish the compliance calendar and update it every year

as mandated by the Higher Education Opportunity Act.
Institutions of higher education have an obligation to comply with regulations that the Department of Education is obligated to enforce. Compliance is enhanced and the need for audits and fines is greatly reduced if
institutions are made clearly aware of the requirements they face. That was the rationale behind the compliance calendar created by Congress in the 2008 HEA reauthorization legislation.
Under that legislation, Congress mandated that the Department of Education publish an annual “compliance
calendar” that lists all compliance requirements and their corresponding deadlines. The goal is straightforward: Institutions should receive a clear checklist of regulatory and information collection deadlines that
documents their regulatory obligations. Armed with this information, institutions—especially small, thinly
staffed ones—will be in a much better position to comply than they are at present. Given that regulations
and requirements continue to grow, the compliance calendar should be updated annually and made easily
available to institutions.

Enforcement of Regulations at the Department
The Department uses a variety of mechanisms to ensure compliance with its rules. Outside auditors conduct
annual audits of all institutions to review compliance with the administration of Title IV programs as well
as an institution’s financial statements. Results of the reviews are shared with the Department, which may, in
turn, take action when a potential problem or an irregularity is reported. The Department’s Office of Inspector General may also conduct an audit, in response to an indication of a problem.
Program reviews are more comprehensive examinations of institutional operations. The Office of Federal
Student Aid uses a taxonomy of thresholds that takes into account statutory requirements and other indicators from the Department’s administrative records to select institutions for review. These reviews are usually
conducted by the Department’s regional offices. Often in the context of Title IX or the Americans with Disabilities Act, OCR responds to complaints by conducting investigations, which may lead to fines or consent
agreements.53

Recommendations to Improve the Enforcement of Regulations
• The Department of Education should recognize when institutions are clearly acting in good faith.

Very few violations of federal regulations are deliberate or reflect negligence by institutions. Nor are all violations equally serious. At present, minor and technical violations are not acknowledged as such by the Depart53

In addition, there are other situations in which Department enforcement action is automatically triggered as a result of an institution crossing a specific threshold. This is the case with institutions exceeding the allowed cohort default rates, as institutions with
default rates higher than 30 percent for three consecutive years are banned from the Pell and student loan programs and institutions with a rate higher than 40 percent in a single year are banned from the loan programs.
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ment. We believe that the Department ought to recognize when institutions have clearly acted in good faith.
In the summer of 2014, for example, the University of Nebraska at Kearney was fined $10,000 for mistakenly
misclassifying a 2009 incident involving the theft of $45 worth of goods from an unlocked custodian’s closet
as a larceny rather than a burglary.54 Because the Clery Act does not require the reporting of larceny,55 the
university did not report the incident on its Annual Security Report. In an audit, the Department ruled that
the incident was a burglary and fined the institution for failing to report it. We believe that this is an example
of an institution being overly penalized for a relatively minor technical violation. In such cases, the size of the
sanctions imposed by the Department does not appropriately reflect the weight of the infraction involved.
Fines that fail to distinguish the important from the trivial undermine the Department’s credibility.
Following the tragic shootings at Virginia Tech in 2007, the Department fined the institution for a technical
error in following its own internal policy; in this case, the campus warning was issued by the office of public
information rather than the office of public safety. The issue is not whether the warning was released—it was.
Rather, the fine was assessed based on which campus office issued the warning. We believe that the university was acting in good faith to comply with the law and that the Department should have recognized this.
Second-guessing informed by hindsight does little to improve practices for similar events that may arise in the
future.
Some agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service and Securities and Exchange Commission, utilize voluntary correction programs. Under those programs, regulated entities identify instances of non-compliance
and report them to the agency. The agency then reviews the self-report, collects evidence of correction, and
issues a confirming letter. Congress and the Department should consider the benefits of developing a similar
voluntary program in appropriate circumstances—for example, in cases involving technical violations where
an institution was acting in good faith.
• The Department of Education should act in a timely fashion when conducting program reviews, inves-

tigating and resolving complaints, and approving new programs.
Under the HEA, colleges and universities are required to submit documents and other records requested by
the Department within a prescribed amount of time. While institutions are required to adhere to strict timelines in terms of responding to the agency’s requests, there are no time limits imposed on the Department in
terms of issuing a final determination after a program review.56
Earlier in this report, we cited a short list of cases in which the Department has dragged out program reviews
over many years, including cases in which institutions were ordered to remand funds more than a decade after
the initial audits. We also noted that it took the Department nearly four years after the tragic shootings at
Virginia Tech to issue the first fines against the institution, even though agency representatives never visited
the campus or met with officials from the university.
54
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According to one article, the stolen items were a bag of potato chips, Little Debbie Nutty Bars, and a set of walkie-talkies. Ben
Miller, Roll Call, August 25, 2014, available at: http://www.rollcall.com/news/how_unnecessary_data_reporting_requirements_
turned_a_44_theft_into_a_10000-235831-1.html?pg=1&dczone=emailalert.
To be precise, larceny is only reported under Clery when it occurs in connection with a hate crime.
Federal Student Aid Programs, Program Review Guide for Institutions, 2009, available at: http://www.ifap.ed.gov/programrevguide/attachments/2009ProgramReviewGuide.pdf.
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It is not uncommon for investigation and resolution of a complaint by OCR to take four to five years. Ironically, when institutions receive a complaint, OCR requires them to complete their investigation promptly,
typically within 60 days. According to some campus officials, this delay allows the agency to go far beyond
the scope of the initial inquiry and what is necessary to assess whether a violation occurred. It also has the
effect of paralyzing institutional efforts to improve policies, since it may be unclear what policy changes will
satisfy OCR and will be required before investigations are completed and resolutions reached. The bottom
line is simply that Congress should require the Department to conduct program reviews and issue fines in a
timely manner.
The problems around timeliness are not limited to compliance and enforcement proceedings, but also appear
in other contexts. As we noted earlier, many institutions report significant delays when seeking approval
from the Department to offer new programs. These delays prevent schools from providing new education
and training programs to students in a timely way. We believe Congress should re-examine the Department’s
process for approving new programs and require it to do so in a timely fashion.
• The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) provisions for Secretarial discretion in resolving viola-

tions currently provided to the K-12 sector should be extended to postsecondary education.
Several provisions of GEPA explicitly provide the Department significant and specific flexibility in recovering
federal funds in the K-12 arena. For example, when dealing with violations of federal regulations by K-12
entities, the Department is able to consider mitigating circumstances and whether the entities acted in good
faith, and to potentially waive the fines. However, GEPA explicitly exempts higher education from such
flexibility.
The Department has told several institutions that, based on mitigating circumstances, it would have been
likely to forgive a fine or a directive to return funds in question but could not do so given the GEPA restriction. The agency maintains that while it has the ability to reduce fines once they are levied, it cannot eliminate fines or waive a remand of funds under current law. There is no legislative history to clarify why such
flexibility was prohibited with respect to colleges and universities. This is an illustration of the type of flexibility that the Department of Education wants and that colleges and universities would like it to have. Congress
should extend the same provisions that currently exist for K-12 schools to postsecondary institutions.
• Staff at Department of Education regional offices should be required to provide the same information

and advice to institutions as the staff in Washington.
Institutional officials often receive conflicting information from the Department’s regional offices and its
headquarters in Washington. Such inconsistency makes compliance with complicated regulations even more
difficult. This problem can be exacerbated when institutions have campuses in multiple regions and receive
conflicting information from different regional offices.
For example, in Section III we discussed the NAICU task force on financial responsibility standards. That
group identified eight accounting elements applied inconsistently by the different regional offices, including
losses on investments and interest rate swaps included in expenses; current maturities of long-term debt not
included as part of long-term debt; and defined benefit plan liabilities excluded from “post-retirement benefit
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plan liabilities” for calculating expendable net assets.57
All regional offices should apply the same standards consistently. The Department should be required to
make sure that the activities of its national and regional offices are in alignment. Expanded and enhanced
training would go a long way toward meeting this goal.
• Congress should ask the Government Accountability Office to review the Department of Education’s

rulemaking in light of Executive Order 13563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.”
On January 18, 2011, the President issued Executive Order 13563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review.” Section 6 of the Order calls for the retrospective analysis of existing rules, where agencies analyze
existing rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and, based on what
was learned from the analyses, modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them.
Also as required by the Order, the Department published its preliminary plan for retrospective analysis of
existing regulations on May 18, 2011, and it published its final plan on August 22, 2011. The final plan,
which incorporated feedback from the public on the preliminary plan, lists the 11 factors and processes the
Department will use in setting priorities for the retrospective review of its regulations.58
The Department has published seven reports describing its regulatory activities under the Order, which
means that the agency is technically in compliance. However, the activities identified in these reports are
largely limited to previously planned rulemaking actions. There are issues that are ripe for a retrospective
review (such as financial responsibility standards), but the Department has yet to announce any plan to
address them. Accordingly, we believe Congress should request that the Government Accountability Office
undertake an examination of the Department’s implementation of Executive Order 13563.

Further Improvements to the Overall Regulatory Process
In addition to the specific reforms identified above, several strategies could usher in broader improvements in
the Department’s approach to regulation.
• Congress should consider developing and implementing “risk-informed” regulatory approaches where

appropriate.
All colleges and universities are regulated in the same manner, regardless of the level of risk involved. This
forces the Department to expend energy on institutions that should command relatively little attention,
while simultaneously skimping on those where more oversight is warranted. Painting all institutions with the
same broad brush does not serve anyone well.
While a risk-informed regulatory system is not appropriate for every issue, there is growing consensus that
institutions with greater levels of risk to students and taxpayers should be regulated by the Department more
closely. After extensive consultations with the higher education community, Congress should require the
57

58

40

Report of the NAICU Financial Responsibility Task Force, November 2012, available at: http://www.naicu.edu/docLib/20121119_
NAICUFinan.Resp.FinalReport.pdf.
See http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/reg/retrospective-analysis/index.html.
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Department to develop and implement risk-informed regulatory systems wherever appropriate.
The ideas behind a risk-informed regulatory system and the areas where such a system might be appropriate
are explored in much greater detail in a white paper appended to this report.
• Congress should order an independent review of the Department of Education’s organizational prac-

tices with respect to issuing regulations.
The Task Force discussed regulatory practices at other agencies and looked at whether there were best practices or desirable organizational structures that might be transferable to the Department of Education. For
example, several members cited the Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy as a possible model
that might merit further study. Others mentioned various federal advisory committee structures, such as the
National Institutes of Health Advisory Committee to the Director, and suggested that a similar body at the
Department of Education could be a source of advice and information to the Secretary of Education.
Before changes can be recommended in the Department of Education’s organizational structure and practices, Congress should commission a review of the Department through an organization with expertise in
these areas. At Congress’ request, for example, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
recently conducted an extensive review of the Social Security Administration and has undertaken reviews
for many other parts of the federal government. NAPA might be well suited to assist in a similar review with
respect to the Department.59 In addition to NAPA, Congress may also wish to ask the Administrative Conference of the United States to review the legal processes and procedures used by the Department.60
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NAPA is an independent, nonpartisan, and nonprofit organization chartered by Congress to improve government performance.
See: http://www.napawash.org/.
The Administrative Conference of the United States is an independent federal agency focused on improving the administrative
process through consensus-driven applied research, providing nonpartisan expert advice and recommendations for improvement of
federal agency procedures. See: http://www.acus.gov/.
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Conclusion
American legal scholar and former OMB senior official Cass Sunstein notes that simplicity is possible without compromising the overall effectiveness of the government’s oversight abilities. In his book Simpler: The
Future of Government, Sunstein writes, “…without a massive reduction in its current functions, government
can be far more effective, far less confusing, far less counterproductive, and far more helpful if it opts, wherever it can, for greater simplicity.”61
We need to be smarter about the regulation of higher education. To that end, we have summarized the current regulatory landscape, outlined some of the challenges that make compliance onerous, detailed many specific concerns that are particularly problematic, and suggested a number of reforms that could help improve
the process of regulation.
The Task Force has also developed a set of Guiding Principles that we believe can help inform a constructive
path forward in recalibrating the regulatory process for higher education. Apart from our interest in seeing
that regulations are coherent and fair, these principles also reflect our belief that all stakeholders—students
and taxpayers, as well as colleges and universities—reap the benefit of well-designed regulation. We want
to keep costs down, keep students safe, focus on educating students, and be good stewards of funds. These
principles will help us do that.
To underscore points that we have made several times in this report, institutions of higher education must be
careful stewards of federal funds, the federal government must ensure that public resources are not squandered, and students and taxpayers must be protected. Regulatory oversight exercised in the right way provides
these essential protections.
But unnecessary and complex regulations provide no benefits. Nor do regulations that have an excessive reach
or are poorly framed, hard to comply with, or difficult to implement. Such regulations thwart student access
to college, impede the pursuit of institutional organizational efficiencies, and constrain innovation. And,
because they increase administrative burden, they drive up institutional operating costs.
Relief from some of the most burdensome or ill-founded regulations and a better process for developing new
ones would help higher education advance its important goals. The Task Force looks forward to working with
members of Congress to address these concerns and others in the upcoming reauthorization of the Higher
Education Act.
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Sunstein, 2013, p. 11. Italics omitted.
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Issue

Description of Problem(s)

Potential Solution(s)

Student Financial Aid
1. *Return of
The concept behind the return of Title IV funds is simple and the legislaED should seek public input on ways to improve clarity of
Title IV Funds
tion is very specific about how the return is to be calculated. However, the R2T4 regulations and conduct a subsequent negotiated
(“R2T4”)
regulatory and sub-regulatory details have become so complicated that the rulemaking session devoted solely to the issue.
General Issues
refund process has become very burdensome to administer and difficult
ED should allow more time for institutions to process
to explain to students. In fact, the ED handbook on financial aid devotes
R2T4 and limit rules to undergraduates only. ED should
more than 200 pages to explaining this process.
simplify the prorated approach by establishing weekly
Institutions spend enormous amounts of time with R2T4 calculations.
increments based on calendar time, with 60% of the weeks
One four-year public university has one staff person who does nothing but of the semester as the point at which all aid is earned.
R2T4 calculations and another who spends half of her time rechecking
Post-withdrawal disbursements should be left to the
every R2T4 calculation before it is submitted. R2T4 is one of the most
discretion of financial aid administrators using a publicized
common mistakes made by institutions, according to ED.
institutional policy.
Amend the “order of return” language and specify that
TEACH Grant and loans should be returned first and
include a directive to repay least-advantageous loans first.
Remove references to the Federal Work-Study Program.
(Recommendations for “last day of attendance” and
“assumption that federal Title IV aid is always applied
to institutional charges first” also apply here. See Items 2
and 3.)
2. R2T4:
There are two distinct but related issues with respect to last day of attenNarrow the definition of institutions that are required to
Documenting
dance that institutions find confusing.
take attendance. Allow institutions not required to take
“Last Day of
First, an institution must determine if a Title IV recipient ever showed up attendance to use a documented “last date of attendance”
Attendance” for
Title IV purposes for at least one class. If it is determined that a student never showed up, the or other academic activity.
institution must return all Title IV funds for that student to ED.
Continue to require that institutions have a publicized
withdrawal procedure that recognizes the student’s withSecond, in a situation where a student “showed up” but then withdrew,
drawal date as the date the student initiates that procethe institution must determine when that student withdrew. For students
dure. Eliminate rules concerning: 1) “intent to withdraw”
who officially inform the institution when they withdraw, determining
how much federal aid to return is a straightforward calculation. However, and 2) students rescinding their decision to withdraw.
for institutions that do not take attendance and where the student simply For students who do not follow the institution’s official
stops attending without telling anyone (“unofficially withdrawing”), deter- withdrawal procedure, allow an institution that is not
mining (1) if the student ever began attendance, or (2) when the student
required to take attendance to set the withdrawal date
withdrew, is difficult. And yet, institutions are required to establish that
under its own defined policies. Unofficial withdrawals
federal aid recipients did in fact attend for at least a portion of the term in should not be regulated by ED.
which the aid was disbursed.
The regulations are unclear and overly complicated.
*These are issues that have been raised repeatedly.
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Proration

5. Student Loan

Loan Limits

4. 150% Subsidized

Assumption
that federal
Title IV aid is
always applied
to institutional
charges first

3. R2T4:

(February 2015)

Description of Problem(s)

The Department of Education assumes in all cases that federal aid is always first applied
to tuition and fees, even when tuition and fees are waived by institutions for federal aid
recipients. This means that the Department essentially counts the waivers from institutions as payments for any remaining tuition and fee charges after applying federal aid to
those charges.
When a student whose fees are waived withdraws or drops out, the institution must pretend that the student actually paid fees using federal funds and the institution must return
the unearned portion of the federal aid that was used to pay the fees. This makes no sense,
however, since fee-waiver students do not actually pay their costs with Title IV funds.
These unearned federal funds are actually institutional funds that must be returned to the
Department.
Effective July 2013, Congress limited the time that a student could borrow federally
subsidized loans to 150% of “normal time” of a program. Simply put, students in a fouryear program will not be eligible to borrow after six years regardless of whether they have
reached the cumulative borrowing cap for subsidized loans of $23,500. The provision is
particularly punitive for transfer students. At the same time, this 150% limit does not
apply to other federal programs. The National Association of Student Financial Aid
Administrators (NASFAA) reports that some of its members spent up to $111,000 per
institution to administer this rule over a three-month period.
The annual loan limits for undergraduate borrowers must be prorated if a borrower is
enrolled in a program that is shorter than one academic year, or if the borrower is in a program that is a year or longer but is borrowing for a final enrollment period that is shorter
than a full academic year. Proration for students in their final enrollment period is inconsistent with other loan limit policies, requires significant and unnecessary calculations for
institutions, and penalizes students who are closest to program completion. For example,
if a student who only has 18 credits left to finish a program (where 12 credits per term/24
credits per year is considered the minimum full-time status) comes back for one final term
to take 18 credits, he would only receive 75% of the federal loan (18 credits/ 24 credits)
for which he would otherwise qualify that year. On the other hand, because a student who
attends at least half-time is eligible to receive up to the annual loan limit, a comparable
student who came back for two semesters for nine credits each semester would receive
100% of his eligible federal loan amount. Institutions who have dispensed with this
requirement in the “Experimental Sites” program have found no adverse effects.

Student Financial Aid cont.

Issue

ED=Department of Education

Remove the proration requirement for the last enrollment
period for students in programs that are at least one academic
year in length.

Eliminate the 150% limit in statute. Satisfactory academic
progress rules and aggregate loan limits already provide adequate incentives for students to complete in a timely manner.
At a minimum, the 150% rule should be applied only at the
undergraduate level, as opposed to at a program or degree
level, making it consistent with Pell restrictions.

Change ED assumption that federal Title IV aid is always
applied to institutional charges such as tuition and fees, first.
At a minimum, revise R2T4 regulations to exclude fee waivers from the R2T4 calculations.
Allow aid that is specified for a particular cost of attendance
(e.g., tuition) and that will not need to be returned under
the source’s rules to be deducted from institutional charges
when determining the amount of unearned aid that must be
returned by the institution.

Potential Solution(s)
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Issue

Description of Problem(s)

Potential Solution(s)

Student Financial Aid cont.
6. Case-by-case
“Professional judgment” is a highly individualized process used by institutional financial
Student aid professionals should be given the authority to
nature of
aid professionals to address individual financial needs of students. But in some cases, it
make changes for broad categories of students, where appro“Professional
makes
more
sense
to
make
changes
for
entire
categories
of
students
rather
than
subjecting
priate. At the same time, student aid professionals should still
Judgment”
be able to exercise professional judgment on a case-by-case
regarding student each individual student to separate treatment. For example, aid professionals should be
financial aid
able to address the needs of borrowers at an institution impacted by a natural disaster,
basis.
such as a flood, all at once rather than going through a review process for each borrower.
7. Institutional
Currently, institutions and financial aid professionals are only allowed to limit borrowing Allow institutions to set lower loan limits for specific proauthority to
below the loan limit on a case-by-case basis. Such a situation leads to over-borrowing by
grams, populations, or other categories established by the
reduce loan limits
many students, including those enrolled part-time. With the authority to set loan limits
institution.
by program, dependency status, living arrangement, enrollment status, or other categories,
schools could notify students earlier of the reduced loan amount and of the school’s process for exceptions, if any, to the policy. This would help address problems with over-borrowing.
8. *Verification
Every year, ED requires institutions to “verify” certain pieces of information provided by
ED should continue as expeditiously as possible the full
their federal aid applicants, such as adjusted gross income. Although ED has started the
implementation of the student-by-student targeted verifitransition to a system that focuses on targeting specific data elements that are likely in
cation approach and should be required to report to Conerror for that particular applicant, verification is still extremely time-consuming. Accord- gress on its progress. ED should also be required to provide
ing to ED, verification is one of the highest error-prone processes at institutions.
publicly available updates on aspects of individualized
verification and make changes to the process accordingly. In
addition, a panel of experts should be brought together to
improve the efficiency of the process while minimizing the
burden on institutions.
(See Item 9 regarding the use of “prior-prior year” data.)
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(February 2015)

Description of Problem(s)

requirements
on providing
information about
favorable federal
and state loans
programs, such as
health professions
loans and state
loans

Student Financial Aid cont.
9. *Lateness of
Currently, federal student aid decisions are based on information and data provided by
financial aid
students and their families from the prior tax year. For example, a student seeking to start
decisions in
a program in fall 2014 would receive information about his or her federal student aid
the college
package based on the tax data from 2013, or the “prior year.” The information about the
application
process caused by aid package would not be available until spring 2014 at the earliest, as students are making
use of “prior year” their enrollment decisions. Because of the timing problems created by the use of prior year
data
data, institutions are forced to address and answer verification issues even as students are
enrolling.
In addition, for students, the use of prior year information creates a situation in which
their aid decisions are not determined until late in their college enrollment process,
impacting their decisions. Analysis of the data has shown that, while providing information to students about their aid package earlier in the application process, a move to the
use of “prior-prior year” information would not impact the size of aid packages for the vast
majority of recipients when compared to packages created using prior year data (current
method), as financial circumstances of federal aid recipients change relatively little from
year to year.
10. Mandatory Credit Current regulations require institutions to undertake extremely complicated calculations
to “Clock Hour”
to translate credit-bearing programs to “clock hours” under certain circumstances. The
Conversion
regulations are problematic in a number of respects. First, they apply only to a limited
for Specified
number of programs at public and nonprofit colleges, adding to administrative burden
Programs
because they often do not mesh with the structure of other programs. Second, the regulations themselves are difficult to interpret. Third, the conversion to clock hours and the
“rounding down” requirement often results in students receiving less Title IV aid than
many colleges believe is appropriate.
11. Impact of
The preferred lender and TILA rules are overly prescriptive and create barriers to pro“preferred lender” viding information about non-Title IV loan programs with favorable terms for students.
and TruthThese include, for example, the federal Health Resources and Services Administration
in-Lending(HRSA) loan programs and state loan programs like the Texas B-On-Time loans.
Act (TILA)

Issue

ED=Department of Education

Allow institutions to waive the clock hour conversion
requirement if programs otherwise covered under the regulation comprise less than five percent of a college’s overall
enrollments. Such de minimus offering of programs otherwise requiring conversion suggests that the institution is only
offering such programs on the margins and should not be
subject to the regulation. Institutions where this forms a bigger part of their mission will have an easier time complying.
Make necessary changes to allow institutions to share information about other federal and state loan programs with very
favorable terms without having to overcome burdensome
barriers.

Changes should be made to require the Department to use
“prior-prior year” data for the purposes of determining federal Title IV aid.
Because institutions would be able to use data more likely
verified by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a move to
the use of “prior-prior year” data would address many of the
burdensome problems related to verification (issue raised
above) with respect to the need to confirm data that may be
incorrect or incomplete.
Furthermore, the use of “prior-prior year” data would also
address many of the frustrations experienced by students and
their families, as they would have their information about aid
packages much earlier in the decision-making process.

Potential Solution(s)
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Issue

Description of Problem(s)

13. An overwhelming Currently, the Department offers and administers seven different loan repayment options
number of loan
to borrowers, many of which are income-based repayment (IBR) programs. The form
repayment
students must complete to enroll in the IBR programs is very complicated and the differoptions
ences among the various programs are modest. It is hard to counsel students about which
program is actually best suited for them, since no one can know what the future will hold
in terms of employment and other personal circumstances. Giving students more options
is not always helpful and can actually make it harder for them to navigate.
14. Requirement
At least 7% of an institution’s Federal Work-Study funds must be devoted to community
that 7% of
service programs. While many institutions have a very strong history and tradition of
Federal Workcommunity service, others are located in geographical areas, such as rural areas, that can
Study (FWS)
make this requirement difficult to fulfill. Institutions can have problems finding placefunds be used
for community
ments for students and it can be difficult to document with community service employers
service
that students actually worked as required. Community service placements can be far more
difficult to create and manage.
15. Inability to make Federal student loans must be disbursed in equal installments. The rule prevents adjustunequal loan
ments of disbursements to address situations where there are unequal resources or costs
disbursements
among payment periods. For nonstandard term programs, this results in disbursement
times that are different for direct loans than for other Title IV programs and prevents
alignment of loan disbursement with academic terms.
16. “Cash
Currently, institutions can only disburse Title IV funds to pay other education-related
Management”
costs charged to the student above and beyond the direct institutional charges (tuition,
fees, room and board, and qualified books and supplies) if the student explicitly authorizes this payment. Students and families do not understand this requirement and do not
realize they must authorize the institution to make these adjustments.

Student Financial Aid cont.
12. *Exit counseling
According to ED, appropriately addressing exit counseling requirements is one of the most
on student loans
consistent mistakes made by institutions.
The biggest issue historically has been the inability to find and counsel borrowers who
withdraw or drop out from an institution without informing the institution.

Reverse the current federal policy and allow students to “opt
out” of policy requiring institutions to seek explicit authorization.

Allow unequal disbursements to accommodate unequal
costs or resources and to facilitate disbursement by term in
nonstandard terms.

Institutions should be required to make community service
placements available only to the extent practicable.

The Department should work with Congress to streamline
the number of repayment options available and create a targeted number of repayment programs with beneficial terms
for the borrower.

When student borrowers withdraw without informing institutions, institutions have difficulty finding them. Consider
whether it makes more sense to have ED conduct exit counseling directly with students through an interactive portal.
Alternatively, institutions making a good faith effort to reach
out to such students should be considered to have met their
exit counseling obligations.

Potential Solution(s)
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Description of Problem(s)

Student Financial Aid cont.
17. Aid Restrictions
As currently written, regulations allow students who have passed a course to retake the
on Repeated
same course one more time using federal aid. For the purposes of this issue, the DepartAttempts of
ment prescribes anything above an ‘F’ as “passing,” even when individual institutions may
Passed Classes
not view a ‘D’ as a passing grade. The federal government should not determine what constitutes a “passing grade.” Even though the number of students impacted by this provision
is small, institutions must still spend an inordinate amount of time trying to track down
students for whom this would be an issue.
Annual
increase
in
18.
As long as the current version of the budget sequestration agreement remains in place,
loan origination
origination fees on student loans will increase on an annual basis. Institutions are dealing
fee
with two burdens as a result of these increases.
The first unintended problem is associated with timing. While a new financial aid award
year starts July 1, annual increases on origination fees become effective at the start of the
new federal year, October 1. This means that, although they are loans for the same academic year, loans disbursed before October 1 and those disbursed on or after that date will
have different origination fees.
Second, although the actual sizes of the changes in origination fees are very minimal—for
example, with the change in fees from 1.072% this year to 1.073% next year, the origination fee increases by $0.05 on a $5,550 loan—the software changes needed at the institution to address the changes are significant. Until sequestration, institutional financial
aid software dealt with numbers up to two decimal places, or whole cents. Because of the
small increases in origination fees which literally lead to changes of $0.05 on a $5,550
loan, institutions now must deal with additional decimal places to deal with fractions of
cents. While this may seem like a minor issue, this has led to expensive reprogramming of
software or purchases of new software by institutions. Institutions have had to retool their
systems to address changes totaling fractions of cents.

Issue

ED=Department of Education

Remove origination fees from sequestration.
At a minimum, link changes in origination fees to the beginning of the academic year ( July 1), not the federal fiscal year
(October 1).

The provision should be revised to allow each institution to
define a “passing grade” based on the graduation requirements for each program.

Potential Solution(s)
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Description of Problem(s)

responsibility
standards

21. *Financial

A college must be deemed financially responsible by ED to participate in Title IV programs. We strongly support this objective. However, the Department’s interpretation of
the statute is incorrect. In addition, its current procedures are outdated and do not conform to either its own regulations or generally accepted accounting practices. As a result,
many institutions were forced to take out letters of credit or have been moved to a “reimbursement” basis for receipt of federal funds. This is costly to institutions, disruptive, and
provides no significant protection to taxpayers.

Institutional Finances

Student Financial Aid cont.
19. Utility of 1098-T Colleges are required to provide 1098-T forms to enrolled students and the IRS. Unfortuforms
nately, the information provided causes confusion among taxpayers and has limited value
(Under the
to the IRS. While the form is intended to help families take advantage of educational tax
jurisdiction of
Internal Revenue benefits like the American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC), unlike other tax forms, the
Service)
information provided in the 1098-T cannot be directly inserted into a tax return. (This is
possible with other tax forms.) For various reasons, the form simply does not provide an
accurate snapshot of a student’s tuition during the tax year at issue. For instance, colleges
can report either amounts billed or payments received for “qualified tuition and related
expenses,” with most institutions reporting amounts billed. Also, the absence of clear
definitions of “qualified tuition and related expenses” and the timing mismatch between
an academic year and a tax year causes confusion for students and families.
For the IRS, the information provided is insufficient to enable it to enforce tax compliance by students and institutions because the included information cannot be routinely
matched to amounts reported on a taxpayer’s return.
Non-matching
20.
Colleges are required to submit the 1098-T forms to the IRS regardless of whether they
TINs on 1098-T
have been able to collect an accurate taxpayer identification number (TIN) for the stuforms submitted
dent, which for most students is the Social Security number. Even though colleges are proby institutions
hibited from using IRS-approved TIN matching services, the IRS in 2013 began to cite
(Under the
jurisdiction of
hundreds of institutions for not supplying correct TINs. Although the IRS announced
Internal Revenue earlier this year that fines would not be sought for incorrect or missing TINs for 2011,
Service)
future decisions remain uncertain.
Current IRS practices of proposing fines and requiring institutions to submit formal
waiver requests create unnecessary burdens on both colleges and universities and the IRS.

Issue

Require ED to conform to the HEA statute, follow current financial responsibility regulations, and use generally
accepted accounting definitions. Retain alternative methods for demonstrating financial responsibility as currently
defined in statute and regulations. Require ED to establish
a uniform appeals process for institutions. Require ED to
examine the “total financial circumstances” of institutions.
Require ED to establish a panel of outside experts to provide
guidance to the Department.

Treasury/IRS should issue guidance to waive penalties for
colleges and universities that file student tuition statements
with missing or incorrect taxpayer identification numbers. A
long-term solution is needed to enable colleges and universities to certify in advance, at the time they file annual information returns, that they are in compliance with TIN solicitation
practices in accordance with the §6050S regulations.
Another option would be to eliminate the regulatory requirement that institutions file 1098-Ts for students who have not
provided a TIN.
Institutions should also be permitted access to IRS TIN
matching programs for purposes of 1098-T reporting.

Treasury, IRS, and the congressional tax-writing committees
should explore a new Form 1098-T reporting model which
requires colleges and universities to report: (A) total amounts
paid to the institution; (B) amounts billed for qualified
tuition and related expenses; and (C) grants administered
and processed by the institution. Such a reporting method
will allow students and families to more readily identify their
eligibility for an education tax credit and to determine the
amounts paid for qualified expenses.

Potential Solution(s)
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Procedures

24. *Timely Warning

reporting of
crimes

23. Duplicative

is not consistent
with Federal
Bureau of
Investigation
(FBI) Uniform
Crime Reporting
(UCR) and the
National IncidentBased Reporting
System (NIBRS)

22. *Clery reporting

Description of Problem(s)

The Clery Act requires institutions to have procedures for issuing Timely Warnings for
Clery crimes occurring anywhere in the Clery geography as soon as information is available
that suggests a serious or continuing threat to students and employees. It is unclear whether
Timely Warnings must be issued for all Clery crimes, what constitutes “timely,” and what
represents a “continuing threat.” Timely Warnings must also include a “safety tip,” which
is usually unnecessary and can be totally inappropriate in certain cases. The handbook
provides a sample that cautions students “not to leave drinks unattended” and “to use the
buddy system when socializing.” Including this type of information could be seen as blaming the victim of a crime. Issuing Timely Warnings for certain crimes may compromise an
ongoing police or campus investigation by alerting a suspect. In addition, Timely Warnings
are likely to be ignored by students because of the sheer number they receive.

The Clery Act has been expanded to require institutions to report on a number of incidents that, while objectionable, are not crimes under the UCR or NIBRS crime reporting
framework. For example, “dating violence” is not classified as a crime under either UCR or
NIBRS (although, of course, “rape” and “assault” are). In addition, for some Clery crimes,
such as “burglary,” ED requires institutions to report crimes based on its own definition
of the crime, a definition at odds with the UCR’s definition. Without a UCR or NIBRS
definition to provide a single and consistent form for reporting, campus officials spend
excessive time determining whether and how a particular incident should be reported and
their decisions are easily second-guessed by ED auditors. This results in inconsistencies in
the data and liability for institutions. Finally, requiring reporting of incidents outside the
UCR and NIBRS framework means that campus crime statistics cannot be compared with
crime statistics gathered from local jurisdictions across the country.
Clery regulations and guidance require institutions to count the same incident in multiple
crime categories, resulting in a significant over-counting of crimes. One recent analysis
demonstrates that a single incident could be reported as 31 separate crimes under Clery.
These requirements make campus crimes statistics less useful to the public, and mean that
this reporting is inconsistent and incomparable with all other crime statistics.

Campus Crime and Campus Security

Issue

ED=Department of Education

Give institutions the clear authority to rely upon their own
professional judgment in determining both what constitutes
a “continuing threat” and when they have the information
needed to release a warning, provided it is consistent with
the spirit of the law. ED should not second-guess institutions that follow their own reasonable policies in making
these determinations.
Eliminate the requirement to include a safety tip in a Timely
Warning. Institutions should include a safety tip only if, in
their judgment, it is helpful and appropriate to do so.

Revise the regulations to require reporting to be consistent
with well-accepted DOJ hierarchy rules. Require crimes to
be reported only once, and in the category that would reveal
the most useful information to those reading the annual
security report.

If Congress believes campuses should report on other
“crimes” that are not currently a part of the UCR or NIBRS,
it should instruct DOJ to modify the UCR to include these
definitions. This would ensure that new crime definitions
would be developed by experts in law enforcement and
crime reporting protocols, and would provide a common
definition for both local police and campus security officials.

Potential Solution(s)
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Issue

Description of Problem(s)

Campus Crime and Campus Security cont.
25. *Overly broad
Under the Clery statute, regulations, and guidance, institutions are required to report
and confusing
crimes that occur on “noncampus property.” The definition of noncampus property is
definition of
extremely broad, requiring institutions to report statistics for locations that are either
“noncampus
controlled by a recognized student organization or owned or controlled by the higher ed
property” for
the purposes of
institution and used in support of the institution’s educational purpose or by students. This
collecting crime
requires, for example, reporting on hotel rooms and common areas where students regustatistics
larly stay overnight for institution-sponsored trips, meeting space provided for a university
club arranged through an email, an institutionally-recognized fraternity house, the stairwell of a building where the institution holds classes on Wednesday night, or on a ship
where the institution conducts research. Counterintuitively, it doesn’t require reporting
on fraternity houses if the organization is not officially recognized by the institution—a
data point consumers may actually find to be important. Since the numbers are reported in
aggregate, without differentiating between an overseas trip and a bowling alley down the
street from campus, the data provides little useful information to consumers. Finally, outof-town and foreign police agencies seldom respond to these requests for information.
26. *Campus Security The regulations and handbook contain definitions of Campus Security Authorities (CSAs)
Authorities
that are very broad, and result in institutions being required to designate hundreds, if not
thousands, of individuals as CSAs. This can dramatically undermine confidentiality for
students and reduce their confidence in the institution’s procedures for handling sensitive
cases.
27. Fire reports
The fire-related reporting requirements under the statute and regulations are excessively
prescriptive and detailed. For example, the statute requires institutions to disclose the
number of supervised fire drills as well as their policies on open flames, such as candles in
dorm rooms. Even minor incidents where no flames are observed, such as a singed extension cord, are defined as a “fire” and must be reported. There is no evidence of significant
demand for this information or that it is used by consumers in making college choices.
28. Policies on
The missing students provision in HEA is needlessly complex and prescriptive. It requires
Missing Students institutions to keep separate records of missing student emergency contacts as opposed to
regular emergency contact information. FERPA already allows institutions to contact a
student’s parent, regardless of age, in the case of an emergency. This requirement is largely
unnecessary since each local law enforcement agency has policies on missing persons, and
they are better equipped to deal with a missing person.

Streamline the provisions. Require institutions to have a policy stating that, if a student goes missing, the institution will
contact law enforcement and either the emergency contact
provided by the student or, if the student is under 18, the
student’s parent. Allow institutions to use general emergency
contact information, instead of requiring them to collect
specific missing student emergency contact information.

Streamline the requirements to require the most important
fire safety information to be disclosed annually, such as
the number of student injuries and the number of student
deaths resulting from a fire. Institutions that want to disclose more information are free to do so.

CSAs should be more narrowly defined. Institutions should
continue to encourage prompt and accurate reporting of
crimes by CSAs.

Narrow the definition of “noncampus property.” Consider
excluding properties such as medical clinics where the
educational use is only incidental. Eliminate foreign and
overnight-trip reporting entirely. (Reporting requirements
from branch campuses are appropriate.)

Potential Solution(s)
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Description of Problem(s)

In 2011, DOJ revised the “direct threat” regulations governing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). As a result, under the current regulations, colleges and universities are
permitted to require treatment or discipline a student only in cases where the student poses
a direct threat to others, but not in cases where the student poses a threat to him or herself.
This change means that, if an institution tries to help a self-harming student by requiring
medical treatment or counseling, it risks an ADA lawsuit or Office of Civil Rights (OCR)
action. This hamstrings institutions in their efforts to help self-harming students and to
prevent trauma to other members of the campus community.
Through subregulatory guidance (Dear College/University President Letter in 2010), ED
has exceeded the parameters of ADA and inhibits institutions from exploring new technologies that may not be fully “accessible” at present but may ultimately yield important
benefits to students with and without disabilities.

generally

32. * IPEDS burden

Institutions are required to respond to nine IPEDS surveys. While some institutions (such
as larger public institutions with significant state data reporting requirements and/or state
longitudinal data systems) find IPEDS manageable, other institutions report a significant
burden with the required reporting and the level of detail required, and question the benefits derived. For example, IPEDS requires institutions to report employees on nine-month,
10-month, 11-month, and 12-month contracts, and requires institutions to assign Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes to academic
jobs even when the positions do not fit neatly into SOC categories. While IPEDS reporting continues to grow and become ever more detailed, there is no formal mechanism to
force the removal of elements that have outlived their usefulness.

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)

chilling effect on
the development
and use of new
technologies

31. ADA regulations’

Threat” Rule

30. ADA “Direct

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Campus Crime and Campus Security cont.
29. Anti-drug/alcohol The HEA requires an institution to certify to the Secretary that it has adopted a drug- and
abuse policy
alcohol-abuse and prevention program meeting a number of detailed requirements. The
institution must conduct a biennial review to determine the program’s effectiveness, make
any necessary changes, and maintain these records for possible review by the Secretary or
audit. This is unduly prescriptive, burdensome, and not necessarily effective in decreasing
alcohol or drug abuse on campus.

Issue

ED=Department of Education

Congress should create an advisory committee to study
the burden associated with IPEDS reporting, and make
recommendations to reduce the number of items reported,
the level of detail, and total time spent by institutions. The
House-passed bill H.R. 1949 provides a useful model.

Revise the 2010 letter to align with actual ADA standards.
Encourage institutions to experiment and conduct research
with new technologies as long as community and public
information highways are fully accessible.

DOJ should reinstate “threat to self ” provisions in Title II of
the ADA regulations. Alternatively, OCR should issue clear
guidance which allows reasonable flexibility for institutions
to address concerns related to self-harming students.

Replace this provision with a clear and straightforward
requirement that an institution must adopt and implement
a program designed to discourage the use of illicit drugs and
abuse of alcohol by students and employees. Remove any
requirements for certification or biennial review and remove
the threat of a loss of all federal funding.

Potential Solution(s)
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Issue

Description of Problem(s)

definitions across
ED data systems

35. Lack of common

Definitions of data elements do not always align across ED data systems, which increases
the reporting burden, jeopardizes data integrity, and often results in the misinterpretation
and misuse of the data when publicly released. For example, students in accelerated adult
programs can be coded as “full-time” for IPEDS, but “part-time” for the Fiscal Operations
Report and Application to Participate (FISAP) because of the time period the courses
cover.

Inconsistent Definitions Across ED Data Systems

Department of
Defense (DoD)
Tuition Assistance
(TA) and Veterans
Affairs (VA) GI
Bill programs

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) cont.
33. IPEDS Human
The IPEDS HR survey requires institutions to use DOL’s SOC codes in reporting on the
Resources (HR)
job functions of their staff. The SOC system is used by federal agencies to classify workers
Survey and use
into occupational categories for the purpose of collecting, calculating, or disseminating
of Department
data. Unfortunately, the SOC codes do not take into account many of the occupations
of Labor (DOL)
Standard
unique to higher education, such as Title IX compliance officers, or employees who
Occupation
perform multiple job functions. Institutions spend an inordinate amount of time on the
Classification
survey trying to make positions fit into the SOC categories.
(SOC) Codes
In addition, some institutions question whether the benefits provided by the HR survey as
a whole outweigh the burdens associated with producing it.
34. Proposed
Starting in 2014–15, ED will collect from each institution via IPEDS the number of
information
students receiving benefits from the DoD TA and VA GI Bill programs as well as the total
collection via
IPEDS on number amount it is receiving from the two programs. Some institutions do not have systems that
can capture this information and will be required to do a hand collection. More fundamenof students using
and the amounts
tally important, the VA and the DoD already have this information, and it would be more
received from the accurate to have ED collect the data directly from those agencies.

Align definitions across ED data systems.

ED should be required to obtain the desired information
directly from the DoD and the VA.

Consider suspending the requirements for this excessively
granular data collection or, at a minimum, revise the requirements to simplify the process of categorizing staff at colleges
and universities.
Alternatively, some institutions believe the HR survey
should be eliminated.

Potential Solution(s)
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Gainful
Employment
(GE) programs
and state
authorization
requirements

38. Link between

Gainful Employment

authorization
of distance
education
programs

37. *State

authorization of
institutions by
name

36. State

State Authorization

Issue

(February 2015)

Description of Problem(s)

In its most recent gainful employment regulations issued in October 2014, the Department
included a provision requiring institutions to certify that each gainful employment program meets state licensure and programmatic accreditation requirements in the states where the
institution is located or is otherwise required to receive state authorization. In addition, the
regulations require institutions to disclose information to students, but do so in a complicated
manner relating to a program’s metropolitan statistical area. As written, these regulations are
unclear in purpose and breadth and inappropriately extend the Department’s regulatory authority beyond the statutory requirements of institutional state authorization and accreditation.

In late 2010, ED expanded and changed the regulations requiring institutions to be authorized by name by the states in which they operate, seeking to force states to exercise greater
oversight of institutions located within their borders. To date, ED has been unable to state
clearly its expectations regarding what appropriate state authorization would entail. More
than three years after these regulations were to have gone into effect, many institutions that
have provided quality programs for decades remain in the dark as to whether or not they
are in compliance with the new ED regulations. In some cases, ED has provided different
rulings to different institutions authorized by the same state in the same manner. Moreover,
ED has refused to provide a list indicating which states have state processes and complaint
systems which meet the federal requirements.
Because of the lack of clarity on this front, in 2013, the Department pushed back the enforcement of this regulation until July 1, 2014. ED announced on June 24, 2014, that it will delay for
a second time the enforcement of this rule, with the new effective date of July 1, 2015.
At a negotiated rulemaking session in spring of 2014, ED proposed a drastic expansion
of state authorization requirements on distance education programs. This represented
a second attempt to do so after regulations issued in 2010 were thrown out by a federal
court. Even without a formal regulation in place, the Department maintains that in order
to satisfy federal requirements, institutions must ensure that their programs are authorized
in any state in which a single student is located. This is a fundamental shift in federal policy.
Prior to 2010, it was well-settled law that institutions needed to be authorized only in
states where the institution was physically located, regardless of where their students were
located. ED has exceeded statutory authority, creating unnecessary and costly burdens on
institutions and creating barriers to higher education for students.

ED=Department of Education

Repeal the provision. While we understand the intention
to protect students from institutions that misrepresent the
quality or purpose of their programs, we believe this can
be regulated differently, both through current regulatory
requirements on misrepresentation and through more clear
disclosure requirements.

Prohibit ED from issuing regulations on this issue without
clear guidance from Congress.

Repeal the current regulations on this issue (34 CFR
600.9), which would result in a return to the state authorization requirements in existence before the 2010 changes.
Consider a prohibition on further regulations in this area
from ED. Immediately require ED to publish a list of the
states that have authorization procedures that meet federal
requirements.

Potential Solution(s)
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Limit the kinds of “substantive changes” that would require
approval by accreditors. Established institutions should have
flexibility to make changes necessary to address their needs
and those of their students.
Limit “additional procedures” to only those cases where
there are substantive changes or when branch campuses are
up for accreditation reviews.

Strike the definition of “credit hour.”

Accreditors should be given the unequivocal authority and
flexibility to design and implement a system of “differentiated review.”

Potential Solution(s)

Accreditors are not allowed to share with an institution information about an ED investi-

Change the regulation to allow accreditors to share infor-

Under current rules, institutions that are not under any sanction from their accreditor are not Remove these requirements.
permitted to change accreditors without first getting approval from ED. This is an unnecessary and
burdensome requirement for institutions that are in good standing with their accreditor. (N.B.:
Institutions that are on sanction are not permitted to change accreditors, which prevents an institution from switching accreditors to avoid actions by their accreditor to address problems.)
The provision requires accreditors to review institutional compliance with the Program
Congress should prohibit ED from requiring accreditors to
Participation Agreement (PPA). Most of the PPA requirements have nothing to do with
review compliance with the PPA.
academic issues and are unrelated to the expertise of accreditors. This is an important task
which should be left to ED and not accreditors.

Currently, there is disagreement as to whether accrediting agencies can use a “differentiated
review” process to review institutions with a record of stability and successful performance.
This means that accreditors must devote the same amount of energy and resources to
review institutions with histories of high performance as they do to review institutions
with documented problems.
ED has, through regulation, created a federal definition of “credit hour.” This represents an
inappropriate intrusion into the academic process. It also discourages the use of innovative
models for measuring learning that are not tied to seat time.
Accreditors must approve “substantive changes” by an institution in a host of areas, including academic programs. The current definition of what constitutes a “substantive change”
is too broad, requiring accreditors to approve even the most minor changes, leading to a
waste of resources.
The regulations require accreditors to take additional steps to review branch campuses of
institutions. The required actions of accreditors related to branch campuses necessitate
extra work for all involved with very little benefit gained.

Description of Problem(s)

into compliance, accreditors should be allowed to share information.
46. National Advisory Many of the concerns about the Department’s intrusion into the accreditation process are
Committee on
manifested in the Department’s micromanagement of NACIQI, a body created by ConInstitutional
gress to serve as an independent advisory committee. The Department’s over-involvement
Quality and
in the everyday activities of accrediting bodies and of the accreditation process as a whole
Integrity
(NACIQI)
has bled over to NACIQI: It expects NACIQI to use and follow similar tactics and processes when reviewing accreditors for recognition purposes.

investigation.
Clear boundaries should be established between the Department and NACIQI to prevent the micromanagement of
NACIQI’s activities by the Department.

ED investigations gation of that institution. In order to allow institutions to improve and allow them to come mation with institutions except as it relates to a criminal
against institutions

45. Confidentiality of

compliance with
institution’s
responsibilities
under Title IV”

44. “Record of

required for
a change of
accreditor for
institution not on
sanction

43. ED approval

cedures” requirement regarding
branch campuses

42. “Additional pro-

“substantive
change” by
accreditors

41. Approval of

“credit hour”

40. Definition of

unequivocal
authority to
accreditors for
“Differentiated
Review”

39. *Provide

Accreditation-Related Regulations

Issue
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Potential Solution(s)

eligibility for
including temporary prohibitions of aid eligibility for convictions while receiving federal
federal student aid
aid. The inclusion of drug offense convictions into the aid process increases the complexity
and convictions
of the application process and only affects a small number of students every year.
for drug offenses

51. Link between

The current federal financial aid system includes provisions related to drug-related offenses, Remove the link between federal student aid eligibility and
drug convictions.

The prevailing mentality is that more information through mandatory disclosures will aid
Congress and the Department should be required to
consumers in their decision making. However, such extensive information, some of which consumer-test proposals for additional information and
is trivial, may, in fact, confuse and overwhelm them. The assumption that consumers can
disclosures from and about institutions before they are
make sense of an ever-increasing amount of information must be questioned.
implemented.
49. Gainful
Since July 2011, institutions have been required to disclose extensive items of information about The regulations should be streamlined to provide a limited
employment (GE) students enrolled in GE programs. The items involve student-based information related to the
number of key pieces of information most useful to consumdisclosures
institution, the GE program, as well as other programs in which the student is enrolled in a
ers. In addition, any proposed GE disclosures should be subparticular academic year. In addition to being burdensome to produce, the current volume and
ject to extensive consumer testing to determine whether the
level of detail of the reporting requirements and the questionable relevance of the disclosures
information is likely to be used in students’ decision making.
confuse rather than inform students, if they look at them at all. For example, even a low-cost
program that enrolls a very small number of students who borrow has to report but, depending
on the number of students, may or may not need to disclose the median loan debt incurred by
any or all of the following groups: students who completed the program during the most recent
year; students who withdrew from the program during the most recent year; or both groups of
students. Under the new GE rules, institutions will be required to provide approximately 30
pieces of information for every gainful employment program on their campus.
50. Link between
The FAFSA form includes a question about Selective Service registration. Colleges and
Remove the Selective Service link from the federal student
Selective Service
universities should not be tasked with resolving discrepancies between aid applicants and the aid system.
registration and
federal student aid Selective Service. It also creates barriers for students, especially for those applying for aid after
the age of 26, the age after which Selective Service registration is not required.
eligibility

disclosure
requirements in
general

48. Additional

Description of Problem(s)

Several sections of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) allow ED significant flex- Amend GEPA to provide flexibility for ED in enforcement
ibility in recovering federal funds in the K–12 arena. When dealing with K–12 entities, ED of technical violations by higher education institutions.
is able to reduce a claim based on mitigating circumstances, issue cease-and-desist orders
rather than immediately withholding funds, enter into a compliance agreement to allow a
recipient time to come into compliance, and forgive a portion of a debt in certain circumstances. However, there are no similar provisions for institutions of higher education.

Disclosure, Reporting and Other Requirements

flexibility
in resolving
violations

47. *ED lacks

Discretion for ED Enforcement Actions

Issue

ED=Department of Education
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Issue

Description of Problem(s)

Congress should prohibit ED from requiring accreditors to
review fire safety reports.

Require that the institution have a policy prohibiting copyright infringement, alert students to the policy, and make a
good-faith effort to discourage peer-to-peer file sharing.

Strike sections of regulations that require such level of detail.

Strike the provision.

Modify the provision to make it much less prescriptive and
to allow colleges to take steps to encourage students to
register to vote.

Strike the provision.

Strike the provision.

Potential Solution(s)

59. Proof of eligibility A student who has been approved for federal student aid purposes is, by definition, a legal Institutions seeking to employ students already approved for
for employment
U.S. resident or a U.S. citizen. And yet, when such students apply for on-campus employor receiving federal student aid should not be required to
for federal student
ment, institutions must still ask for, and students must still provide, additional documenta- seek additional documentation to determine employment
aid recipient for
tion proving that they are legally authorized to work for “I-9” purposes. This part of the I-9 eligibility of the same students for I-9 purposes.
“I-9” purposes
process is redundant and creates unnecessary burdens for institutions and students.

Disclosure, Reporting and Other Requirements cont.
52. Vaccination Policy Institutions are required to disclose their vaccination policy. The information is not useful
to students and not likely utilized by prospective students or parents. Even without this disclosure requirement, institutions will still maintain their vaccination policies per state laws.
53. Foreign Gift
Institutions are required to submit a detailed report of all foreign gifts or contracts over
Reporting
$250K, as well as any restricted gifts from foreign sources. This information is not of widespread interest and may be available from the other sources.
54. Voter Registration Institutions are required to distribute a voter registration form, in a federally specified time
Requirement
frame and format, to each student enrolled and physically in attendance at the institution.
We strongly support civic participation, especially voting. However, this is an overly prescriptive requirement with modest, at best, benefit.
55. Constitution Day Requiring institutions to hold an educational program pertaining to the U.S. Constitution
on a prescribed day (September 17) each year sets a bad precedent.
56. Information
HEA requires an institution to provide illustrative examples of the careers and employment
on graduates’
opportunities pursued by its graduates. The purpose of this legislative provision was to give
employment
students a general sense of opportunities pursued by an institution’s graduates based on
placement
various sources. However, ED regulations have required institutions to go even farther. If
institutions decide to calculate placement rates of programs for internal purposes (such as,
for example, how many philosophy majors are employed as attorneys in 20 years), they must
disclose that placement rate, even if such calculations may not provide useful information to
consumers.
57. Peer-to-peer file
Title IV requires institutions to have policies related to copyright infringement, including
sharing policy
unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing, to have plans to combat it, and to offer alternatives
to illegal downloading or file sharing. They must annually inform students of the penalties
associated with such copyright infringement. These provisions are too prescriptive and,
with new technologies this issue has become obsolete.
58. Accreditors’
As a result of subregulatory guidance, accreditors are required to review an institution’s
review of
compliance with fire codes. Accreditors do not have the knowledge or expertise to make
institutional fire
informed judgments in this area.
code compliance

APPENDIX II: Regulations Process Reform Chart
Development of
Regulations

Implementation of
Regulations

Enforcement of
Regulations

• GAO should review ED methodology
for estimating burden of regulations and
make recommendations for improvement.

• Allow adequate time
for implementation of
regulations.

• Extend GEPA protections
to colleges and
universities.

• “Neg Reg” improvements:
1. Change process for selecting
negotiators.
2. Facilitators should serve as
mediators and arbiters of fairness.
3. Minimize “bundling” of unrelated
issues.

• Answer questions in a
timely manner.

• Recognize “good faith”
by institutions.

• Publish and then
update compliance
calendar every year.

• Require ED to provide
the final report for a
Program Review within
60 days of the receipt of
the institution’s response.

• Create regulatory “safe harbors.”
• Regulations should not exceed
legislative language or Congressional
intent.
• The Department should follow “noticeand-comment” procedures when making
significant policy changes.

• Require ED to give
institutions at least
nine months between
the publication of
final regulations and
the initiation of any
related data collection.

• Write in plain language.
• Before any more consumer information
is collected from institutions, focusgroup test all new collections for
usefulness.

• Require ED to act in a
timely fashion.
• Require GAO to examine
whether the Department
has retrospectively
analyzed existing rules,
as required by Executive
Order 13563.
• Train regional staff
appropriately and
consistently.

• Create an ombudsman to act as a “gobetween” for institutions and federal
regulators, similar to the SBA Office of
Advocacy.
• Establish a small advisory board of
institutional officials to advise the
Secretary on regulatory burden.
• Subregulatory guidance should not stray
from underlying regulation/statute.

Changes That Could Improve Every Phase of the Process
• Develop “risk-based” regulations where appropriate.
• Commission outside experts to analyze departmental structure and practices with respect to regulations.

Feb. 2015
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The beginning of the 21st century has brought unprecedented change to the higher education community. The
last decade has produced significant increases in enrolled students, financial aid demands, numbers and variety
of institutions, types of educational delivery methods, and employer expectations, to name a few. Technological
developments are driving the pace of change on many fronts even more rapidly—a pace will likely increase in the
years to come.
Meanwhile, regulatory systems are not keeping up. Decades of statutory and regulatory amendments have created
a dense, labyrinthine thicket of rules and requirements that reflect competing priorities and changing compliance standards. Too much of the federal regulatory system relies on a one-size-fits-all reporting and enforcement
regime that is out of sync with the broad diversity among American institutions of higher education and numerous interests and needs of students. As a consequence, the system too often fails to direct limited oversight and
enforcement resources in the most effective, efficient manner. Without question, we need new regulatory strategies that can respond to these shifts and, as important, can prepare for the new changes on the horizon.
“Risk-informed” regulatory regimes have significant promise to
correct some of the problems of the past and help prepare the
system for today and tomorrow. These regimes present a fundamental shift in the regulatory paradigm. Instead of requiring the
institution to comply with every requirement and regulation,
institutions are required to comply with some baseline rules and
submit to a preliminary risk assessment. When that assessment
reveals a problem, regulators and/or their non-governmental partners may take additional action that ranges from requiring more
information or participation in technical assistance programs,
mandating corrective action, or – in worst case scenarios—applying sanctions.1 Risk-informed regimes reflect a hybrid of “deterministic” (one size fits all) and “risk-based” systems (regulatory
action only applies when a regulated entity presents a certain level
of risk, so some entities are not regulated at all).

Instead of requiring the institution
to comply with every requirement
and regulation, institutions are
required to comply with some
baseline rules and submit to a
preliminary risk assessment.
When that assessment reveals a
problem, regulators may take
additional action that ranges from
requiring more information or
participation in technical assistance
programs, mandating corrective
action, or – in worst case scenarios –
applying sanctions

Incorporating risk assessment into regulatory regimes has been endorsed by leading higher education organizations2 and by both sides of the political aisle.3 Supporting organizations recognize the prospective efficiency, as
1

2

3

See Jonathan Coburn and Greg Weddle, Risk-Based Regulation: Learning from the Experience of Others, BioProcess Int’l 22-23 (Sept.
2006).
See, e.g., Association of American Universities, AAU Submits Comments on Draft HEA Bill to Senator Harkin (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.aau.edu/policy/article.aspx?id=15447; Peter McPherson, Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, APLU
Comments on HEAA Discussion Draft (Aug. 22, 2014), available at: https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/
APLU%20HEAA%20Response%20Final%20082214.pdf; Molly Corbett Broad, American Council on Education, Recommendations
from 39 Higher Education Associations for the Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.acenet.edu/
news-room/Documents/HEA-Reauthorization-Recs-080213.pdf.
For instance, a bipartisan group of Senators endorsed the concept behind the Food and Drug Administration’s proposed risk-based
approach to the regulation of medical devices, while the group also emphasized the importance of transparency in communicating to
stakeholders to avoid confusion. Sens. Michael Bennet, Orrin Hatch, Tom Harkin, Lamar Alexander, Mark Warner, and Richard Burr,
Letter to Commissioner Hamburg (March 18, 2014) (“Given that a large number of medical mobile applications could be actively regulated under the statute using this definition, we appreciate the FDA’s decision to use a risk-based approach to regulation.”), http://www.
help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=2354f485-f387-40c4-80c9-158491f2fd1a; see also discussion drafts of HEA reauthorization and the America COMPETES Act, infra notes 34-35.
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well as better deployment of resources that risk-informed regimes can promote. Most proposals, however, only
include a brief reference to the concept without fully exploring the analytical foundations for successful adoption
and implementation of risk-informed systems—or even clear and comprehensive definitions that precisely define
the term.
This paper is intended to fill that void. It provides a vision and framework for prospective risk-informed federal
regulatory reform affecting American higher education to create more effective and streamlined oversight and
action aligned with the goals of the Higher Education Act (HEA). It is intended to inform and illustrate how
risk-informed approaches could work in the regulation of postsecondary education as a foundation for further
dialogue regarding specific recommendations that should be considered in the context of the reauthorization of
the HEA.4 Within the paper:
• Section II provides an overview of the relevant policy landscape that should inform any evaluation of

prospective risk-informed regulatory regimes in American higher education. It then provides a definition
of risk-informed regulation, elaborating on differences from other regulatory approaches and key elements
integral to the successful development of such a regime.
• Section III provides domestic and international illustrations of the incorporation of risk into various

regulatory settings.
• Section IV distills key design, implementation, and evaluation principles derived from risk-informed

experiences in other sectors and settings. It also provides a beginning list of sample policy areas where
risk-informed reform might be undertaken in higher education.
• Section V concludes the paper with recommendations and key questions for policymakers to consider.

The paper also includes two appendices: a prospective “process map” to inform future policy deliberations and a
recommended reading list.
♦♦♦
To design and implement risk-informed regimes successfully, policymakers, advocates, and practitioners—working together—must be willing to think creatively and to return to first principles for federal regulation (maintaining provisions for strong enforcement when needed). Some existing regulatory provisions will need to make way
for more efficient and effective regulatory regimes that can meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. (Meaningful regulation that ensures effective, impactful investment of federal funding in higher education should,
of course, be preserved.) In addition, risk-informed regimes may be established in ways that align with performance-based regimes, which are currently the subject of significant exploration and pursuit among various higher
education sectors and institutions.5
This paper focuses on identifying the models, conditions, and areas for exploration to guide future deliberations
4

5

This paper was developed with the support of Lumina Foundation at the request of the American Council on Education as part of its
work with the Task Force on Government Regulation of Higher Education, made up 16 higher education leaders appointed by a bipartisan group of U.S. Senators. It is intended to serve as a resource for the Task Force and to complement its Final Report. In keeping with
the Task Force’s scope, the paper primarily focuses on the U.S. Department of Education’s regulatory regimes under the HEA, but the
principles and concepts within the paper may be applied in a variety of other contexts that affect institutions of higher education, such
as requirements related to research grants funded by other federal agencies.
Although beyond the scope of this paper, the prospective alignment of federally-embedded risk-informed regimes in higher education
with performance-based, outcome-centered policies merits further attention – particularly in the context of the much-anticipated reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. See Arthur L. Coleman, Bethany M. Little, Teresa E. Taylor, and Katherine E. Lipper, Getting
Our House in Order (publication forthcoming in winter 2015).
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among policymakers and stakeholders in the higher education community. It does not propose that risk-informed
regimes are a panacea for all regulatory woes. As with any regulatory regime, there are strengths and challenges to
successful design, implementation, and evaluation. Those should be fully understood.
Correspondingly, the paper does not present an argument for an immediate and complete overhaul of the entire
federal regulatory system to incorporate risk-informed regimes. The graphic below illustrates one way of clustering the major areas of federal compliance for higher education institutions. Only some of these are likely both
appropriate and ripe for the incorporation of risk-informed regimes. In some cases, risk-informed systems will
never be appropriate. Civil rights enforcement, for example, is based on constitutionally-guaranteed individual
student rights—parameters that likely cannot and should not be adjusted based on the level of risk involved. In
other cases, data sources and systems are not yet mature enough to support the development of accurate, meaningful risk assessments.

Illustrative Sectors of HEA Institutional Requirements
Data
Reporting

Financial
Financial Aid
Accreditation
Responsibility Administration

Student
Safety

Audits and
Program
Reviews

Civil Rights
Enforcement

The paper strongly counsels that well-informed deliberation takes place before any risk-informed regime is
adopted and implemented. The problems in today’s regulatory environment for higher education institutions
built up over decades; they will not be solved in a month—or a year. We hope that this paper, however, can serve
as a foundation and resource for policymakers and stakeholders in higher education as risk-informed regimes are
considered, designed, implemented, and evaluated.

II. THE RELEVANT EDUCATION LANDSCAPE AND POTENTIAL FOR RISK-INFORMED REGULATION
A. The Regulatory and Policy Landscape
American higher education is provided by a vibrant array of colleges, universities, and other providers. More
than 7,000 institutions of higher education operate today—an increase of more than 500 in the past decade.6 In
addition to growth in the sector, many institutions are expanding internally, creating new programs that leverage
technology and can respond to the needs of students in a new way, such as competency-based learning models,
distance learning opportunities, and prior learning assessments.
The population of students has grown, too, as postsecondary credentials have become increasingly important
for sustainable employment. In the fall of 2012, there were 17.7 million undergraduate students and 2.9 million
graduate students attending degree-granting IHEs in the U.S. —an almost threefold increase from the 5.9 million
students enrolled in postsecondary programs when the HEA was originally passed in 1965.7 This growth can be
6

7

Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Fast Facts: Educational Institutions, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=84 (last accessed Oct.
26, 2014).
IPEDS, Condition of Education Report (updated May 2014), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_csb.asp; Thomas D. Snyder
and Sally A. Dillow, Inst. of Educ. Scis, Nat’l Ctr for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2012 319, t.221 (NCES 2014-015)
(2013). The pace of growth has been particularly brisk recently: enrollment at degree-granting institutions increased 32 percent between
2001 and 2011, from 15.9 million to 21 million. Id. at 307. And USED expects overall postsecondary enrollments to increase by 14
percent from 2011 to 2022. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Projections of Education Statistics to 2022, NCES 2014-051, 19 (Feb. 2014), http://
nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014051.pdf.
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largely attributed to the fact that, in most of today’s economy, postsecondary credentials are a pre-requisite to job
security and long-term financial health. The pay gap between college graduates and non-college graduates reached
a record high in 2013, as those with four-year degrees made 98 percent more an hour on average than people
without one.8
The federal regulatory regime has also significantly grown and evolved since HEA’s original passage—with both
Congress and the U.S. Department of Education (ED) adding layers of complexity (and significant burdens)
along the way. In exercising its regulatory oversight functions, ED tends to evaluate nearly all institutions in the
same way. But consequential institutional differences should be taken into account in regulatory responses, even if
systems are framed around common interests and metrics.
Enforcement tools tend to address deficits with blunt, one-size enforcement mechanisms, which can result in less
targeted, timely, and effective action. The loss of Title IV eligibility, in particular, would have an enormous impact
on students enrolled at an institution, and ED is often justifiably hesitant to use this enforcement tool. But that
means that ED might only act in the most egregious cases, and not have the intermediate processes in place to
take action that could help mitigate the impact of an identified problem.
Moreover, the regulatory landscape shifts
Despite capacity challenges and other limitations, the federal
frequently, creating an
government's influence and involvement in higher education will not
abate anytime soon as long as today's high demand for federal
unstable environment
financial aid continues.
that makes it more
difficult for institutions
The challenge will be how to prioritize and direct federal attention to
and non-governmental
those areas that merit the most significant oversight. Incorporating
risk assessments have significant potential to do just that.
partners to carry out
their responsibilities
under federal law.
This uncertainty is pervasive and contributes to unnecessarily high costs and ineffective deployment of limited
resources. In 2012 alone, through electronic announcements and Dear Colleague letters, ED issued at least 270
regulatory updates or modifications – more than one change per workday.9 At the same time, though Congress
has provided ED with various oversight tools (including the authority to close a school immediately), ED uses
these tools irregularly and idiosyncratically. In 2013, for example, the Department announced it would levy fines
on institutions for alleged violations that occurred in 1995—so nearly two decades passed between the violation
and ED’s levying of fines.10
This complex, unsettled terrain has a significant impact on institutions and their ability to fulfill their primary
missions of educating. Regulatory compliance burdens detract from their ability to focus more resources on
academic programs and services that directly benefit students. Calculating the cost of federal regulatory com8

9

10

This represents an increase from 89 percent five years earlier, 85 percent a decade earlier, and 64 percent in the early 1980s. David Leonhardt, Is College Worth It? Clearly, New Data Say, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2014), http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/upshot/iscollege-worth-it-clearly-new-data-say.html; see also U.S. Departments of Education and Treasury, The Economics of Higher Education 3
(Dec. 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/20121212_Economics%20of%20Higher%20Ed_vFINAL.pdf (“The
median weekly earnings of a full-time, bachelor’s degree holder in 2011 were 64 percent higher than those of a high school graduate
($1,053 compared to $638). The earnings differential grew steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s.”)
The gainful employment regulations alone spawned 43 separate Dear Colleague letters and electronic announcements further detailing
institutional reporting and disclosure requirements. Broad, supra note 2, at 20.
Id. at 16.
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pliance is challenging—largely because requirements implicate a wide range of administrative staff, institutional
leaders, and faculty members – but a few data points exist. A study of financial aid officers found that about two
thirds reported that their financial aid office was facing a moderate or severe resource shortage that affected their
ability to provide adequate personnel for administering Title IV programs and to provide adequate financial aid
counseling for students.11 Eighty percent of respondents identified greater regulatory / compliance workload as a
“major” factor behind the shortage.12 Hartwick College, a liberal arts college in New York, determined in 2012
that it spent about seven percent of its operating budget (nearly $300,000) annually on federal compliance related
activities.13 Similar studies have been launched at other institutions recently, including at Vanderbilt University.
It is important to recognize that ED is the smallest of Cabinet-level federal agencies, with limited staff resources.
Though the federal aid programs have grown six fold since the early 1980s, ED only employs 0.1 percent of the
total Executive Branch workforce, with the number of ED employees quite close to its levels in the late 1970s,
before it was a Cabinet-level agency.14 Its partners in oversight and accountability—states and recognized accrediting agencies—also have significant capacity challenges. Regulatory breadth strains the system and ED lacks
the capacity and expertise to do everything well and in a timely manner. And ED’s efforts to delegate additional
responsibilities to accrediting agencies has created new burdens that accrediting agencies are not always experienced or equipped to enforce. But the reality is that, despite these capacity challenges and other limitations,
the federal government’s influence and involvement in higher education will not abate anytime soon as long as
today’s high demand for federal financial aid continues. The challenge will be how to prioritize and direct federal
attention to those areas that merit the most significant oversight. Incorporating risk assessments have significant
potential to do just that.

11

12
13

14

Nat’l Ass’n of Student Financial Aid Administrators, Findings from the 2010 NASFAA Administrative Burden Survey (2011), http://
www.nasfaa.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=3903.
Id.
This represents $192,874 in salary costs, $30,900 in direct costs, and $11,515 accreditation costs. Kelly Zack-Decker, Compliance
at Hartwick College: A Special Report to the President of the College 4 (Dec. 2012), available at: http://www.naicu.edu/docLib/20130315_Compliance-HartwickColl-12-12.pdf.
USED currently has approximately 4,200 employees, compared with 3,000 in 1979—far fewer than the 17,000 projected in 1980 when
President Carter elevated USED to a Cabinet-level agency. White House, The Executive Branch, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch (last accessed Nov. 3, 2014); U.S. Dep’t of Educ., An Overview of the U.S. Department of Education (Sept.
2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/focus/what_pg2.html; United Press International, Education Department Created, The
Palm Beach Post (Oct. 18, 1979), available at: http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=0sZUAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ejsNAAAAIBAJ&pg=1984,3959160&dq=department+of+education&hl=en.
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B. An Overview of Risk-Informed Regulation
1. The Risk-Informed Concept
Risk-informed systems are best understood as part of a spectrum of regulatory approaches that ranges from
subjecting all regulated entities to highly prescriptive requirements to only requiring entities deemed risky to
regulatory oversight.15 This paper’s recommended risk-informed approach is in the middle of this spectrum, as
illustrated below. It is also important not to confuse a risk-informed system with a crisis management system, as
the former focuses on prioritizing and managing risks while the latter concerns procedures that will be activated
when a particular risk comes to fruition.
The more traditional or “deterministic” system uses the same rules and consequences for all regulated entities,
regardless of the level of risk they pose. Most federal requirements related to accreditation of institutions of higher
education qualify as deterministic. Historically, for instance, in order to grant accreditation status to institutions
as a pre-requisite for participation in federal financial aid programs, accrediting agencies must have been recognized by ED, as advised by the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI).
Because an accrediting agency is either recognized or not recognized, all agencies seeking recognition have been
required to submit the same documentation for the same level of review.
A fully risk-based system sets a threshold for acceptable risk and only subjects regulated groups to regulation if the
regulatory body deems them risky. As a result, regulated entities deemed not risky can completely bypass oversight and enforcement. For example, all agencies in the federal government have used common audit standards
that classify federal programs as “major” or “non major” (measured by the level of federal funding for the overall
program and for the specific recipient) and then determine whether recipients qualify as “low risk” or “high
risk.”16 If a recipient is granted low-risk status, it is exempted from several federal audit requirements for as long as
it undergoes no major changes.17 These rules allow auditors to avoid performing time consuming risk assessments
for relatively small federal programs, focus their attention on those programs most likely to present problems, and
relieve those with strong performance records of some regulatory burdens.

15

16

17

These ideas were drawn from a number of scholarly works, particularly Coburn and Weddle, supra note 1; Julia Black and Robert
Baldwin, Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation, 32 L.& Pol’y 181, 184-85 (2010); and Peter May, Performance-Based Regulation,
Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance Working Paper No. 2(April 2010), http://regulation.huji.ac.il/papers/jp2.pdf.
Auditors make a holistic determination of risk using factors including current and prior audit results (e.g., evidence of weak or multiple
internal controls and prior audit findings indicates higher risk); results from oversight and monitoring by relevant federal agencies (e.g.,
monitoring that identified significant programs indicates higher risk; and the inherent risk of the program (e.g., greater program complexity or new programs indicates higher risk). OMB Super Circular §§200.518-520, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590, 78670-72 (Dec. 26, 2013),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-26/pdf/2013-30465.pdf.
Low-risk entities are only obligated to be audited for the following programs: (1) All major programs not identified as low risk; (2) all
non-major programs identified as high risk; and (3) any additional programs to fulfill “percentage of coverage” rules. On the third group
of programs, federal auditors are generally required to audit major programs that make up at least 40 percent of the total federal awards
expended on the entity. If major programs do not comprise at least 40 percent, the auditor must select additional programs (either major
or non-major) to include in the audit. For low risk auditees, the percentage is dropped to 20 percent, meaning that it is less likely that
the auditor is required to include additional programs in the audit to fulfill the percentage of coverage rule. Id. at §200.518(f ); see also
Am. Inst. of CPAs, OMB Circular A-133 Audit Refresher –Major Programs (2008), http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/governmentalauditquality/resources/ombcirculara133/ombcirculara-133auditrefresher-majorprograms/pages/default.aspx.
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Understanding the Risk-Related Regulatory Design Spectrum

Deterministic

Uses the same rules
and consequences
for all regulated
entities, regardless
of the level of risk
they pose

Riskinformed

Requires all
regulated entities to
follow some
baseline rules, but
requirements will
differ based on the
nature of risk
presented by
different entities

Riskbased

Sets a threshold for
acceptable risk and
only subjects
regulated entities to
regulation if
deemed risky

A risk-informed system adopts a hybrid approach, combining risk-based enforcement mechanisms with baseline
deterministic regulatory rules. All regulated groups must follow those baseline rules and submit to a preliminary
risk assessment, but the regulatory response will differ based on the degree of risk presented by different groups.
Systems vary, but risk-informed systems commonly involve targeting enforcement resources on the basis of
assessment of risk that a regulated entity poses to the regulator’s objectives—which may be paired with additional requirements for supplying information on those entities that pose greater risks. Several examples of this
approach are provided in Section III.
To illustrate differences between these regimes, imagine an obstacle course that a set of Army recruits must
complete to be eligible for active duty. The “risk” here would be that recruits would fail to perform in active duty,
putting themselves and their fellow soldiers in danger. A traditional regulatory or deterministic system would
require all recruits to complete the obstacle course regardless of past performance or ability. On the other end
of the spectrum, a risk-based system would require only those recruits with certain risk factors to complete the
obstacle course, such as failure to complete prior physical tests, existing health conditions, or other indicators
that they may be less able to serve effectively as an active solider. Between the two extremes, risk-informed system
would require all recruits to pass through a portion of the obstacle course, but require only those recruits with
identified risk factors to complete a second portion. (This portion would be optimally designed to test different
levels of risk for different recruits, such as an extra climbing exercise for recruits with a fear of heights, an extra
weight lifting exercise for recruits with less demonstrated strength, or an extra leadership exercise for recruits who
did not participate sufficiently in prior group activities.)
Extending this illustration to a higher education setting, a risk-informed system might require all institutions
to overcome a baseline “obstacle” of key reporting and data collection requirements, as well as a confirmation of
accreditation status and state authorization. For those institutions with indicators of risks of financial instability,
additional assurances may be appropriate to ensure that the institution’s financial health is sufficient to support
its students. (Indeed, ED already has a requirement similar to this.) For institutions with a low graduation rate,
additional information on transfer rates may help to overcome concerns about the institution’s graduation rate.
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2. Core Functions Within Risk-Informed Regimes
Determining whether to pursue the development of a risk-informed regime requires comprehensive understanding of the primary functions in these systems.18 A review of the frameworks behind risk-informed regimes in
several countries found that, despite significant variation in the details, five functions are common:19
1. Defining the purpose and goals of the system in terms of specific risks. It is important to distinguish
overarching, big picture risks from the specific, measurable risks that go into a risk-assessment. Some risk
will always be present within the system, and this step should focus on defining the precise risk that the
regulatory regime seeks to assess and avoid. For example, ED’s financial responsibility requirements for
institutions (described in detail on page 24) are intended to assess the specific risk of imminent closure—
not a general examination of whether an institution is financially responsible.
2. Determining the responsible agency or organization’s own risk appetite. This step has proved to be
“extremely challenging” for regulators and their non-governmental partners responsible for risk-informed
regimes.20 Political risks—including reactions from politicians, the media, stakeholders, and the general
public—are always present, and may be particularly strong in the design and early implementation stages.
3. Assessing the risk and its likelihood of occurrence. Two broad categories of risk are usually involved in a
risk assessment: (1) risks inherent to activity within the sector; and (2) individual entities’ efforts to manage and control those risks.21 Though they can be combined in different ways, inherent risks and management/control risks work together to provide a complete picture of the risks posed by an individual entity.
Metrics for these risks should center on what really matters within the regime—and what is most appropriate for the responsible agency or regulatory partner. Some regimes are highly quantitative (e.g., financial responsibility ratios) while others may be more qualitative and, therefore, rely more on the informed
professional judgment of those performing the risk assessment (e.g., accreditation).22
4. Assigning scores or ratings to regulated entities on the basis of risk assessments. Many systems use relatively
simple “red,” “yellow,” and “green” categories to differentiate different levels of risk (one example of this is
given on the next page). Others have a more granular system with many categories; the Financial Services
Authority in the United Kingdom, for example, has 15 different categories.23 Ideally, data and information
necessary for risk assessments can be acquired through existing mechanisms to avoid new compliance
burdens.
5. Linking regulatory responses and resources to scores or ratings categories ( for individual regulated
entities and/or for system-wide issues. Regulatory responses should be targeted at providing support to
address identified problems and imposing more significant consequences for egregious or repeat violations. Generally, requirements should be loosened when low risk is presented and should be tightened
when medium or high risk is presented.
Additionally, ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the system and its effects is essential, with particular focus in
early years to allow for fine-tuning.
18

19
20
21
22
23

These functions presuppose that an appropriate issue or program area for risk-informed regulation has been identified. Not all areas of a
system will be optimal candidates for a risk-informed regime. Implementation should only take place in areas where appropriate foundations are present (e.g., legal authority, sufficient data systems, and stakeholder support).
Black and Baldwin, supra note 15, at 184-85.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Id. at 185.
Id.
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Fully developed risk-informed systems are usually graphically depicted to illustrate how risk and regulatory
response relate under different conditions. The Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) developed the
graphic on the next page to show how impact and probability guide risk assessments and regulatory responses.24

The FSCO defines “green” entities as those that present low probability and low impact risk. This group is
required to support that determination, but—once that determination is made—need not do more. In such cases,
FSCO only provides general updates and communications; no specific plan to engage individual entities within
this category exists. For “yellow” entities that present low probability but high impact of risk, FSCO proactively
supervises through ongoing monitoring, regular reporting, and possibly site visits. For the other “yellow” entities
that present high probability but low impact risk, FSCO will monitor with less rigor that the low probability /
high impact group (given that the impact of risk is lower), but will regularly monitor and engage on specific issues
identified. “Red” entities present high probability and high impact risk. Because these entities present such a
significant danger, they require the most FSCO time and effort through regular interactions, proactive measures
to mitigate risks, site visits, and—in egregious cases—enforcement actions.
The regulation of scientific laboratories provides a useful illustration of these concepts.25 A laboratory with “high
impact” risk involves experiments with highly hazardous materials such as plutonium or uranium. In those cases,
the danger to the public is high enough to merit proactive regulatory supervision, even if the laboratory only has
a handful of researchers. A laboratory with “high probability” risk might involve many researchers working on
many experiments. These projects may not involve highly hazardous materials (so the impact of the risk is low),
but the frequency and number of experiments increases the probability of something going wrong. In those cases,
regulatory monitoring is appropriate to keep an eye on potential problems. When both risk conditions are present—highly hazardous materials with a large number of experiments and researchers involved—regulators and
their non-governmental partners may need to intervene with stronger regulatory tools to protect public safety.
But when neither risk condition is present—no highly hazardous materials and a smaller number of experiments
and researchers involved—regulators likely only need to ensure that those laboratories receive appropriate education about regulatory changes and other key developments.
These concepts can also be applied to higher education. One example might involve assessing the risk of students
24

25

Financial Services Commission of Ontario, Risk-Based Regulation: Framework Document 4 (2011), http://www.fsco.gov.on.ca/en/
pensions/fsco_consultations/Documents/Framework_Final.pdf.
The principles undergirding this simple illustration are reflected more robustly in several federal statutes, including the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (which governs the safe generation, storage, transport, and disposal of hazardous chemical waste), and the Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act. See The Nat’l Acads Press, Prudent
Practices in the Laboratory: Handling and Disposal of Chemicals 198 (1995).
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at an institution eventually defaulting on their loans. At a very basic level, those colleges and universities with a
large number of students taking out loans would have a higher probability of default, while those with very high
tuition or very high borrowing amounts would have a higher impact of default because repayment would be a
more significant financial burden. (Additional risk indictors could be built into a system, but these indicators are
provided simply for illustrative purposes.) Regulatory responses by ED and its partners could be designed to focus
most on those institutions with both risk conditions present, while designing supportive monitoring and supervision efforts for those institutions with one of the risk conditions present.
3. Benefits and Costs
When considering the plausibility of pursuing a risk-informed regime, the potential benefits and challenges inherent to that model should be fully understood.26 Fundamentally, the approach provides an opportunity to realign
regulatory requirements with the primary risks that rules and regulations are intended to prevent. Correspondingly, these regimes allow regulators and their non-governmental partners to acknowledge differences among
regulated entities and to develop more systematic responses to the variety of unique circumstances presented
within a regulatory area.
At the same time, however, these regimes require significant investment in the design process, particularly in
identifying appropriate metrics and thresholds. Though most stakeholders are likely to embrace risk-informed
regulation conceptually, that support can evaporate when the work of setting metrics and thresholds actually
takes place – particularly if a metric or threshold is likely to place an entity or group in a higher risk category.
Finally, risk-informed regimes are intended to reduce burden for strong performers and to increase it when performance is lagging (according to a range of different responses). But this may implicate significantly more regulatory
activity and responsibilities for regulators and their non-governmental partners, particularly in the early years of
transition to the new system. These challenges do not negate the benefits—but policymakers should approach
risk-informed regimes fully aware of the potential investments that are certainly implicated and the downsides
that may be centrally relevant to any such endeavor.

26

This discussion was informed significantly by several scholarly sources, particularly Coburn and Weddle, supra note 1; Baldwin and
Black, supra note 15; Financial Services Commission of Ontario, supra note 24; as well as the various U.S. and international models
discussed in Section III infra.
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Risk-Informed Decision Making in American Higher Education
Incorporating risk into decision making is not foreign concept to American higher education. Indeed, many
colleges and universities already embed risk assessments into strategic planning efforts and employ a chief
risk officer. Many even develop their own impact versus probability charts similar to the graphic on page
10 to determine which risks to accept, monitor, or mitigate and control. And, as a response to institutions’
tendency to focus on risk only in the negative, the University Risk Management and Insurance Association
(URMIA) was founded by various U.S. institutions to promote a more positive view of risk management in
universities.
Moreover, accrediting agencies—key actors within the federal regime who address issues of institutional and
provide quality—have begun to incorporate risk into their accreditation decision making process. For example, the Western Association of Schools and Colleges Senior College & University Commission (WASC
Senior) has developed considerable variability in its responses to findings of accreditation reports similar to
the “red-yellow-green” responses described earlier in this paper. Depending on the level of strength (and level
of risk, determined holistically), WASC Senior varies the term of years before the next required accreditation
review cycle from seven to ten years. For institutions demonstrating a need for close monitoring, WASC
Senior has tiers of follow-on requirements (e.g., progress reports, special visits, and notices of concern).
These developments in the higher education community illustrate the appeal of incorporating risk into the
regulation of higher education. The concept is already familiar to the regulated community of institutions
and has been a useful tool for these complex organizations to bring greater prioritization and focus to their
work. It comes as little surprise, then, that the concept has been endorsed in current postsecondary legislative
proposals. One draft HEA reauthorization bill calls for ED to conduct “risk-based reviews” for at least two
percent of IHEs for program reviews (and names several conditions for prioritization of reviews). And draft
bill to reauthorize the COMPETES Act includes a provision that requires the study of risk-based regulatory
procedures for determining requirements for evaluation requirements for federal research awards.

III. HOW RISK-INFORMED AND RISK-BASED REGULATORY APPROACHES HAVE BEEN PURSUED AND
APPLIED IN OTHER SETTINGS
Before launching into recommendations for new risk-informed regimes in the regulation of higher education, a
careful examination of more mature risk-informed systems is called for. At a basic level, these illustrations bring
this paper’s general discussion of the functions and design elements to life. And understanding these systems, both
in design and execution, can significantly enhance perspectives regarding the prospective improvement of our
higher education system—may help inform the identification of viable areas of higher education regulation that
are strong candidates for adoption of new risk-informed systems. This section explores existing risk-informed and
risk-based systems in multiple sectors in the U.S as well as risk-informed systems being developed in postsecondary regulatory systems in Australia and the United Kingdom.

A. Illustrations from Other Sectors
Risk-informed and risk-based systems have their origins in the latter decades of the 20th century, when industrialized nations became more interested in deregulation initiatives and a shift toward the private sector-style
management methods including the use of cost-benefit analyses. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission provided
early leadership in the field of American regulation, while the Basel Accords on requirements for capital systems
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led the way internationally through a voluntary series of agreements. Today, risk-informed approaches have been
established or are emerging in a variety of sectors, including the regulation of scientific laboratories and health
information technology firms.
Risk-informed regulation has been used in some form by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) since the
late 1970s.27 Its status as an early adopter and decades of experience with these systems make the NRC an appropriate starting point. Indeed, the NRC conducted a rigorous review of regulatory approaches before adopting its
risk-informed system, which has served as guidance for this paper and for many others on risk-informed regimes.28
The NRC’s risk policy mandates that the risk of cancer fatalities of people living near a nuclear power plant
cannot exceed 0.1 percent of the sum of cancer fatality risks from all other sources, and licenses will only be given
to power plants who meet the requirements in the policy for an acceptable level of safety to the public.29 The
Commission complements these requirements with regulations based on probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to
assess the likelihood and consequences of severe reactor accidents.
The Federal Reserve Board oversees a risk-informed capital system that weighs the risks inherent in the different types of loans offered by a bank and determines how much capital a bank needs to possess in order to be
protected upon default. This system is part of a voluntary, global effort that started in the 1970s in response the
increasing internationalization of economies and capital flow—and the large foreign currency losses many banks
were experiencing when the system allowed a bank to have three times the exposure in foreign markets than its
available capital.30 Foundations were laid during a 1975 meeting of the G-10 countries, followed by successive
Basel Capital Accords among many countries.31 “Basel III” is currently being implemented, which includes significant changes to respond to banking strategies that led to the global financial crisis.32 Notably, the same problem
that led to Basel I—too much exposure and not enough capital—was a significant reason for the financial crisis
in 2007–09.33 This history demonstrates the importance of remaining grounded in the original purpose of the
system, but revising standards and metrics to meet new challenges.
The success of the Basel Accords has led to risk-based capital rules being expanded to financial institutions in the
U.S. other than banks. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, a standard-setting and regulatory
support system created by the insurance regulators from each state, also employs a risk-based capital system based
on the Basel Accords to ensure that insurance companies have adequate levels of capital.34 And other countries
have expanded Basel principles even further, with some converting all financial regulation to a risk-based system.
Since 1976, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has used a risk-based approach to classify medical devices,
using the degree of control necessary to assure the safety of effectiveness of the devices as a risk barometer.35 The
27
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Coburn and Weddle, supra note 1.
William D. Travers, Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulation (March 1, 1999), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/1998/1998-144srm.pdf.
U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, Fact Sheet on Nuclear Reactor Risk ( June 30, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/
fact-sheets/reactor-risk.html.
Bank for Int’l Settlements, History of the Basel Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (updated Oct. 28, 2014).
Id.; Capital Standards for Banks: The Evolving Basel Accord, Fed. Reserve Bulletin 395 (Sept. 2003).
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems 2 (rev.
June 2011), www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
Id.
Nat’l Ass’n of Insurance Comm’rs, Risk Based Capital General Overview 1 (2009) http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_capad_RBCoverview.pdf.
The statutorily created device classes are: (1) Class I devices are generally low risk and are mostly exempt from premarket review and
are subject—unless exempt—to the requirements for reporting of adverse events, manufacturing and design controls, registration and
listing, and other “general” controls. Surgical apparel and surgeon’s gloves are examples of Class I devices. (2) Class II devices implicate
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FDA has created a comprehensive listing of about 1,700 types of medical devices, each of which has been assigned
one of three risk categories. The success of this approach led Congress to instruct the FDA, in consultation
with other relevant federal agencies, to propose a strategy and recommendations on “an appropriate, risk-based
regulatory framework pertaining to health information technology, including mobile medical applications, that
promotes innovation, protects patient safety, and avoids regulatory duplication for a health information technology (health IT) framework.”36 The resulting report proposes to clarify oversight of health IT products based on
a product’s function and the potential risk to patients who use it.37 The report makes an instructive observation
for many sectors in its discussion, “Ultimately, the Agencies recognize that any categorization scheme will be
imperfect and may need to adapt over time. Nevertheless, we believe that this proposed functional categorization
can both assist the Agencies in avoiding regulatory duplication and prompt meaningful policy discussions with
stakeholders to identify and clarify unresolved areas of ambiguity.”38

B. International Examples in Postsecondary Education
Even though important contextual differences exist, experiences in other countries can be useful illustrations of
how the design and implementation of risk-informed regimes has worked in practice. This section explores systems in Australia and the United Kingdom.
1. Australia
In Australia, the Tertiary Education Quality Standards Agency (TEQSA) began operating in 2012 as the
national quality standards agency for the 37 public institutions, four private institutions, and 131 other providers
that make up the Australian system of higher education.39 TEQSA’s establishment followed on the opening of
Australia’s public institutions in 2009 to a “demand-driven” system as caps on bachelors-degree enrollment were
removed and institutions were allowed to increase enrollment based on student demand.40
Under TEQSA, Australian degree-granting institutions have the authority to self-accredit their courses through
academic boards or similar internal bodies. But they must do so under the Higher Education Standards Frame-
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generally moderate or well-understood risks, are subject to general controls, are usually subject to premarket review, and subject to
enumerated “special controls” that are closely tailored to the specific risks presented by that particular device type. Ear, nose, and chin
prostheses are examples of Class II devices. (3) Class III: Devices that generally present high or poorly understood risks. In addition
to general controls, Class III devices are subject to premarket approval and certain other regulatory controls. A special injectable paste
designed to augment or reconstruct a vocal cord is an example of a Class III device. Food and Drug Admin. (FDA), Overview of Device
Regulation, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/default.htm (last updated June 26, 2014);
FDA, Device Classification Panels, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051530.htm (last updated June 26, 2014); FDA, FCC, ONC, FDASIA Health IT Report: Proposed Strategy and Recommendations for a Risk-Based Framework 29, n.76 (April 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM391521.pdf.
FDASIA Health IT Report, supra note 42, at 3.
The three risk categories within the proposed system are: (1) Products with administrative health IT functions that pose little or no risk
to patient safety and thus require little to no additional oversight or attention (e.g., software for billing, claims processing, and scheduling). (2) Products with health management heath IT functions that pose sufficiently low risk so they do not require significant oversight
(e.g., software for health information and data management, electronic access to clinical results, and clinical decision support software).
For this category, the FDA proposes relying primarily on coordinated regulatory activities among different agencies, supported by
private sector capabilities, and tools for testing, certification, and accreditation. (3) A final group of products with medical device health
IT functions that pose greater risks to patients if they do not perform as intended (e.g., computer-aided detection software, software
for bedside monitor alarms, and radiation treatment software). The FDA proposes to continue regulating these products as it currently
regulates all health IT functions. Id. at 11-13.
Id. at 11.
Hon. Dr. David Kemp and Andrew Norton, Review of the Demand Driven Funding System—Final Report 77 (2014), http://docs.
education.gov.au/system/files/doc/other/review_of_the_demand_driven_funding_system_report_for_the_website.pdf.
Discussion of the Australian system was informed by an interview with Andrew Norton, co-author of the report cited in note 34, and
several representatives of Australian institutions, which took place on October 22, 2014. Notes from the interview on file with the
authors.
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work and they must be registered annually with TEQSA. (TEQSA also approves each course at most non-institution providers through a separate process.)
TEQSA’s actions represented a significant change for Australian institutions because, prior to 2012, most regulation was conducted through state governments. Though states took different regulatory approaches (some
were more expansive than others), they generally adopted a very light touch regulatory approach. But in the first
decade of the 21st century, Australia—like the U.S.—saw a large expansion in the higher education and vocational training sectors driven by growing student populations (particularly international students) and demand
for financial aid. The failure of some new institutions and some questionable student recruitment practices led
to increased scrutiny of oversight regimes for institutions. A review in 2008 of Australia’s postsecondary funding
system triggered a broader legislative effort to create a more rigorous national system of regulation by enhancing
requirements that public institutions participate in a national quality agency’s review process as a condition for
qualifying for student aid from the national government. Policymakers also saw a more rigorous quality control
system as a precondition for expanding aid programs to students at private institutions.
Notably, risk assessment was embedded in the TEQSA bill by the Australian Parliament on the recommendation
of the higher education community.41 An early bill would have created a much more prescriptive agency to mirror
Australian agencies in other sectors. The Australian higher education sector responded by proposing that regulation be determined in proportion to risk. The final law was initially seen as a victory by Australian institutions.
Under that law, TEQSA’s review process for degree-granting institutions includes an initial review using three
guiding principles: risk assessment, proportionality, and intervention only when necessary. Through its risk assessment framework and the use of risk assessments, TEQSA aims to:
• Reduce regulatory burden by using risk assessments to inform a differentiated approach to evidence and

reporting requirements;
• Strengthen the protection of students’ interests and the sector’s reputation by monitoring key aspects of

providers’ operations during review periods;
• Encourage TEQSA case managers and providers to engage early with providers about emergent issues;

and
• Support quality improvement by sharing information with providers about potential risks and good prac-

tices in the sector.42
Importantly, TEQSA uses risk assessments to identify potential risks of non-compliance (or “leads” that warrant
additional consideration by TEQSA case manager)—not to draw conclusions about compliance with regulatory
or other legal standards.43 Instead, TEQSA uses the risk assessment as a basis for determining how to respond to
providers based on the issues identified in the risk assessment.
TEQSA defines risk in four key areas: (1) regulatory history and standing; (2) student profiles and outcomes
(measured by student load, student attrition rate, progress rate, completions, student satisfaction, and graduate
41
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Incorporation of risk in TEQSA’s process was partially due to the fact that, during the global financial crisis, Australia’s banking system
survived mostly intact – which much of the Australia public attributed to Australia’s risk-based financial regulatory system. This public
sentiment influenced the Australian government’s reauthorization of higher education-related legislation in 2011. TEQSA, A Snapshot
of TEQSA (2013); Self-Accrediting Authority, TEQSA (2012), http://www.teqsa.gov.au/for-providers/self-accrediting-authority.
Australian Government Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, TEQSA’s Risk Assessment Framework Version 2.0 2
(March 2014), http://www.teqsa.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/TEQSARiskAssessFramework2014_0.pdf.
Id.
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destination); (3) academic staff profile (measured by qualifications of senior academic leaders, student to staff
ratio, and academic staff on casual work contracts); and (4) current and historical financial viability. TEQSA has
developed a list of specific risk indicators for each area44 and TEQSA’s evaluation uses a simple rating system of
high, moderate, or low risk (represented by traffic colors) for each.
Risk thresholds are considered in the context of other information and are not the sole determinants of risk. For
annual risk assessments of institutions, TEQSA considers past and present documentation and reference material,
statistical analysis of the sector, experience from previous risk cycles, and any special considerations related to the
nature of the indicators.45 TEQSA keeps the actual numeric thresholds confidential, but does publish its standard
thresholds.46 Providers are thus aware of general expectations and what data and information will be assessed, but
are unaware of the precise point at which their risk drops below a risk threshold.
TEQSA combines the information from these sources and makes a judgment about the risks of the provider
against the identified threshold. Importantly, TEQSA’s overall evaluation examines both risk to an institution’s
students and risk to its financial position.47 TEQSA calculates risk holistically, meaning even when a higher education provider falls below a threshold, success in other priority areas may balance the provider’s overall quality,
eliciting less or no regulatory response from TEQSA.48 From this rating, TEQSA takes one of the following five
steps:
1. Formal regulatory action outside the scheduled review process, e.g., undertaking a compliance assessment
or imposing formal conditions on registration for institutions
2. Consideration of issue during scheduled regulatory review
3. Formal request for information
4. Recommendation that the institution carefully monitor and/or put into place appropriate controls or
improvement strategies
5. No action49
TEQSA keeps its risk assessments confidential, and only shares them with providers if the institution receives an
overall moderate or high risk rating, has significant gaps in data (or otherwise causes TEQSA to have no confidence in the data), requests a copy, or faces registration renewal.50 Because of this—and the fact that TEQSA
relies on existing information in its systems (e.g., providers’ annual reporting requirements)—burdens on providers are limited. In many cases, providers do not have any responsibilities to interact with unless there is an identified issue. In other words, low-risk providers have very low burdens related to TEQSA’s risk assessment.
TEQSA’s early years have not been without controversy. Australian institutions broadly endorsed these design
elements (including the incorporation of risk-informed regimes), but believed that TEQSA pushed an overly
prescriptive interpretation of statutory requirements, mandating significant new reporting requirements and
pouring significant staff time into institutional reviews that went beyond the intentions of the Parliament.51
44
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Id. at Appendix 1.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 4.
Part of the challenge for the longstanding public institutions is that they had long enjoyed very light regulation and a reputation for
quality. But, when TEQSA was established, institutions suddenly had to provide data and information to support their claims of quality.
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Another challenge was that TEQSA had been established before Australia’s national standards for postsecondary
quality were revised (a process that has now been initiated), meaning that TEQSA lacked important foundations
to justify its more outcomes-oriented approach. As a result, the Australian Parliament commissioned a study of
TEQSA’s performance, which concluded, “TEQSA, while subject to criticism for bureaucratic over-reach, is now
effectively preventing sub-standard higher education courses in both public and private institutions. The existence
of a system of standard setting, with appropriate monitoring and enforcement, has a significant bearing on any
decision to expand the scope of the demand driven system.”52
As a result of the report and mounting political pressure, several actions were taken to reduce burdens on institutions and to streamline TEQSA processes. TEQSA deemed 2013–14 the “year of reform” and reduced evidence
requirements by tailoring assessment processes for low risk providers; reduced timelines for completing course
accreditation and re-accreditation assessments; and reduced annual risk assessment requests for information
by drawing on existing data.53 TEQSA has also increased its efforts to engage with the higher education sector.
Finally, significant personnel changes have taken place in 2014, with the founding chief commissioner of TEQSA
placed on leave in June 2014 and the agency staff significantly downsized—deliberate decisions to force TEQSA
to focus its review process on the most essential elements.
Notably, the concept of risk within the TEQSA system has not been the target of critics and remains a regulatory
concept that both the government and institutions support.54 The challenge for TEQSA now will be to develop
proportional procedures that reduce burdens on low risk providers and focus agency resources on high risk providers.
2. United Kingdom (U.K.)
The British context mirrors that in Australia in two key ways. First, the U.K. is currently moving toward a more
“market-based” system of higher education that allows for enrollment in institutions to be based not on pre-allotted quotas but on student demand. Second, Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)—a
public body not situated in any government department or agency—is moving toward a risk-informed system in
which regulators will conduct fewer and less frequent reviews on institutions that have long records of quality in
higher education and more thorough and frequent review of institutions with short records or records lacking
quality.55
HEFCE acts as a broker between institutions and the U.K. government with authority to determine the conditions for government funding for institutions and to distribute those funds. 56 Under a new framework released in
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Kemp and Norton, supra note 46, at 3. Other specific findings from the report included:
• All existing institutions “aware that their actions and performance, including any rapid expansion under the demand driven system,
are potentially subject to scrutiny from TEQSA.”
• Though not a formal complaint resolution agency, TEQSA keeps records of complaints and, when “multiple credible complaints
suggest there may be a significant problem, TEQSA is able to investigate further.”
• New institutions and providers face “a very significant barrier to entering the higher education system” by virtue of TEQSA’s registration process.
• TEQSA’s standards are rigorous, and the body “has rejected provider registration and course approval requests that do not meet the
standards and has applied conditions to other approvals to ensure that the standards are met.” The report concludes, “This third-party
scrutiny contributes to our confidence that Australia’s higher education system can accommodate increasing numbers of students and
higher education providers without compromising quality.”
Australian Government Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, TEQSA Annual Report 2013-14 2 (tabled in Parliament
Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.teqsa.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/TEQSA2014AnnualReport_FullReportWeb.pdf.
Norton et al. interview, supra note 47.
UK Dep’t of Bus., Innovation and Skills, Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System 10 (2011).
HEFCE, Memorandum of assurance and accountability between HEFCE and institutions: Terms and conditions for payment of
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the summer of 2014, HEFCE includes confidential risk assessments as conditions of funding. These assessments
use institutions’ annual accountability reports (a requirement for funding eligibility), outputs of the institution’s
internal and external auditors, information from other public bodies, and HEFCE’s own audit and assurance
work.57 Results are provided to the applicable institutional leaders.58 These risk assessments will normally remain
confidential for three years, and then be released to the public. HEFCE considers this three-year period to be an
appropriate period of time to allow institutions found to be high risk to address issues and reduce its classification.59
HEFCE judges an institution to be “at higher risk” when, on the basis of all available evidence, it:
• Faces threats to the sustainability of its operations, either immediately or in the medium term,
• Has serious problems relating to value for money, propriety or regularity (that is, whether funds are used

for the purpose intended), or
• Has materially ineffective risk management, control, or corporate governance.

When it judges that an institution “does not meet” or “requires improvement to meet” its standards then fails to
make the necessary improvements through a relatively low-burden follow-up process, HEFCE will step in and
require regular meetings. HEFCE has explained that its greater involvement in such cases is justified “because it
has a clear regulatory interest to ensure that [institutions] in receipt of public funds provide value for money and
are responsible in their use of these funds.”60 HEFCE expects institutions in this process to improve. If improvements do not occur, however, HEFCE may apply sanctions in “exceptional” cases, including the withdrawal of
some or all HEFCE funding.
Implementation has gone more slowly than initially proposed due to the concern from the field that the categorization and ranking of higher education institutions could pose political challenges, could create a large burden
from initial investment as regulated groups compile the necessary data, and could place more regulatory burdens
on new institutions than under the old regulatory scheme.61 Though HEFCE has implemented the new risk
assessments, it is still working with stakeholders to determine appropriate risk thresholds.62

IV. PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE ACTION AND PROSPECTIVE RISK-INFORMED REGIMES TO CONSIDER
Developing effective risk-informed regimes that are a net benefit to regulators, their non-governmental partners, and the regulated community requires a significant investment of time and resources from many different
stakeholders. Any new regimes will likely take many months to be designed and many years to mature. Moreover,
new or enhanced risk-informed regimes are likely to require traditional regulatory structures to give way to new
requirements and processes. And they will need to be coherently integrated into a larger regulatory regime that

57
58
59

60
61

62

HEFCE grants to higher education institutions 1 ( June 2014), http://www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/pubs/2014/201412/
HEFCE2014_12.pdf.
Id. at 20-21.
Id.
HEFCE does allow for limited release of risk assessment results before the three years have elapsed in two exceptional cases: (1) if other
public funders and other regulators to need the results to make their own assessments of risk, or (2) if the National Audit Office needs
to discuss the results at the Public Accounts Committee or disclose them in a published report. Additionally, HEFCE will make results
public (after notifying institutions) at any stage if it has “strong grounds for believing that it is in the collective student or the public
interest to do so.” Id. at 4–5.
Id.
Roger King, The Risks of Risk-Based Regulation: The Regulatory Challenges of the Higher Education White Paper for England 3-7
(2011).
See HEFCE, supra note 63.
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will likely include other non-risk-informed provisions. In addition, regulators and the regulated community
must have confidence in each other that the new regime will be designed and implemented—and responded to
by institutions—in good faith. Otherwise, prospects for success are likely slim. Policymakers should initiate this
process, therefore, with clear eyes about what new legislation or regulation will precipitate and what investments
and commitments from various stakeholders will be required.
This section provides guiding principles for developing risk-informed systems, starting with the conditions that
must be in place before starting the process and then exploring key factors for system design, implementation, and
evaluation and improvement.63 With these principles in place, the second half of this section identifies prospective opportunities for risk-informed regimes within the current federal postsecondary regulatory system.

A. Guiding Principles
Based on the theory associated with risk-informed regulation and lessons that have emerged during the implementation of other regimes, we have identified the following principles to inform the assessment of necessary
prerequisite conditions and to guide action for the development, implementation, and continuous improvement
of specific risk-informed regimes. These principles are intended to be applied in specific, discrete regulatory contexts—not to guide the complete overhaul of the federal regulatory system for institutions of higher education.
And it is important to understand the difference between the fundamental risk in the federal regulation of higher
education and the specific risks that provide the foundation for risk-informed regimes. The fundamental risk
entailed in the federal regulation of higher education is tied to the federal investment in financial aid and the
desire to protect students and to be a good financial steward for the taxpayers’ dollars. In other words, the overall
risk in the system is that students use federal financial aid (and, therefore, taxpayer dollars) to pay for low quality
postsecondary programs that do not enhance their professional prospects. This broad risk should motivate all of
federal regulation of institutions. But it is essential to distinguish this broad risk from the specific risks that must
be identified for risk-informed regulatory regimes. In those cases, the risk must be related to a more specific problem that is directly tied to a particular area of regulation, e.g., the risk of mismanaging federal financial aid dollars
through problematic disbursement or refund processes.
Necessary prerequisite conditions (i.e., conditions that must be in place before any risk-informed regime is even
considered)
• A risk-informed regulatory regime should only involve areas where regulators have clear authority to

develop a risk-informed regime or significant discretion in determining regulatory response. Granting
accrediting agencies flexibility to establish risk-informed review procedures (as explored in more detail
later in the paper) is likely to be an appropriate area, while using a risk-informed system to enforce federal
civil rights laws is not, given the legally mandated statutory and constitutional rights and protections
associated with individual student rights that dictate permissible regulatory parameters.
• Risk should be defined very precisely and concretely. The examples of successful risk-based and risk-in-

formed systems described above started first with the question of the risk or danger to be avoided (e.g.,
cancer rates for nuclear power plants), and built the system from there.
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These principles were distilled from a range of scholarly sources, interviews with practitioners, and policy best practices, particularly
Coburn and Weddle, supra note 1; Baldwin and Black, supra note 15; Financial Services Commission of Ontario, supra note 24; as well
as the various domestic and international models discussed in Section III supra.

78

Recalibrating Regulation of Colleges and Universities

• The regulatory area should have some type of prospective risk involved.64
• The regulatory area should implicate a risk that is measurable through existing data sources.65
• There should be some evidence that regulated entities are likely to fall under each level of risk defined. In

other words, the risk thresholds should relate to known variances in performance related to the risk in
question, even though the precise lines between thresholds should not be drawn at the outset.
• Regulators should be able to develop a range of potential regulatory responses that are specifically tailored

to the different levels of identified risk. This process likely provides an opportunity for regulators and their
non-governmental partners to be more systematic and strategic in how they allot technical assistance,
make requests for additional information, and impose more severe consequences.
Potential key questions to assess necessary prerequisite conditions:
• Is the risk in question real and easily understood? Does it implicate a specific area of regulation?
• Do the likely benefits of the prospective risk-informed regime outweigh the likely challenges (both in the

short and long term)?
• Does stakeholder support exist for the concept of shifting to a risk-informed regime and are stakeholders

committed to the hard work of turning the concept into an actual regulatory regime?
System design
• The system should incorporate the five key functions present in mature regimes (from pages 8-9):

1. Defining the purpose and goals of the system in terms of specific risks
2. Determining the responsible agency or organization’s own risk appetite
3. Assessing the risk and its likelihood of occurrence
4. Assigning scores or ratings to regulated entities on the basis of risk assessments
5. Linking regulatory responses and resources to scores or ratings categories (for individual regulated
entities and/or for system-wide issues)
• The type of risk in question and the different thresholds for performance should be clearly defined by

regulators (and, in some cases, enforcement partners such as accrediting agencies), with the input of the
full range of stakeholders.
• Data and information sources to determine and monitor risk should be clearly defined before any assess-

ment of risk takes place.
• Thresholds should be based on accessible and reliable data and information sources—and collection

should be based on existing sources and through existing collection methods wherever possible to avoid
duplication of existing reporting requirements.
64

65

A risk-informed system would be inappropriate for retroactively adjusting the regulatory response for violations that have already occurred. In the higher education context, a risk-informed system would be inappropriate for re-designing USED’s procedures for assessing fines for past violations by institutions of federal rules. The fact that USED’s fine assessment procedures might benefit from greater
flexibility—an objective shared by risk-informed regimes—does not mean that the entire regulatory action can be designed according
to the principles in this paper because the two regulatory functions are fundamentally different (creating conditions for monitoring, as
opposed to imposing consequences when violations are made).
This is not to say that new data sources should not be developed to build a smarter, more effective regulatory system. Indeed, new prospects for risk-informed regimes may emerge in time. But this paper focuses squarely on the prospect of developing viable risk-informed
systems today (and not on how to develop new data sets), meaning that existing data sources are an appropriate necessary condition.
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• Regulatory responses should be tiered and should be defined in direct relation to the types of risk that

they are intended to address.
• If systems are defined as “opt in” by institutions, every effort should be made to avoid the creation of mul-

tiple regulatory regimes that may conflict or overlap with one another.
• Regulated entities and other stakeholders should be given multiple opportunities to contribute to and

comment on the proposed system design elements.
Potential key questions to assess system design:
• What body is the most efficient and effective entity to maintain oversight or control over the contem-

plated risk informed regime?
• What are the risk variables at the top of the hierarchy? Are the metrics that are incorporated into the risk

determination primarily outcome measures that related directly to the defined risk areas for the regime?
• Do proposed metrics and thresholds appropriately allow for differences in institutional mission and

students served? Are all institutions implicated by the regime responsible under similar performance
standards that may nevertheless be applied by regulators in a way that appropriately accounts for different
contexts?
• Who should be responsible for defining the risk and identifying appropriate metrics and thresholds? And

based on what process?
System implementation
• The primary oversight body and enforcer of the new risk-informed regime should be prepared for an ini-

tial investment of time and resources to set up the regime, to provide information and technical assistance,
and to conduct a baseline assessment for regulated institutions. Regulated institutions will also need to
invest resources into understanding and complying with the new requirements.
• Piloting of the system for a small number of regulated entities may be an important foundation for

informing how risk is defined and assessed over time. No binding regulatory response should take place
for at least the early phase of the pilot.
• Regulated entities and other stakeholders should be given multiple opportunities to comment on the

implementation process to inform final processes and system elements.
Potential key questions to assess system implementation:
• Are all system participants prepared for the initial investment of time, effort, and resources—and clear

about the longer-term payoff for this investment?
• Are regulators prepared and empowered to make mid-course corrections when problems arise?

System evaluation and improvement
• Regulators should regularly review overall system performance, with special attention to tracking how

institutions are categorized on the basis of risk and what types of regulatory responses are most common.
Adjustments should be made as appropriate.
• Regulatory burden should also be regularly assessed, both for regulated institutions and for regulators.

Adjustments should be made as appropriate.
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• The definition of risk, how it is assessed, and how regulators respond should be regularly revisited and

revised.
Potential key questions for system evaluation and improvement:
• How can the regime mitigate unanticipated, unforeseen, or misunderstood elements of the definition of

risk, the identified thresholds and metrics, and the appropriate regulatory responses? Can these be mitigated?
• Does the regime tend to affect certain types of institutions in unique ways? Are any institutions experi-

encing negative consequences due to student demographics and other factors outside the institutions’
control?

ED's Financial Responsibility Standards
ED has a risk-informed system for assessing private nonprofit and for-profit institutions' financial viability
for purposes of Title IV funding eligibility. In the late 1990s—based on a congressional mandate in the 1992
amendments to the HEA—ED worked with a variety of stakeholders and commissioned a task force and
expert report to inform methods of calculating financial ratios to identify financially troubled institutions.
The process of calculating these ratios was intended to provide an “initial screening” through which ED could
“appropriately allocate its limited resources to more financially at risk institutions.” This initial design and
implementation process was largely considered a success by the higher education community.
The current system is largely unchanged from what was established in the late 1990s. One key measure is
the "financial ratios test," which draws on institutions' annual financial statements to create a ratio for each
institution on a scale of -1.0 to 3.0. Those institutions with a score of 1.5 or above are considered financially
responsible, and no other requirements apply. Institutions with scores between 1.0 and 1.4 may continue to
receive federal funding, but are required to submit to additional monitoring and oversight requirements.
Institutions with scores below 1.0 only remain eligible for Title IV funding if they provide additional surety,
such as a letter of credit equal to a minimum of 10 percent of the Title IV aid received in the institution's
most recent fiscal year.
After the financial downturn of 2008–09, more than 100 non-profit colleges unexpectedly "failed" the
financial ratios test by receiving scores under 1.5, due in large part to decreases in endowment funds. Many
of these colleges were forced to obtain letters of credit to maintain their Title IV eligibility, which can be
an expensive, time-consuming endeavor. As a result, the National Association of Independent Colleges and
Universities (NAICU) to establish its Financial Responsibility Task Force to review the ED's process for
determining institutions' fiscal viability. In November 2012, the Task Force released its final report, which
called into question ED's financial review procedures. The report made several recommendations, including
that ED's financial responsibility system be revised to reflect generally accepted accounting principles that
have been revised since the 1990s, particularly with regard to the assessment of changes in endowment funds,
and that ED should convene a new panel of accounting experts to provide technical guidance in that effort.
Though these issues have yet to be fully resolved, this experience illustrates the importance of regularly engaging
with stakeholders and technical experts to ensure that risk-informed systems remain current and relevant over
time. It also shows the difference between the viability of a risk-informed regulatory approach from challenges
or problems that may be part of the implementation and continuous improvement of such an approach.
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B. Prospective Risk-Informed Regimes
Building on the principles explored in the preceding section, the following discussion provides a beginning list
of sample policy areas where risk-informed reform might be undertaken in higher education. Each of these areas
meets the “necessary prerequisite conditions” identified—though, in some cases, changes in regulations or statute
may be necessary. These prospective regimes also represent opportunities to reduce compliance burdens significantly and to direct ED’s enforcement efforts more meaningfully. Significant stakeholder engagement will be
necessary for the successful design and implementation of any of these regimes, and this list is intended only to
provide concrete examples of potentially ripe areas for risk-informed regulation in the existing federal regulatory
system for colleges and universities.
Requirements for financial aid reporting could be restructured around a risk-informed regime. The bulk of
the reporting burden for institutions in reporting student financial aid information is not necessarily the annual
reporting that takes place through IPEDS for accountability, completion, and other purposes. Instead, the bulk
of the burden comes through the bimonthly updates that financial aid offices are required to submit through the
NSLDS system for Direct Loan compliance and with the Department of Defense for financial aid programs for
veterans. These updates are intended to track the changes in enrollment that may cause students to fall out of
eligibility for federal financial aid programs (and, therefore, the institution is in improper receipt of federal funds
after the funds have been disbursed to students). For institutions that have stable student populations and/or a
history of sound financial accounting practices and appropriate return of federal funds (among other indicators),
a risk-informed system could reduce the frequency of reporting requirements. For example, institutions deemed
low risk might be subjected to only the annual accounting process, those deemed medium risk could have quarterly reports due, and those deemed high risk could continue to be subjected to the bimonthly updated reports.
• The risk. The risk is that institutions are promoting fraud in the use of federal funds in cases where stu-

dents fall out of eligibility for some or all of their federal financial aid during the semester or school year.
• Benefits. This system could significantly reduce compliance burdens for both low risk institutions and for

ED.
• Challenges. The system would mean that at least some institutions would be providing much less frequent

reports to ED, which may prompt regulatory oversight concerns.
Accrediting agencies could have clear authority to develop risk-informed approaches to reviewing and taking
action regarding institutions.66 Approaches could encompass new policies for both strong performers (e.g.,
expedited review) and low performers (e.g., consequences other than removal of accreditation status)—guided
by a system for differentiating between levels of institutional performance. It should be noted that accrediting
agencies have already explored and implemented some risk-informed concepts, including tiered consequences
based on review findings. The prospective regime contemplated here, however, would allow accreditors to develop
more robust systems that could tie to new, more nuanced requirements in the HEA. In other words, rather than a
determination of “accredited or not” for Title IV purposes—leaving aside the more nuanced judgments accrediting agencies make within their peer review processes described above—systems could potentially allow for strong
performing, low-risk institutions to receive an expedited review and/or for low-performing, high-risk institutions
to be targeted and supported more effectively through the accreditation process.
66

The application of this prospective regime (at least for expedited review for strong performers) has been endorsed by ACE, AAU, and
APLU, among others, in recent comments submitted to the Senate HELP Committee on Senator Harkin’s discussion draft bill. See note
2, supra.
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• The risk. The central risk implicated is that of the accreditation process failing to identify weak institu-

tional performance and take action before students are unduly harmed.
• Potential benefits. Accrediting agencies already make very context-specific assessments of institutional

performance as part of the accreditation process; developing more systematic risk-informed systems
may reduce burdens for institutions with a history of strong performance, allow accreditors to be more
systematic in targeting resources, and provide additional transparency in the accreditation process. And
because they work with groups of relatively similar institutions (either in terms of region/geography or
institutional sector) accrediting agencies can work more quickly and more closely with their institutions
on new approaches than if ED attempted to design and implement a risk-informed system for all of higher
education. These approaches also promise to reduce burden on institutions that present low risk, thereby
freeing more of their resources to go toward students.
• Potential challenges. Most importantly, developing new risk-informed systems within accrediting agen-

cies may be a significant new burden for ED, for accrediting agencies, and for institutions, at least in the
design and early implementation process. Also, the approaches developed by different accrediting agencies
may differ in key areas. For example, accrediting agencies (particularly the regional accrediting agencies),
accredit a wide variety of institutions, which may make it challenging to develop metrics and thresholds
that can apply in a variety of institutional contexts.
ED could establish a risk-informed regime for the program reviews conducted by the Federal Student Aid
(FSA) office. Approximately 300 reviews are undertaken each year, and encompass assessments of whether the
institution under review meets requirements for institutional eligibility, financial responsibility, and administrative capability for purposes of Title IV compliance.67 The HEA identifies a few prospective triggers for a program
review, but leaves significant discretion to ED.68 ED currently does not publish how it selects the institutions to
undergo program reviews. Policymakers have already identified this area of ED’s authority as ripe for potential
risk-informed systems, as demonstrated, for example, in Senator Harkin’s draft HEA reauthorization bill that
would direct ED to build in “risk-based” program reviews annually for two percent of institutions participating in
Title IV.69
• The risk. The risk is that institutions are inappropriately using federal financial aid funding, to be primarily

measured by student outcomes. Some metrics may include those already embedded in the HEA: a cohort
default rate over 25 percent; a cohort default rate in the top 25 percent of all institutions; significant
fluctuation in Stafford Loan, Direct Loan, or Pell Grant volume; identified deficiencies or financial aid
programs identified by the relevant state or accrediting agency; and high annual dropout rates.70
67

68

69

70

During a program review, reviewers evaluate the school’s compliance with requirements, assess liabilities for errors in performance, and
identify actions the school must take to improve its future administrative capabilities. Federal Student Aid, Program Reviews, https://
studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/school/program-reviews (last accessed Oct. 26, 2014).
HEA § 498A, 20 U.S.C. § 1099c; see also Federal Student Aid, Program Review Guide for Institutions (2009), http://www.ifap.
ed.gov/programrevguide/attachments/2009ProgramReviewGuide.pdf.
Specific considerations may include large increases in funding over a five-year period, a large proportion of overall federal funding,
significant fluctuation in federal funding, sharp increases in enrollment, high default rates, high student default risk, high proportion or
rate of complaints, low graduation rates, poor financial health, large proportion of funding toward recruiting and marketing, large profit
margins [for proprietary institutions], negative action by an accrediting agency, prior compliance problems, large amounts of federal
funds returned, and change in ownership [for proprietary institutions]). The bill allows USED to determine the final specific criteria as
well as the processes for conducting for such reviews. Harkin HEA Reauthorization Discussion Draft ( June 25, 2014), Sec. 498A(b)(3),
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HEAA%20Discussion%20Draft%20Language%206.25.14.pdf.
HEA § 498A, 20 U.S.C. § 1099c; see also Federal Student Aid, Program Review Guide for Institutions (2009), http://www.ifap.
ed.gov/programrevguide/attachments/2009ProgramReviewGuide.pdf
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• Potential benefits. The program review function is an important accountability tool controlled by ED, but

it is currently used in a way that is opaque and not clearly defined in terms of risk. Creating a clear definition of risk and prioritizing certain factors may be a way for this accountability tool to be used in a more
meaningful, transparent way. Systems also might be designed in a way to complement activity by other
members of the triad; if accreditors were also using risk-informed regimes, for example, the risk factors
and consequences between those regimes and ED’s program reviews may make for more effective and
aligned overall accountability systems.
• Potential challenges. ED has limited resources to conduct program reviews, and the risk factors for pro-

gram reviews should not be so broad as to implicate more institutions than ED can effectively review in a
single year. (Senator Harkin’s bill, for example, has been estimated to implicate thousands of institutions
per year—a number far beyond FSA’s current capacity.71) And program reviews can be a significant burden for institutions undergoing them; any risk-informed systems must be developed in a way that complements (rather than duplicates) efforts by other regulatory bodies and regulatory partners (i.e., states and
accreditors).

V. CONCLUSION
While certain areas within the HEA may be ripe for exploration of new risk-informed regimes, others simply are
unlikely to be appropriate or ready for such pursuits. As policymakers explore the adoption of new risk-informed
regimes, they should take care to balance the burdens and expected benefits of these new regimes within the
overall context of the importance of effectively regulating a sector that receives billions of dollars in taxpayer and
student dollars every year. Creating a system that supports deterministic and risk-informed regimes is entirely
possible—but care must be taken not to create greater burdens by layering new regulatory approaches on top of
existing requirements, nor to abandon critical protections of student and taxpayer investments.
Moreover, policymakers must be clear on the goal of creating new risk-informed regimes. Is the intention that an
entire area of regulation be replaced by a new risk-informed regime? Or should some parts of the regime remain
deterministic while others become risk-informed? Should the new approach apply to all institutions? Or should
the risk-informed regime be applied only to a subset of institutions (at least as a pilot for the initial period of
implementation)? Though the latter approach may provide an opportunity for less complexity and controversy
at the outset, it may also create a regulatory environment that is even more complex and confusing than what we
have today. A primary interest should be to do no harm.
The current policy environment requires ED to develop strategies for using its resources effectively and efficiently—particularly to allow for better responsiveness to the unique circumstances presented by different
institutions in various regulatory contexts. ED’s efforts should be targeted at the areas most in need of federal
oversight and enforcement, in light of a realistic assessment of capacity and expertise. Federal resources should not
be spread so thin that enforcement mechanisms are ineffective and regulatory requirements impose burden on
institutions often without real impact (particularly when compliance burdens siphon institutional resources away
from functions essential to student success). Risk-informed regimes hold significant promise to aid in this effort,
but ED may need additional capacity with new skill sets to ensure these new regimes are effective.
So what’s next? First, the higher education community should come together to identify the most viable regula71

Molly Corbett Broad, Letter on the Harkin Higher Education Act Reauthorization Discussion Draft 3 (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.
acenet.edu/news-room/Pages/Letter-on-the-Harkin-Higher-Education-Act-Reauthorization-Discussion-Draft.aspx.
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tory area(s) for new risk-informed regimes. Additional papers should explore which areas are most ripe and lay
out design option. A commission, task force, or other body made up of a variety of stakeholders—in collaboration with ED and Congress—may be an appropriate body to decide on the best areas to determine risk-informed
approaches, design specific systems, and make recommendations on key decisions about metrics, thresholds, and
regulatory response strategies. Congress may want to hold hearings to r understand the ripeness, fit, and impact of
implementing risk-informed regimes in various areas of higher education regulation. And, in the meantime, ED
can assess where it might make changes without legislation and explore whether there is a more effective regulatory strategy that could be deployed within its existing authority. The potential payoff of a well-designed risk-informed regime to create more effective regulation is significant enough to merit the pursuit of these important
steps.

Questions on the Horizon
This paper is intended to be an important early step in a long-term conversation about the prospect for the
incorporation of risk-informed regimes within the regulatory system for institutions of higher education.
Some important questions include:
1. Within the full range of federal regulations of higher education (at least within the context of compliance with federal financial aid programs in Title IV), what areas may be ripe for risk-informed
regulation—and what areas are not?
2. What should institutions and regulators expect in terms of initial investments and long-term benefits? For example, would the adoption of risk-informed regimes truly lead to meaningful lower
burdens for high performers with low risk?
3. Would the adoption of risk-informed regimes help ED (and other regulatory partners such as accrediting agencies) allocate their enforcement resources more accurately?
4. In the context of institutional quality, what metrics should factor into a risk assessment, how should
thresholds be determined, and who is responsible for making these decisions?
5. How can Congress, ED, and other stakeholders be able to trust one another to design, carry out, and
comply with risk-informed regimes, particularly when these regimes require removing other requirements or safeguards?
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APPENDIX A: RISK-INFORMED PROCESS MAP
The following table aligns with the guiding principles for the design, implementation, and continuous improvement of risk-informed regimes in EducationCounsel’s 2014 white paper, New Directions in Regulatory Reform:
Prospects for Reducing Regulatory Burden Through Risk-Informed Approaches in Federal Law Governing American
Higher Education. This appendix is intended to serve as a standalone resource that may be used to inform future
discussions among policymakers and stakeholders about new regimes to explore.
Process step

Key concepts

Potential key questions

Necessary prereq- A risk-informed regulatory regime should only involve
uisite conditions areas where regulators have clear authority to develop
a risk-informed regime or significant discretion in
determining regulatory response. Granting accrediting
agencies flexibility to establish risk-informed review
procedures (as explored in more detail later in the
paper) is likely to be an appropriate area, while using a
risk-informed system to enforce federal civil rights laws
is not, given the legally mandated statutory and constitutional rights and protections associated with individual student rights that dictate permissible regulatory
parameters.

Is the risk in question real and
easily understood? Does it implicate a specific area of regulation?
Do the likely benefits of the
prospective risk-informed regime
outweigh the likely challenges
(both in the short and long
term)?

Does stakeholder support exist
for the concept of shifting to a
risk-informed regime and are
stakeholders committed to the
Risk should be defined very precisely and concretely.
The examples of successful risk-based and risk-informed hard work of turning the concept
systems described above started first with the question into an actual regulatory regime?
of the risk or danger to be avoided (e.g., cancer rates for
nuclear power plants), and built the system from there.
The regulatory area should have some type of prospective
risk involved.
The regulatory area should implicate a risk that is measurable through existing data sources.
There should be some evidence that regulated entities
are likely to fall under each level of risk defined. In
other words, the risk thresholds should relate to known
variances in performance related to the risk in question, even though the precise lines between thresholds
should not be drawn at the outset.
Regulators should be able to develop a range of potential regulatory responses that are specifically tailored
to the different levels of identified risk. This process
likely provides an opportunity for regulators to be more
systematic and strategic in how they allot technical
assistance, make requests for additional information,
and impose more severe consequences.
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Process step

Key concepts

Potential key questions

System design

The system should incorporate the five key functions
present in mature regimes:

What body is the most efficient
and effective entity to maintain
oversight or control over the contemplated risk informed regime?

Defining the purpose and goals of the system in terms
of specific risks
Determining the responsible agency or organization’s
own risk appetite
Assessing the risk and its likelihood of occurrence
Assigning scores or ratings to regulated entities on the
basis of risk assessments

What are the risk variables at
the top of the hierarchy? Are the
metrics that are incorporated
into the risk determination
primarily outcome measures that
related directly to the defined
risk areas for the regime?

Linking regulatory responses and resources to scores or
ratings categories (for individual regulated entities and/
Do proposed metrics and
or for system-wide issues)
thresholds appropriately allow
The type of risk in question and the different thresholds for differences in institutional
for performance should be clearly defined by regulamission and students served? Are
tors (and, in some cases, enforcement partners such as
all institutions implicated by the
accrediting agencies), with the input of the full range of regime responsible under similar
stakeholders.
performance standards that may
nevertheless be applied by reguData and information sources to determine and monilators in a way that appropriately
tor risk should be clearly defined before any assessment
accounts for different contexts?
of risk takes place.
Who should be responsible for
Thresholds should be based on accessible and reliable
defining the risk and identidata and information sources—and collection should
fying appropriate metrics and
be based on existing sources and through existing colthresholds? And based on what
lection methods wherever possible to avoid duplication
process?
of existing reporting requirements.
Regulatory responses should be tiered and should be
defined in direct relation to the types of risk that they
are intended to address.
If systems are defined as “opt in” by institutions, every
effort should be made to avoid the creation of multiple
regulatory regimes that may conflict or overlap with
one another.
Regulated entities and other stakeholders should be
given multiple opportunities to contribute to and comment on the proposed system design elements.
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Process step

Key concepts

Potential key questions

System implementation

The primary oversight body and enforcer of the new
risk-informed regime should be prepared for an initial
investment of time and resources to set up the regime,
to provide information and technical assistance, and
to conduct a baseline assessment for regulated institutions. Regulated institutions will also need to invest
resources into understanding and complying with the
new requirements.

Are all system participants prepared for the initial investment
of time, effort, and resources –
and clear about the longer-term
payoff for this investment?
Are regulators prepared and
empowered to make mid-course
corrections when problems arise?

Piloting of the system for a small number of regulated
entities may be an important foundation for informing
how risk is defined and assessed over time. No binding
regulatory response should take place for at least the
early phase of the pilot.
Regulated entities and other stakeholders should be
given multiple opportunities to comment on the implementation process to inform final processes and system
elements.
System evaluation Regulators should regularly review overall system
and improveperformance, with special attention to tracking how
ment
institutions are categorized on the basis of risk and what
types of regulatory responses are most common. Adjustments should be made as appropriate.
Regulatory burden should also be regularly assessed,
both for regulated institutions and for regulators.
Adjustments should be made as appropriate.

How can the regime mitigate
unanticipated, unforeseen, or
misunderstood elements of the
definition of risk, the identified
thresholds and metrics, and the
appropriate regulatory responses?

Does the regime tend to affect
certain types of institutions
in unique ways? Are any instiThe definition of risk, how it is assessed, and how regu- tutions experiencing negative
lators respond should be regularly revisited and revised. consequences due to student
demographics and other factors
outside the institutions’ control?
How can best practices and
lessons learned be memorialized
and shared?
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APPENDIX B: RECOMMENDED READING ON RISK-INFORMED REGIMES
General information about risk-informed models and design theory:
• Julia Black and Robert Baldwin, Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation, 32 Law & Policy 181, 184–85

(2010)
• Jonathan Coburn and Greg Weddle, Risk-Based Regulation: Learning from the Experience of Others, Bio-

Process Int’l 22-23 (Sept. 2006)
• Peter May, Performance-Based Regulation, Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance Working Paper

No. 2 (April 2010), http://regulation.huji.ac.il/papers/jp2.pdf
• William D. Travers, Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulation (March 1, 1999), http://www.nrc.

gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/1998/1998-144srm.pdf
U.S. models in other sectors:
• Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient

banks and banking systems (rev. June 2011), www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
• Food & Drug Administration, Federal Communications Commission, and Office of the National Coor-

dinator for Health Information Technology, FDASIA Health IT Report: Proposed Strategy and Recommendations for a Risk-Based Framework (April 2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM391521.pdf
Australian and U.K. models in postsecondary regulation, including technical information about metrics, thresholds, and methods of calculation:
• Australian Government Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, TEQSA Annual Report

2013–14 (tabled in Parliament Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.teqsa.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/TEQSA2014AnnualReport_FullReportWeb.pdf
• HEFCE, Memorandum of assurance and accountability between HEFCE and institutions: Terms and

conditions for payment of HEFCE grants to higher education institutions ( June 2014), http://www.
hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/pubs/2014/201412/HEFCE2014_12.pdf
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APPENDIX IV

Enhancing the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking by the U.S. Department of Education
By Jeffrey S. Lubbers1*
December 5, 2014
As the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement made its way from the courts to the agency hearing
rooms in the 1980s, negotiated rulemaking (sometimes called “regulatory negotiation” or simply “reg-neg”) also
emerged on a parallel track as an alternative to traditional procedures for drafting proposed regulations.
This exemplar of “regulatory reform” was based on two insights: (1) that the usual Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) process of written notice-and-comment rulemaking2 has an intrinsic limitation because stakeholders
engaged in it do not interact with each other or with the agency, and (2) in certain situations it is possible to bring
together representatives of the agency and the various affected interest groups to negotiate the text of a proposed
rule. If stakeholders are able to negotiate a consensus on a draft proposed rule, the resulting final rule is likely to be
issued more quickly, easier to implement, and less likely to be subsequently challenged in court. Moreover, even in
the absence of consensus on a draft rule, the process may be valuable as a means of better informing the regulatory
agency of the issues and the concerns of the affected interests. For these reasons, negotiated rulemaking was seen
as an appropriate application of ADR principles to the rulemaking process.
After its development in recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS),3 its
use was codified by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act (NRA), enacted in 1990 and made permanent in 1996.4 Both
the ACUS recommendations and the NRA make clear that its use is only advisable in certain circumstances—
after the agency concerned used a “convener” to explore whether the proposed rulemaking lends itself to a successful negotiation. The NRA established a basic statutory framework for agency use of negotiated rulemaking. It
serves to supplement the rulemaking provisions of the APA, largely codifies the practice of those agencies that had
previously used the procedure, and incorporates relevant ACUS recommendations.5 It does not require use of the
technique; rather, it was intended to clarify agency authority and to encourage agency use of the process, allowing
each agency the discretion whether to employ it.
There was an initial groundswell of agency interest in the 1990s, but as I have lamented, its use has waned in the
2000s.6 Nevertheless, Congress has continued to require its use in certain narrow areas of regulation through
1

2
3

4

5
6

Professor of Practice in Administrative Law, Washington College of Law, American University. Former Research Director of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) at the time when ACUS developed the concept of negotiated rulemaking. This
white paper was written in my capacity as consultant to the American Council on Education (ACE), but any errors are mine.
As prescribed in 5 U.S.C. § 553.
See ACUS Recommendation 82-4, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708 (1982); ACUS Recommendation 85-5, Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,895 (1985).
Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570). The NRA was permanently reauthorized in 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-320 § 11, 110 Stat. 2870, 3873.
See supra, note 2. See also Administrative Conference of the United States, Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook (2d ed. 1995).
See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev.
987 (2008) (tracking the use of reg-neg from 1991 to 2007). See also Peter H. Schuck & Steven Kochevar, Reg Neg Redux: The Career
*
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specific legislation. One of those areas is Section 492 of the Higher Education Act, as amended by the Higher
Education Amendments of 1998,7 which requires that all Title IV regulations promulgated after the enactment of
the Amendments of 1998 be subject to a negotiated rulemaking process. The process mandated by this legislation
differs in some significant ways from “classical reg-neg” envisioned by ACUS and the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act. This paper will explore how it is has worked at the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and suggest some
ways of making it work better.

OVERVIEW OF “CLASSICAL” NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING8
As mentioned above, when an agency goes forward with a negotiated rulemaking, the agency, with the assistance
of its convener, assembles a committee of representatives of all identifiable affected interests willing to negotiate
the proposed rule. The goal of the process is to reach consensus on a text that the agency and all the stakeholders
can accept. The agency is supposed to be represented at the table by an official who is sufficiently senior to be able
to speak authoritatively on its behalf. Negotiating sessions, however, are chaired not by the agency representative,
but by a neutral mediator (“facilitator”) skilled in assisting in the resolution of multiparty disputes.
Although the NRA sets forth some basic public notice requirements, most of the language is permissive.9 It sets
forth several criteria to be considered when an agency determines whether to use reg-neg.10 These include: (1)
whether there are a limited number of identifiable interests—usually not more than twenty-five, including any
relevant government agencies—that will be significantly affected by the rule; (2) whether a balanced committee
can be convened that can adequately represent the various interests and negotiate in good faith to reach a consensus on a proposed rule; (3) whether the negotiation process will not unreasonably delay issuance of the rule; (4)
whether the agency has adequate resources to support the negotiating committee; and (5) whether the agency—
to the maximum extent consistent with its legal obligations—will use a committee consensus as the basis for a
proposed rule. These criteria are based on the ACUS recommendations and actual agency experience using the
process.
In “regular” rulemaking, absent special circumstances, the APA requires an agency planning to adopt a rule on a
particular subject to publish a proposed rule in the Federal Register and to offer the public an opportunity to submit written comments.11 However, the APA does not specify who is to draft the proposed rule nor any particular
procedure to govern the drafting process. It is purely an institutional decision; ordinarily agency staff performs
this function, with discretion to determine how much opportunity for public input to allow. Any agency contacts
with regulated parties or the general public while the agency is considering or drafting a proposed rule are usually
informal and unstructured, and some agencies bar such “ex parte” contacts after the issuance of the notice of proposed rulemaking.12 Typically, there is no opportunity for interchange of views among potentially affected parties,

7

8

9

10
11
12

of a Procedural Reform, 15 Theoretical Inq. L. 417 (2014) (updating my figures from 2007 to 2013 and finding a further “gentle”
decline).
Pub. L. No. 105-244, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1098a. See also the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of
1996 Pub. L. No. 104-330, § 106(b) (2), 110 Stat 4030, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 4116(b)(2), mandating that “all regulations required
under this Act shall be issued by a negotiated rulemaking procedure.”
Much of this initial overview is adapted from Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking 190-94 (5th ed.)
(American Bar Ass’n 2012).
See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 327 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The plain language of the statute undermines the

notion that the NRA’s procedures are mandatory.”).

See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a).
See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
See, e.g., Department of Transportation Order No. 2100.2 (1970). Ex parte communications are discouraged after the end of the comment period. After the notice of proposed rulemaking is published, all communications must be reduced to writing and promptly placed
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even where an agency chooses to conduct an oral hearing.
The dynamics of the normal rulemaking process tend to encourage interested parties to take extreme positions in
their written and oral statements—in pre-proposal contacts as well as in comments on any published proposed
rule. They may choose to withhold information that they view as damaging. A party may appear to put equal
weight on every argument, giving the agency little clue as to the relative importance it places on the various issues.
There is usually little willingness to recognize the legitimate viewpoints of others. This adversarial atmosphere
often contributes to the expense and delay associated with regulatory proceedings, as parties try to position themselves for the expected litigation. What is lacking is an opportunity for the parties to exchange views and to focus
on finding constructive, creative solutions to problems. This is what reg-neg is intended to provide.
However, it should be remembered that negotiated rulemaking is a supplement to the rulemaking provisions
of the APA. This means that the negotiation sessions generally take place prior to issuance of the notice and the
opportunity for the public to comment on a proposed rule. In some instances, renewed negotiations may be
appropriate at a later stage of the proceeding. But negotiated rulemaking does not reduce in any way the agency’s
obligations to follow the APA process, to produce a rule within its statutory authority, or to adequately explain
the result.

THE CLASSICAL NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING PROCESS
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act authorizes use of a convener to report on the feasibility of undertaking a negotiated rulemaking.13 If the agency decides to go forward, its public notice announcing its intent to use the procedure is supposed to provide an opportunity, for at least 30 days, for members of the public who believe they are
inadequately represented on the negotiating committee to apply for membership or better representation, though
the agency retains discretion as to whether to grant such requests.14 If, after considering the public responses
to the published notice of intent to establish a negotiating committee, the agency determines not to do so, the
agency should publish a notice of that fact and the reasons for the decision.15
The agency must comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)16 in establishing and administering
the negotiating committee,17 although other agency procedural actions relating to establishing, assisting, or terminating the committee are not subject to judicial review.18 However, the otherwise available judicial review of a
rule is not affected by the fact that it resulted from a negotiated rulemaking, and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act
even specifies that a reviewing court is not supposed to accord such a rule any greater deference merely because of
the procedure followed.19
13

14
15
16
17
18

19

in the public docket. Summaries should include list of participants, summary of discussion, and statement of commitments made by
Department of Transportation personnel.
See 5 U.S.C. § 563(b). For a good example of such a report, see EPA, Final Convening Report on the Feasibility of a Negotiated
Rulemaking Process to Develop the All Appropriate Inquiry Standard Required under the Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act (Dec 17, 2002) (prepared for EPA by Susan Podziba & Associates), available at http://podziba.com/
sites/all/themes/ppm/pdf/projects/brownfields/2.3AAIFinalReport.pdf; and U.S. Department of Energy, Convening Report on the
Feasibility of a Negotiated Rulemaking to Revise the Certification Program for Commercial Heating, Ventilating Air Conditioning
and Commercial Refrigeration Equipment (Oct. 2, 2012) (prepared for DOE by Alan W. Strasser), available at https://www1.eere.
energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/pdfs/convening_report_hvac_cre_1.pdf.
5 U.S.C. § 564.
Id. § 565(a).
Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 2).
5 U.S.C. § 565(a).
5 U.S.C. § 570. See also Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (denying an advocacy group standing to
challenge final rule on the basis of an alleged defect in the composition of a negotiated rulemaking committee).
5 U.S.C. § 570. However, courts obviously know that a rule has been a product of negotiated rulemaking. See, e.g., Steel Joist Inst. v.
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It is assumed that the agency will be represented on the committee, but committee meetings are to be chaired
by an impartial “facilitator” who assists the committee in its deliberations.20 If the committee reaches consensus
on a proposed rule, it transmits to the agency a report containing the proposal.21 Consensus is defined as unanimous concurrence among the interests represented, unless the committee agrees on a different definition.22 If the
committee does not reach consensus on a rule, it may transmit to the agency whatever information, recommendations, or other material it considers appropriate.23 The agency may keep a negotiating committee in existence until
promulgation of the final rule, but earlier termination is permitted if the agency or the committee so chooses.24
Agencies may contract with private parties or may use government employees to act as facilitators, or to assist
the agency in the “convening” process.25 Agencies are authorized to pay expenses of certain committee members
in accordance with the FACA, and agencies are authorized to accept outside funds and use them in planning or
conducting negotiated rulemakings if no conflict of interest is created.26
For reg-neg to be successful there should be a number of diverse issues that participants can rank according to
their own priorities, so that each of the participants may be able to find room for compromise on some of the
issues as an agreement is sought. However, it is essential that the issues to be negotiated not require compromise
of principles so fundamental to the parties that meaningful negotiations are impossible. Parties must indicate a
willingness to negotiate in good faith, and no single interest should be able to dominate the negotiations.
The existence of a deadline for completing negotiations, whether imposed by statute, by the agency, or by other
circumstances, has been found to impart a degree of urgency that can aid the negotiators in reaching a consensus on a proposed rule. On the other hand, where the participants feel that they have a strong “BATNA” (best
alternative to a negotiated agreement),27 such as hope of obtaining a better result from the agency or Congress
through the political process, the chances of an agreement are reduced.
If a consensus is achieved by the committee, the agency ordinarily would publish the draft rule based on that consensus in a notice of proposed rulemaking—and the agency would have committed itself in advance to doing so.
Such a commitment is not an abdication of the agency’s statutory responsibility, for there would not be a consensus without the agency’s concurrence in the committee’s proposed rule.28 Even negotiations that result in less than
full consensus on a draft rule can still be very useful to the agency by narrowing the issues in dispute, identifying
information necessary to resolve issues, ranking priorities, and finding potentially acceptable solutions.29

20
21
22
23
24

25
26

27
28

29

Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 287 F.3d 1165, 1166 (upholding a rule and noting that it was “based on a consensus document
submitted by a rulemaking advisory committee in a negotiated rulemaking”); Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d
1531, 1544 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding a negotiated sulfur dioxide emission rule designed to improve visibility at the Grand Canyon).
5 U.S.C. §§ 565(b), 566.
Id. § 566(f ).
Id. § 562(2).
Id. § 566(f ).
Id. § 567. But see Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 60,
135 (2000) (recommending “that agencies maintain negotiating committees through rule promulgation, rather than disbanding them
upon reaching consensus,” and suggesting “that agencies experiment with keeping committees intact, or recalling them periodically, for
post-promulgation consultation, perhaps through the implementation period”).
5 U.S.C. § 568.
Id. § 569, amended, Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 11, 110 Stat. 3870, 3873. This provision
was modified to take account of the then-recent (but later rescinded) closure of ACUS, which previously was authorized to accept and
pay out such funds. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Building Consensus in Agency Rulemaking: Implementing the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act—A Report to Congress (1995).
See Roger Fisher, William Ury, & Bruce Patton, Getting To Yes 97-106 (2d. ed. 1991) (describing the concept of BATNA).
Nor would such an agreement undercut the agency’s authority to make changes at the final rule stage. See Natural Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
There remains a lively debate on the pros and cons of negotiated rulemaking. See generally, Symposium, Twenty-Eighth Annual
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
Statutory Requirements
Section 492 of the Higher Education Act, as amended by the Higher Education Amendments of 1998,30 requires
that, absent good cause for not doing so,31 all Title IV regulations promulgated after the enactment of the
Amendments of 1998 be subject to a negotiated rulemaking process.32 This represented an expansion of the statutory mandate to use reg-neg (introduced for some aspects of Title IV in the 1992 Amendments) to all of Title
IV. In place of the convening activity that would precede a decision to undertake a classical reg-neg, the statute
mandates a consultation process.
More specifically, before engaging in the actual negotiation of a proposed regulation, the Secretary must first
“obtain advice and recommendations from individuals and groups involved in student financial assistance . . .
such as students, legal assistance organizations that represent students, institutions of higher education, state
student-grant agencies, guaranty agencies, lenders, secondary markets, loan servicers, guaranty agency servicers,
and collection agencies” and must provide for a comprehensive discussion and exchange of information concerning the implementation of Title IV of the HEA.33 This requirement “to obtain advice and recommendations” has
been implemented in practice by the Department through a series of “pre-reg-neg” public hearings that are held
before proposals are put before a negotiating committee.
According to the statute, all published proposed regulations must conform to any agreements resulting from the
negotiated rulemaking process unless the Secretary reopens the negotiated rulemaking process, or provides a written explanation to the participants in that process why the Secretary has decided to depart from the agreements.

30
31

32

33

Administrative Law Issue, 46 Duke L.J. 1255 (1997). Several critics have argued that negotiated rulemaking allows agencies to transfer
too much control to private parties. See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the
Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 Duke L.J. 1351 (1997); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 Duke L.J. 1206 (1994); William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the
Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 Envtl. L. 55 (1987) (arguing that EPA’s negotiated woodstove emissions rule went
beyond the bounds of the Clean Air Act). Cary Coglianese has challenged empirically the basic assumption that regulatory negotiation
has produced faster and less litigated rules. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to
Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 386 (2001); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 Duke L.J. 1255 (1997).
On the other hand, the authors of several empirical studies have strenuously rebutted the critics. See Philip J. Harter, A Plumber
Responds to the Philosophers: A Comment on Professor Menkel-Meadow’s Essay on Deliberative Democracy, 5 Nev. L.J. 379 (200405) (summarizing his arguments in response to critics of regulatory negotiation); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 32 (2000) (rebutting Professor Coglianese); Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius
M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. Pub.
Admin. Res. & Theory 599 (2000) (finding that participants felt negotiated rules were superior, and more likely to be implemented,
than conventional rules); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J.
60 (2000) (finding significant legitimacy benefit); see also Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to
Regulate, 29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 179, 195-202 (2005) (finding good arguments on both sides, but generally siding with Coglianese on
empirical debate with Harter).
Pub. L. No. 105-244, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1098a.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1098a(b)(2), specifying that negotiated rulemaking is not required if “the Secretary determines that applying such a
requirement with respect to given regulations is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest (within the meaning of
section 553 (b)(3)(B) of title 5).”
I note that this paper covers ED rulemaking under the Higher Education Act. The Department is also required to use reg-neg by a
special provision of the No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b). The Department failed to achieve consensus in its one reg-neg
under this Act, and only held one committee session. Its attempt was criticized in Danielle Holley-Walker, The Importance of Negotiated
Rulemaking to the No Child Left Behind Act, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 1015 (2007) (arguing that the Department improperly implemented the
reg-neg requirement). The Department’s reg-neg practices in that rulemaking were challenged in Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ.,
315 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissed on standing grounds). I was told by one former ED official in the Higher Education Office
that “we briefed them on how we did it, but they didn’t follow our advice very well.”
See 20 U.S.C. § 1098a(a)
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The Act is quite detailed concerning the selection of members of the reg-neg committee:
Participants in the negotiations process shall be chosen by the Secretary from individuals nominated by
groups described [above], and shall include both representatives of such groups from Washington, DC,
and industry participants. The Secretary shall select individuals with demonstrated expertise or experience in the relevant subjects under negotiation, reflecting the diversity in the industry, representing both
large and small participants, as well as individuals serving local areas and national markets.
In addition, the Department must operate under several strict time constraints in issuing regulations. It is supposed to issue regulations implementing statutory changes within 360 days of enactment,34 and, accordingly, the
Act specifies that the “negotiation process shall be conducted in a timely manner in order that the final regulations may be issued by the Secretary within the 360-day period.”35 Even more significantly, the Department is
also subject to a “master calendar” requiring that any final rules containing regulatory changes must be published
by November 1 in order to be effective by July 1 of the following year.36 This means that a rule that misses the
November 1 date may not go into effect for 19 months. These two requirements combine to put a lot of time
pressure on the Department to complete the required negotiating phase of the process.
Unlike other agencies’ reg-negs, the Department of Education’s are exempted from the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act;37 nevertheless the Department opens the negotiating meetings to the public.38

The Department’s Negotiated Rulemaking Practice
After the 1992 Amendments but before the 1998 Amendments, the Department of Education had used negotiated rulemaking several times,39 but after the 1998 amendments, its use took off, and the Department has
averaged about one negotiated rulemaking package (some containing numerous issues) every year.40 After 1998,
many of these rulemakings were legislation-directed, e.g., 1999 and 2000 (1998 Amendments to HEA), 2006-07
(Higher Education Reconciliation Act), 2007–08 (College Cost Reduction and Access Act), spring 2009 (2008
HEA reauthorization), and 2014 (implementing changes made to the Clery Act by the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013). But in recent years there have been several ED-initiated rulemakings as well—in
2002 (the “FED-UP” initiative), 2006–07 (accreditation), and various program integrity issues, such as “gainful
employment,” and “teacher preparation” program issues beginning in the fall 2009 and continuing. A list of ED’s
34
35

36

37
38

39

40

20 U.S.C. § 1232(e).
20 U.S.C. § 1098a(b)(1). It should be noted that the Department’s violation of these deadlines does not negate its ability to issue rules
after the deadline.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1089(c) (November 1 deadline for rules applying to next award year), and 20 U.S.C. § 1088(a) (defining “award year” as
beginning on July 1).
20 U.S.C. § 1098a(c).
The Negotiated Rulemaking Process for Title IV Regulations—Frequently Asked Questions, Question 4, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/
highered/reg/hearulemaking/hea08/neg-reg-faq.html.
I found five reg-neg committees in that period:
Office of Postsecondary Education; The Higher Education Amendments of 1992; Negotiated Rulemaking, 34 CFR Chapter VI, 57
Fed. Reg. 62,533 (Dec. 31, 1992);
Office of Postsecondary Education; Direct Student Loan Regulations Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee and the Guaranty
Agency Reserves Regulations Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee; 34 CFR Chapter VI (establishing two negotiated rulemaking committees), 58 Fed. Reg. 68,619 (Dec. 28, 1993);
Office of Elementary and Secondary Education; Title I—Helping Disadvantaged Children Meet High Standards; Request for Advice
and Recommendations on Regulatory Issues Under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 34 CFR Parts 200, 201,
203, and 212, 59 Fed. Reg. 54,372 (Oct. 28, 1994);
Office of Postsecondary Education; Borrower Defenses Regulations Negotiated Rulemaking Advisory Committee; Establishment, 60
Fed. Reg. 11,004 (Feb. 28, 1995).
See the Department’s archived information on its reg-negs in 1999, 2000, and 2002 at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/
policyarchives.html, and from 2006-07 to the present, at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/policy.html.
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reg-negs from 2007 to the present, and whether or not they achieved consensus, is in Appendix A.
The Department describes its practices for conducting its negotiated rulemakings on its website.41 Interviews with
federal and non-federal participants provide the following picture of how reg-negs have been, and are conducted.
It was interesting to note how little these procedures have changed over the years.
The process begins when the Department decides that new regulations or changes in existing regulations are
needed—either due to a directive in legislation or due to a policy decision by the Department. In any given year,
of course, there may be more than one such triggering event, and then the Department must decide whether it
can bundle issues (the more related the better) into one rulemaking proceeding. Timing exigencies may lead to
somewhat unrelated issues being bundled together, a practice that can obviously make it harder to negotiate the
entire package.
But except for rare instances of good cause for avoiding the process, the Department must follow the statutorily
mandated reg-neg process. To meet the needs of the master calendar, which requires a final rule by November 1,
the initial public hearings with stakeholder groups are normally held in the previous fall. After the committee
members are selected and the facilitator is hired, the committee typically meets three times: January, February,
and March. If consensus is achieved on the text of the proposed rule, the Department drafts the preamble (after
providing it to the committee for its comments), publishes the proposed rule for comment in the Federal Register sometime in late spring or early summer, digests any comments received, and then publishes the final rule in
the Federal Register usually on or just before November 1. If the committee reached consensus, this task is made
easier because the participants agree in advance not to comment negatively on the proposal.42 If the committee
was unable to reach consensus, the Department retains the option of drafting the text of the proposed rule (and
preamble) itself to suit its own predilections, which might delay the publication of it in the Federal Register and
would likely lead to more numerous and more contentious comments and a concomitant delay in publishing its
final rule.
It is apparent from this schedule that unless the Department is willing to plan at the outset for a more distant
effective date—something that it rarely willing to do—the November 1 deadline can compress the available time
so that not much leeway is present for extended negotiations.

Public Hearings
The public hearings at the beginning of the process, used by the Department to allow the statutorily listed stakeholders to make oral statements to Departmental officials, are typically held both in Washington and in a couple
of other cities. Because of the travel, and the practice of having them transcribed by a court reporter, they are
rather costly. The main benefit of having these hearings from the Department’s standpoint is to get a better handle
on the sub-issues that might be involved in the upcoming reg-neg. But they don’t seem to provide much useful
new input on who should be named to the reg-neg committee. Moreover, the out-of-Washington hearings are
often sparsely attended, and in some cases only Washington-based people appeared in those hearings anyway. One
facilitator told me that when he was hired to do his first reg-neg for the Department he eagerly sat down with the
transcript of the public hearings, only to discover that it was relatively useless in that most of the testimony was
41

42

The Negotiated Rulemaking Process for Title IV Regulations—Frequently Asked Questions, http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/
reg/hearulemaking/hea08/neg-reg-faq.html.
It is unclear whether participants who disagree with the preamble comment on that aspect, even if they feel bound not to comment on
the proposed rule text. As explained above, the preamble is not negotiated although the Department solicits comments on it from the
committee members.
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irrelevant to the issues actually to be negotiated. The consensus among my interviewees was that normally the
hearing could be held in Washington only (perhaps with video technology allowing out-of-towners to participate) and that the money saved could be better spent elsewhere in the program. I should also point out that the
Department is not statutorily obligated to hold these public hearings—only to “obtain advice and recommendations” from the named stakeholders, so perhaps the Department should take advantage of that flexibility and
experiment with other ways of obtaining the public’s views.

Selection of the Committee Members
The Department controls the selection of committee members. The statute, with its emphasis on regulation of
financial matters in the world of higher education, dictates that individuals and groups “such as students, legal
assistance organizations that represent students, institutions of higher education, State student grant agencies,
guaranty agencies, lenders, secondary markets, loan servicers, guaranty agency servicers, and collection agencies”
be selected. But the use of the phrase “such as” gives the Department more leeway in selecting committee members—which, of course is necessary when the rulemaking has little to do with financial matters (e.g., the Violence
Against Women Act). Nevertheless, the Department feels it has to be faithful to this statutory directive, so this
can potentially lead to a large number of committee members. The Department relies on nominations (including
self-nominations) of persons to serve on the committee. It solicits these nominations in a Federal Register notice
in which it identifies the constituencies it believes will be significantly affected.
The self-nomination process can create some issues. One association member complained that “Stakeholders
don’t get to ‘choose’ a representative; nominations are made and ED picks, so people who are nominated by
groups representing hundreds of institutions now seem to have no leg up on people who nominate themselves.”
Another said, “Everybody and their uncle would like to have a seat at the table, but many participants don’t have
the resources, the time, the knowledge, or sometimes even the desire to be actively engaged. They see appointment
to a reg-neg committee as a ceremonial honor, and are frequently net negatives in terms of their uninformed participation in discussions that they sometimes don’t fully understand.”
Moreover, the Department feels it is necessary to select an “alternate” member for each “primary” member—who
has all the privileges of membership except that (s)he cannot vote unless the primary is absent. The alternates do
not sit the main table, but have the same rights to speak, and in fact are treated as members in all other respects.43
It is notable that the Department selects the alternate, and doesn’t rely on the primary to do so unless there are no
nominations for that position. This can lead to the anomalous situation where the primary and the alternate are
representing different constituencies or even hold opposing views.
The selection of committee members by the Department and the related issue of the make-up of the negotiating
committees are quite controversial. Selection of committee members is obviously a crucial aspect of reg-neg more
generally, and the normal convening process is designed to produce a committee with optimum balance, qualifications and ability to negotiate. ED’s process lacks the convening stage and the Department does the selection
in a rather opaque way, although its defenders point out that anyone can be nominated and that the committee
itself can add new members (assuming everyone on the committee agrees). In addition ED representatives also
aver that “We do pay attention to how well a person performed in a previous negotiation when we are deciding
whether to choose him or her.” But my interviews identified a number of issues, in addition to problems with
43

Indeed recent meeting summaries listed them all without even distinguishing between primary and alternates. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Education, Program Integrity and Improvement Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, Meeting Summary (April 23-25, 2014)
(listing 31 non-federal members without affiliation or status as primary or alternate).
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primaries and alternates who don’t agree with each other:
• I was told that during both the Bush II and Obama Administrations there has been a preference for

appointing individuals with practical experience over people who work for associations. This may make
sense for some topics where it’s better to have a practicing financial aid officer or registrar at the table, but
when the issue is a broad policy one like the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), it is problematic not
to have someone with a breadth of historical or industry-wide knowledge.
• One member was told (s)he was representing “all associations.” Other times a particular official (e.g., a

financial aid officer or a campus security officer) was supposed to represent his or her entire institution,
or, worse, all such institutions. Too often a segment of the industry is “represented” by a “surprise” selectee
who is unfamiliar with the relevant association’s policy development process and often cannot represent
smaller schools’ interests well. One upshot is that affected groups may not feel bound by a consensus
formed by such non-representative members.
• Partly because of the “doubling” created by the status given to alternates, and partly due to the statutory

enumeration of members, some proceedings become imbalanced with a surfeit of consumer-oriented
representatives. For example, in rulemakings dealing with for-profit institutions there were multiple consumer representatives (state attorneys general, students, consumer protection organizations) compared to
a few representatives of the institutions. This problem was compounded, according to one of my interviewees, who felt “chilled” by the presence of law enforcement personnel (state AGs) on the committee
who had the power to investigate the institutions or associations of such institutions if something was said
in the committee meeting that might imply some sort of wrongdoing. Whether or not that person would
have really behaved differently without the State AGs present (since the meetings are public anyway), it
does seem clear that one side of the “ledger” should not be overloaded.
• In proceedings with multiple bundled issues, there were too many single-issue members selected for the

committee who didn’t know or care about most of the other issues. This can make achieving consensus
impossible.
• The facilitators (even experienced ones) are not consulted by ED officials about the selection of represen-

tatives.

Bundling of Issues
Due to the ever-present Master Calendar and resource constraints, the Department has a great incentive to try to
combine as many issues as it can into a single rulemaking, which of course means one reg-neg (albeit sometimes
with separate subcommittees). This can make consensus more elusive as the sheer number of issues to negotiate
(normally in three meetings) can make it difficult to give enough attention to all the issues. Moreover, it can lead
to the selection of more “single issue” members who might not know or care about many of the issues and may
become more dug in on their issue.
For example, in November 2013 the Department announced its intent to do a negotiated rulemaking on the
broad topic of “Program Integrity and Improvement,” and in the notice listed the following issues to be negotiated:
• Cash management of funds provided under the title IV Federal Student Aid programs, including the use

of debit cards and the handling of title IV credit balances.
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• State authorization for programs offered through distance education or correspondence education
• State authorization for foreign locations of institutions located in a state.
• Clock-to-credit-hour conversion.
• The definition of “adverse credit” for borrowers in the Federal Direct PLUS Loan Program, an issue of

special concern to Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs).
• The application of the repeat coursework provisions to graduate and undergraduate programs.44

Given the diversity of issues in this rulemaking, it is not surprising that the notice listed 20 separate “constituencies as having interests that are significantly affected” by these topics.45 Ultimately the Department selected
“primary” representatives (and with one exception, alternates) for 16 of these constituencies—still leading to an
unwieldy group of 31 members of the committee.46 Not surprisingly, although quick agreement was reached on
several issues, and the committee did reach consensus on the issues of concern to HBCUs, consensus was not
reached on the cash management or state authorization issues.
An even larger committee was necessary in the 2009 “Negotiated Rulemaking for Higher Education—Team
V—General and Non-Loan Programmatic Issues.”47 The protocol listed 46 members. It also included an unusual
provision: “Single-issue members will participate for the purpose of determining consensus only for the single
issue that they have been chosen to negotiate.” This seems to be an acknowledgement by the Committee that
some members should not vote on the whole package—which is certainly a significant departure from the normal
type of ED reg-negs, much less classical reg-negs. But even this unusual provision failed to produce consensus.48
Ideally, the Department should take steps to break up these bundles into separate, but narrower, severable proceedings. One way to do that would to try to identify those issues where time is not of the essence. These issues
might be broken off into a proceeding that could end after November 1. I realize that this may require more staffing of these spin-off reg-negs, but it would certainly increase the chance of achieving more consensus outcomes.

Selection and Use of Facilitators
The Department has, over the years, used a relatively small number of facilitators. In the beginning it hired facilitators who believed in being pro-active in terms of achieving consensus through their own communications with
78 Fed. Reg. 69,612, 69,613 (Nov. 20, 2013).
Id. at 69,614.
46
See http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2012/programintegrity.html. The list was:
1.
Students
2.
Legal assistance organizations that represent students
3.
Consumer advocacy organizations
4.
State attorneys general and other appropriate State officials
5.
Financial aid administrators
6.
Business officers and bursars at postsecondary institutions
7.
Minority serving institutions
8.
Two-year public institutions
9.
Four-year public institutions
10.
Private, non-profit institutions
11.
Private, for-profit institutions
12.
Institutional third-party servicers
13.
Distance education
14.
Business and industry
15.
Lenders, community banks, and credit unions
16.
Accrediting agencies
47
See http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2009/gen-program.html.
48
Notice of proposed rulemaking, General and Non-Loan Programmatic Issues, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,379, 42,382 (Aug. 21, 2009) (“Team V
did not reach consensus on the proposed regulations.”).
44
45
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committee members. For example, one anecdote I heard about that took place in the early days of the program
was a situation where one of the more active facilitators successfully defused a rancorous morning discussion by
inviting a few people on each side to have lunch with him. They ordered pizza, readily agreed on the toppings,
proceeded to have convivial lunch, and the afternoon sessions were much more collegial and productive. This
was told to me by someone who had been at the Department at the time and felt it was an example of a skillful
facilitator at work. But I have reason to doubt that the Department would encourage that sort of behavior by its
facilitators now.
There is at least a perception among some participants that the Department now prefers more passive and less
independent facilitators. In 2006, one potential facilitator was told by ED’s subcontractor, which was soliciting
potential facilitators, that he could not even count on having free communications with members of the committee but would have to go through the Department’s political officers. He declined the offer. In 2009 he was
solicited again by the same contractor and was then given assurances that he could have such communications.
However, another facilitator told me he thinks he that some of his (post-2009) activism in resolving acrimony
and urging a little more time for negotiations may have annoyed the Department so much that he has not been
asked back despite some successful results.
Indeed several of the recent facilitators I spoke with told me they were aware of this perception and took pains to
be neutral, to be equally “tough” on the Department’s representative, and to be careful to avoid any actions that
might give rise to a feeling that they were overly chummy with the Department. Nevertheless, one participant
said: “They need to be Switzerland—with a great deal more independence from the Department than recent
facilitators have shown. In the last 10 years, the Department has chosen facilitators that defer to the Department
far too much.” On the other hand, former or current Departmental officers said that the real problem was that the
former facilitators simply became too expensive, given the Department’s increasingly severe budget constraints.
ED reg-neg facilitators have another handicap—the lack of a convening stage. Because ED reg-neg is mandatory,
the only pre-negotiation phase is the public hearing stage, but I was told that in some proceedings facilitators
were hired not only after the public hearings, but less than three weeks before the first committee meeting. This is
not enough time to allow the facilitator to get sufficiently up to speed on the issues or to talk intelligently to the
committee members before the first meeting.
In this connection, I spoke to a retired agency regulator who was involved with negotiated rulemaking at his
Department and is now engaged in facilitating reg-negs for another Department (not ED). In his first one, he had
the benefit of an extensive convening report written by a separate convener and he told me he learned a lot from
it and from his conversations with the convener. He was also able to call the committee members before the meeting. In the second one, due to special circumstances there was no convening report, and although he said he was
well briefed by Department staff, he felt his lack of prior knowledge about the issues and the participants made
him uncomfortable, reduced his stature in the eyes of the participants, and made it harder to understand the areas
of disagreement within the committee.
Obviously the skill of the facilitators is crucial to a successful negotiation. I would hope that the Department
could afford to pay for the best facilitators, although most participants I talked to were not overly critical of most
of the recent ones. But, regardless of their facilitating “style,” it also seems clear that the Department could make
better use of its facilitators. To be more specific:
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• Facilitators should be given more time to prepare, and should be hired before the public hearing if possi-

ble.
• If the Department wishes to maximize the chances of achieving consensus, it should encourage facilitators

to use their skills to attempt to achieve consensus, not by encouraging any particular substantive result,
but by being more active in exploring areas of agreement.
• Facilitators should either draft or be closely involved in drafting the meeting agendas. In one instance the

facilitator was in the dark about the Department’s agenda for the committee meeting session until the
morning of the session.
• Unless the matter is extremely sensitive, facilitators should be kept better informed about relevant aspects

of a rulemaking, such as concerning Departmental policy or developments pertaining to the positions of
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the White House, or Members of Congress. If they are
left uniformed about these matters, as has apparently happened, this undermines their ability to facilitate
the meeting.
• The Department should consult with facilitators early and often (especially experienced ones), because

they may be able to provide useful substantive or procedural advice (e.g., who should be appointed to
the committee, or whether it is worth having another meeting). At present the Department rarely if ever
consults them on such matters.
• The Department should diversify its roster of facilitators. Given some of the topics of recent reg-negs (e.g.,

HBCUs, VAWA) and the pervasiveness of social media, it is problematic that ED’s current facilitators are
all white men in their 60s.

Departmental Negotiators
Departmental interviewees made clear that, with a few exceptions, the Department purposely chooses to assign
the role of Departmental negotiator to a career (non-political) official—and usually a non-lawyer. Most interviewees who had been participants, in general, praised their capabilities. One said that “on the whole, the ED representatives are professional, knowledgeable, and handle their role with aplomb.” Several, however, did complain
that they too often had to clear their positions with political officials not in the room. To my mind, that comes
with having a career person as the negotiator. I suspect that many non-federal participants also have to check with
their superiors before making commitments.
A more troubling concern was that with the departure of senior people, “in recent years, the quality has suffered
and the Departmental representative lacked knowledge of the relevant policy and history.” This seems to largely
be a function of resource and staffing concerns.
I would be open to using political appointees more often, especially in proceedings where it can be anticipated
that there will be otherwise be a frequent need to seek political guidance. Secondly, I suspect that there are some
talented career lawyers who could be brought out from behind the curtain to take on this role—and this could
make it more feasible for the Department to have more numerous, narrower reg-negs in order to reduce bundling
problems.

Definition of Consensus
Everyone I talked to agreed that the Department takes a firm position on what “consensus” means. Not only do
the reg-neg protocols define it to mean unanimity in the sense of lack of dissent (as it is defined in many classical
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reg-negs too), Departmental practice is to require unanimity on every issue. Thus, to take an extreme example, if
the proceeding had 50 issues and the group agreed on the text of the proposed rule for 49 of the issues, with one
member being a holdout on issue number 50, the Department would consider that consensus was not reached.
The upshot would be that the Department would not feel bound to propose the language agreed to on the 49
provisions—even if number 50 could reasonably be seen as severable. This is not to say that the Department
might not go ahead on the proposed text for some or all of the 49, but it does not feel obliged to do so. My
impression is that it often does, but not always.
This stance has two ramifications—it tends to reduce the incentive for the Department to achieve full consensus,
while perhaps putting more pressure on the non-federal participants to, say, agree to all 50. The last ramification
may be somewhat salutary, but the problem is that any one participant can derail this. I did hear one complaint
that in one of these mega-issue proceedings, the Department itself seemed to be moving the goalpost on one of
the last issues in such a way that consensus could not be achieved. I also heard that in another proceeding, where
a fourth (phone) meeting was added and it appeared that a little more time might get the group to the finish line,
the Department “pulled the plug.” These anecdotal references hardly amount to an indication that the Department is playing games to avoid full consensus on any regular basis. Nor does the Department ever seem to be the
lone hold-out in a negotiation, and I was assured by current and former officials that the Department highly values consensus, but there is still a perception that in some cases the Department is less interested in a full consensus
than it might be. This may, of course, be a function of the fact that the Department has to use reg-neg in every
rule and has limited time and resources to do so.
On the other hand, a former official pointed out that one important benefit of consensus was that OMB would
let rules go through when a consensus was reached but might very well raise questions on a rule that was not
founded on consensus.49 Moreover, I did hear a counter example in which a particular committee member who
was the lone dissenter on an issue was allegedly invited by Departmental personnel (unsuccessfully) to resign from
the committee, indicating that the Department was truly (and perhaps overly) interested in achieving consensus
on that proposed rule at least.
A separate issue regarding consensus is the Department’s policy of requiring unanimity even on procedural matters, such as whether to add another constituency to the committee, to form a subcommittee, to bring an outside
expert, or to make adjustments in the organizational protocols. Perhaps such procedural steps could be taken with
a “consensus” amounting to a super-majority but short of unanimity.

Caucuses/Subcommittees/Use of Outside Experts to Speak to the Committee
Use of caucuses, subcommittees, and outside experts were relatively non-controversial aspects of ED’s reg-negs
and my impression is that this aspect is relatively similar to the way it works in classical reg-negs, although ED’s
time pressures may limit its ability to take advantage of these techniques. The facilitators I spoke to seemed to
think that this was not a problematic area. With respect to use of experts, one did say that he thought ED tended
to use more of its own experts from other parts of the Department than outside experts, due to cost considerations. One mentioned that officers from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau came to a meeting and
provided useful information. A participant mentioned that a subcommittee on campus security and fire issues
brought in several technical experts who were quite helpful.
49

Under Executive Order, 12,866, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in OMB is charged with reviewing proposed
and final significant rules of all executive agencies. ED takes pains to keep OIRA (and OMB’s budget side) apprised of the progress of
negotiation of rules that are subject to such review.
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As for caucuses, I received conflicting views. One Departmental person told me that they are used regularly, and
are mostly closed, but when the caucus members come back to the table they report in public. This conforms to
classical reg-neg. Usually the Department representative is not included in the caucus, but occasionally a subgroup
will ask to caucus with the Department. One participant opined that this was “an area of potential improvement
and efficiency that hasn’t been utilized well, but that’s mostly the non-federal negotiators’ fault, not the Department’s.” However, one participant did complain that “During the teacher preparation negotiations, the federal
negotiators, at the urging of Department officials, refused to allow non-federal negotiators to caucus with the
associations representing the broad sectors. It undermined the caucuses’ purpose and outcome.”

Logistics
The Department now uses its own conference room in the Office of Postsecondary Education at 1990 K Street
NW. It formerly used hotels, but its current practice saves money—although I heard that in a few years this facility may not be available. I also heard a few relatively minor complaints about the room: It lacks a guest Wi-Fi network. There is no live or archived streaming of meetings or use of Skype. The temperature cannot be controlled
by the facilitators or anyone else—this was an oft-expressed complaint. There apparently is no dedicated copy
machine, so that when documents are introduced in the meeting, too few copies are sometimes provided, and
attendees regularly complain about this to the facilitators. Finally, whether or not by design, the Department does
not use a projector/screen to help the negotiators discuss draft language. This technique can be useful as demonstrated by an ongoing (classical) reg-neg of energy efficiency standards I learned about where the group worked on
a set of PowerPoint slides throughout a series of meetings that resolved issues and formed the basis for agreements
on regulatory language.50 A secretarial assistant sat in the meeting and made the changes and highlighted relevant
text as the discussion proceeded.
The Department would do well to upgrade these aspects of the process.

Transparency
Many meetings have a high degree of public interest, with investors and other policy mavens seated in the public
seats (or the overflow room).
Because ED reg-negs are exempt from the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Department can avoid formally
chartering the committee, submitting data to the General Services Administration FACA database, or having a
federal officer take minutes or recordings. Accordingly the Department made the decision early on not to have
transcripts taken. As one former Departmental officer explained, “we didn’t want lots of ‘he said, she said.’” Nevertheless, in at least two instances the Department included provisions for a transcript in its draft protocol only to
have it vetoed by a number of committee members.
Social media’s advance may be making this issue moot. A Departmental participant pointed out with some
annoyance that observers were increasingly attempting to plug in their tape recorders into the room’s microphone
system to aid in the production of a transcript after the committee rejected transcribing, but “it is unclear how
that can be prevented completely as these are public meetings.” On the other hand, the Department may have
good reasons to want a transcript. As one former official said, “Trade press routinely records the negotiations and
can produce transcripts but ED can’t. This has caused problems in litigation. ED can’t produce a transcript or
recording but, at least in theory, the other side could by seeking a court order to turn over the recording.”

50

See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EERE-2011-BT-CE-0077-0066.
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The facilitators are tasked with writing meeting summaries, but they have almost no substantive content. One
facilitator joked that “there is no ‘there’ there.” Participants invariably laughed when I brought up these summaries. But another facilitator stoutly defended the extremely barebones summaries as appropriate under the
circumstances. He didn’t think it was a useful use of the facilitators’ time to write up detailed minutes, especially
when attendees were tweeting out summaries anyway. Moreover, he felt if the facilitators did do that, it could just
become another bone of contention at the next meeting.
A former ED official conceded that live blogging and “Twitter wars” have become a problem since he left. He
said these are mostly being waged by those not at the table, and said he doesn’t know how you contain that. He
pointed out that the producers of the PBS Frontline piece, “College Inc.,” asked to film the negotiation. “We
asked them not to because it would turn a negotiation into theater. They ultimately agreed not to film the negotiations and we negotiated an arrangement that satisfied them. But how do you negotiate with the Twitterverse?”
As one participant concluded, “I think it’s too soon to know what the long-term effects will be although it seems
to render the requirement of negotiators not to speak to the media obsolete.”
Personally, if the Department is unwilling to push for (and pay for) a transcript, I would like to see better summaries or minutes prepared, with an opportunity for members of the committee to review them and suggest changes
before they are finalized and approved by the Committee. Facilitators should be in charge of this, and should be
permitted to hire an assistant to help with this task.

Overall Departmental Control of the Process
It seems clear that the Department exercises a high degree of control over the reg-neg process. Not only does it
choose the issues, the participants, the facilitator, and the agenda for the meetings, it also maintains firm control
of the drafting. As one former official acknowledged:
The Department does all the drafting. In the first meeting, the Department brings its list of issues
(already published in the Federal Register) and short briefing papers on each one. Occasionally additional
issues are accepted, but not often. During the process Department will refine drafts, and then present
them. The facilitator doesn’t participate in this, but can suggest language.”
Another former official agreed that “ED is primarily responsible for writing the rule. Most of the writing is done
in the program office (OPE) and not by lawyers. Lawyers review.”
One participant stated that “The Department exercises complete control over the initial draft (the negotiating
document) and extends that control through the selection of negotiators who support its point of view.” Another
characterized the control over the drafting as “enormous.” Another said the “other members can make suggestions
and work on language but ED only takes what they want.” These complaints are not new; an early critique of
the process complained that “by controlling and principally defending the text of the proposed regulations, the
Department assumed a dominant position and was not just one of the negotiating parties.”51 This is certainly a
different approach from that used by other agencies in classical reg-neg, where it is the committee (including, of
course, the agency representative) that drafts the text of the proposed rule, often with the help of the facilitator.
But it bears repeating that the mandatory nature and the other constraints on ED make this a different “animal”
than classical reg-neg. As one of the facilitators opined, the mandatory model “produces some odd incentives and
perhaps unintentional consequences, but it still produces benefits for the Department and the participants, not51

See Mark L. Pelesh, Regulations Under the Higher Education Amendments, 57-Aut. Law & Contemp. Probs. 151, 154 (1994).
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withstanding its warts. It manages to force the Department to actually sit down with, learn from its stakeholders,
and exchange views with them.” He also said that his view as facilitator is that “it is the Department’s process and
he is there to try to make it work, or put another way, to help the parties pursue the best possible deal in the time
available.” Ultimately, he also said that he obviously does not agree with every aspect of the way the Department
does it, but he understands why they do it the way they do, and that he might not do it all that differently if he
were given that statute to implement. He also thought it was best not to get involved with drafting the proposed
rule text. He felt it was ultimately the Department’s rule and that it was appropriate for it to come out with its
new draft seven days before each meeting, and that everyone had two cracks at the draft before the final Committee decision, plus an opportunity to comment on the draft preamble of the proposed rule before ED finalized it.
It is hard to disagree with this point of view, although committee members would undoubtedly feel better about
the process if they thought they had more say in the final result.

We Must Remember the Constraints under which the Department Is Operating
It is tempting to criticize the Department’s reg-neg process as “violating” the tenets of classical reg-neg.52 One
participant went so far as to argue that the reg-neg label was a misnomer and that it was not really a true negotiation. It clearly is far from a classic reg-neg, but to some extent the Department has been dealt a difficult hand—in
having to use reg-neg for every rulemaking, within difficult time and financial constraints—and is playing it in an
understandable way.
As one former official pointed out, “Don’t forget, the Department has no dedicated resources for rulemaking
activities. The funds used to negotiate come from the program administration account so the program office has
to compete against other demands for funding to operate the application system and loan servicing.” Moreover,
the Office of Postsecondary Education is apparently losing staff, especially senior staff, at an alarming rate.
These constraints go far in explaining why the Department exercises as much control as it does over the process—
why it tends to bundle too many issues into one rulemaking, limits the number of committee meetings, prefers
cheaper and less active facilitators, does all the drafting, and may not be overly concerned when it doesn’t achieve
full consensus.
Nevertheless, although these incentives are understandable, from a good government standpoint, there are
improvements that can and should be made.

General Feeling that the Process is Valuable in Many Rulemakings
Given some of the complaints discussed above, I was surprised that nearly everyone believed the process was
generally beneficial, at least as compared to regular notice-and-comment rulemaking, and would not want Congress to remove it. One former ED official stated, “Frankly when reg-neg was expanded to virtually all Title IV
rulemakings, top officials at the department were not so supportive (didn’t want to ‘share’ power), but I think staff
will grudgingly admit that the process produces a better result. It does have costs of money, time, and compression. But it’s worth it.”
The costs of doing these are not negligible. Another former official estimated the costs as follows: “My estimate
is that it costs between $600,000 and $1 million more to convene a committee when facilitators, non-federal
negotiators, and staff time are considered than public comment rulemaking. ED has had to cut back some of
52

See an early criticism of this type in Pelesh, id. at 161 (“The negotiated rulemaking conducted by the Department was clearly flawed.
It departed extensively from the ‘classic’ model of negotiated rulemaking that has evolved since [Philip] Harter’s article in 1982, and it
failed to follow the precepts set forth in the Administrative Conference’s Recommendations as mandated by Congress.”).
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those costs.” In addition the Department pays the expenses of student participants. Counting extra staff time may
not be correct, since in regular rulemakings, staff must deal with more extensive drafting and review of comments
than would normally be the case in a reg-neg. Still, given that the Department lacks a dedicated appropriation for
rulemaking, these extra front-end costs are a significant concern.
Nevertheless, the process enjoys support among some current and past officials of the Department, although
there was wide agreement that the mandatory nature of it deserves to be reconsidered. While the Department
apparently does not have an official position whether or how the program should be continued, my talks led me
to believe that Departmental officers who have worked with the program feel that it adds value to the regular
rulemaking in several respects, both as to the merits of rules and in making the process visible to the stakeholders. At a minimum it gives the Department a window to see how a rule could work—what the consequences and
problems might be in the field, and even if consensus is not achieved, it provides some confidence that there will
be a high degree of tolerance in the field for what is being proposed.
Among the non-federal participants there was also a general feeling that the process was valuable, even among
those who were critical of the Department’s practices. One association representative told me it was a misnomer
to call it a negotiation or a true effort to achieve consensus, and suggested it should be eliminated in favor of a
true consultation process. But that person was an outlier among the people I talked to. One association representative said:
When we can participate (or are assured of appropriate participation by our college and university members) we feel it is worthwhile. Even in the current less-than-optimal negotiating environment, we have
tended to feel that it is a useful way for the Department to gain insights into how campuses work, and
what they can and cannot do.
Another suggested that even when consensus is not reached, “it appears to inform and make a positive contribution to rulemaking.” Another said, “I think the final rules are greatly improved by the [reg-neg] process and avoid
implementation problems that might have occurred otherwise.” Another gave it “high marks”:
I’ve been generally happier with regulations developed through reg-neg than those without. It has tended
to be an educational experience for both the Department and the stakeholders. In some cases the process
is actually therapeutic. The participants gain a better understanding of each other’s positions. I’ve been
through contentious reg-negs that, contrary to expectations, produced consensus and those that, contrary to expectations, didn’t. In both cases, I’d say that the outcome was better than it would have been
without reg-neg.
In sum, it seems like both the Department and most stakeholders have come to appreciate the benefits of sitting
down at the same table to discuss their concerns. And while stakeholders may not be thrilled with the substance
of the ensuing regulations, and would like to see changes in some of the Department’s practices, they would not
like to see reg-neg disappear from the Higher Education Act. For its part, the Department has learned to live with
the process, and given its ability to control it, and the lack of “penalty” for not achieving consensus, seems content
to continue it—if they can obtain the resources to do so.

But Maybe an Opt-Out Provision for Certain Types of Rules or Circumstances Would Be Beneficial
As mentioned, reg-neg under the Higher Education Act is mandatory for every rulemaking (including amend-

106

Recalibrating Regulation of Colleges and Universities

ments to existing rules), unless there is good cause for not doing so.53 But the Act’s good cause exemption specifically invokes the similar exemption in the APA from notice-and-comment rulemaking—it must be shown to be
“impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” This APA language has been very strictly construed by the courts—the rule has to be a true emergency or a very trivial one.
I was told that the Department’s Office of General Counsel has also felt constrained to interpret this provision
narrowly and has only invoked this exemption once—in an interim-final rulemaking where the statutory deadline
was really short, and even in that one a reg-neg group was convened to do the “final-final” rule.
But keeping in mind the basic tenet of classical reg-neg—that it should only be attempted when a convener determines that the circumstances are propitious—perhaps it is time to advocate an expanded opt-out provision.
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act itself contains the classic factors, as recounted in the introduction of this paper,
and it seems clear that in some of ED’s rulemakings, these factors will not all be present. There is also the more
fundamental question of whether ED, virtually alone among all Departments and agencies, should have to do all
of its rulemakings through negotiated rulemaking.
As one former ED official said:
While I think reg-negs have worked well in a number of circumstances, and I would choose to voluntarily do them perhaps more than some of my colleagues, I think it is fundamentally inappropriate for
any agency to have to do them for all rules. I can think of a situation (9½ Rule) where it would have
taken us a year and half to change a policy that was requiring us to pay excess subsidies if we had to go
through reg-neg. Its rigors have prevented the Secretary from taking rapid action that could have saved
the taxpayers money. . . . I think there should be an opt-out provision. That would be a legitimate recommendation.
When I broached this idea in my other interviews, no one disagreed with this, so long as the opt-out provision
was properly drafted.
So I believe Congress should consider an opt-out provision that is broader than the current good cause provision.
I think that the Secretary should have to certify that (and explain why) certain conditions are present (or not
present) that makes the use of reg-neg inadvisable. One example might be an amendment to an existing rule that
would not significantly increase the regulatory burden on affected institutions or significantly decrease the protections afforded to students. Another condition might be that a delay in the rulemaking would require significant
expenditures of government funds. Another might be a rulemaking with an especially short statutory deadline.
To avoid delays caused by judicial review of such certifications, I would prohibit or narrowly limit such review. Of
course, when opting out of using reg-neg, the Department would still ordinarily have to use regular notice-andcomment procedures.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The general approach of these recommendations (based on the preceding report) is to urge Congress to reduce
the time and resource constraints on the Department of Education’s use of negotiated rulemaking (“reg-neg”) and
to concomitantly urge the Department to cede a bit of its control to the negotiating committee.
53
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Recommendations to Congress
1. If Congress wishes to retain the “master calendar” requirements currently applicable to rulemaking under
the Higher Education Act, it should (1) eliminate the general 360-day time limit now applicable to some
such rules, and (2) consider extending the master calendar deadline from November 1 to December 1.
2. Congress should amend the Act’s negotiated rulemaking provision to allow the Department to choose
to use APA notice-and-comment rulemaking instead of negotiated rulemaking. This provision should
be broader than the current “good cause” provision, but should require the Secretary to have to certify
that (and explain why) certain conditions are present (or not present) that makes the use of reg-neg
inadvisable. Congress should make clear that such an opt-out provision should not be used as a basis for
not using reg-neg where the matter is of significant public concern, but instead would be used in circumstances such as:
a.

When the Department wishes to propose an amendment to an existing rule that would not
significantly increase the regulatory burden on affected institutions or significantly decrease the
protections afforded to students;

b. When the Department certifies that a delay in the rulemaking would require significant expenditures of government funds;
c.

When there is a rulemaking with an especially short statutory deadline.

Such certifications should not be subject to judicial review.
3. Congress should consider revising (and making more general) the list of stakeholders that are supposed to
be invited to participate in negotiated rulemakings.
4. Congress should provide dedicated, adequate funds in the Department’s appropriations to be used for the
purpose of conducting negotiated rulemakings, including the use of a dedicated conference room for this
purpose.

Recommendations to the Department of Education
Public Hearings
1. The Department should consider other ways than its current practice of holding several public hearings
in Washington and in the field to meet its statutory obligation to “obtain advice and recommendations”
prior to undertaking a reg-neg. It should experiment with using video conferencing to avoid the expense
of field hearings and transcripts, and in some cases should try collecting written views instead of hearings.

Selection of the Committee Members
2. The Department should relax its control over the selection of committee members.
a.

It should make the initial selection of constituencies to be represented but should allow each
constituency to nominate its own primary and alternate members, and should accept those
nominations unless there is a good reason not to.

b. It should use Federal Register notices to solicit additional interested constituencies, and ask the
committee to suggest the absence of key constituencies.
c.
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In any event, it should end its practice of choosing alternates for all “primary” committee
members who are now given all the privileges of membership except the vote. This creates either
double representation or in some cases incompatible representatives. Alternates should be true
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alternates (who sit at the table only in the absence of the primary), and they and other attendees
should be able to speak only with the committee’s permission (which should not be unreasonably withheld).
d. It should strive for balance and a manageable number of members, without over-representing
one “side” of the issue. In the event that similar groups seek to have their own representation,
and that would create overloading, the Department should ask those groups to select a representative for the larger group.
e.

It should have no blanket preference for “practitioners” over association representatives. The
elimination of the doubling effect of the current “alternate” policy should enable the selection of
more of both practitioners and association representatives as the issues warrant.

f.

It should maintain its practice of taking into account the nominee’s negotiating behavior in
previous reg-negs, and should also consult experienced facilitators in identifying constituencies
and accepting nominations.

Bundling of Issues
3. The Department should avoid bundling unrelated issues into a single reg-neg. It is hoped that a relaxation
of time and resource constraints would allow use of separate reg-negs for clearly separate issues.

Selection and Use of Facilitators
4. Facilitators should be given more time to prepare, and, if possible, should be hired before the public hearing—if those are to be continued.
5. If the Department wishes to maximize the chances of achieving consensus, it should encourage facilitators
to use their skills to attempt to achieve consensus, not by encouraging any particular substantive result,
but by being more active in exploring areas of agreement.
6. The Department should allow the facilitators to either draft or be closely involved in drafting the meeting
agendas.
7. Facilitators should be kept better informed about relevant aspects of a rulemaking, such as applicable
Departmental policy or developments pertaining to the positions of OMB, the White House, or Members of Congress, unless such matters are extremely sensitive.
8. The Department should consult with facilitators early and often (especially experienced ones), because
they may be able to provide useful substantive or procedural advice (e.g., who should be appointed to
the committee, or whether it is worth having another meeting). At present the Department rarely if ever
consults them on such matters.
9. The Department should diversify its roster of facilitators.

Departmental Negotiators
10. The Department should consider using its political appointees as its negotiator in reg-negs more often,
especially in proceedings where it can be anticipated that there will be a frequent need to seek political
guidance. When using career officials, it should also consider using its experienced lawyers in this role.

Definition of Consensus
11. If the Department is forced to continue its practice of bundling a number of unrelated, severable issues
into one rulemaking, it should make clear that if a consensus is reached on some of these issues, the
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Department will agree to publish the agreed-upon text of those proposals in its proposed rule.
12. On procedural matters, such as whether to add another constituency to the committee, to form a subcommittee, to bring an outside expert, or to make adjustments in the organizational protocols, the Department should allow the Committee to take actions with a “consensus” amounting to a super-majority but
short of unanimity.

Caucuses/Subcommittees/Use of Outside Experts to Speak to the Committee
13. The Department should continue to allow (and if resources permit, encourage) the use of caucuses and
the bringing in of outside experts to educate the committee.

Logistics
14. The Department should strive to continue to use its own dedicated space for reg-neg meetings, but should
upgrade the space and modernize the meetings by (a) installing a guest Wi-Fi network, (b) allow live and
archived streaming of meetings or use of Skype, (c) installing a room thermostat to allow temperature
control, (d) providing a dedicated copy machine, and (e) using a projector/screen to help the negotiators
discuss draft language.

Transparency
15. The Department should consider requiring that either a transcript or better summaries/minutes are
prepared of each meeting, with an opportunity for members of the committee to review them and suggest
changes before they are finalized and approved by the Committee. Facilitators should be in charge of this,
and should be permitted to hire an assistant to help with this task.

Drafting
16. The Department should consider experimenting with allowing the committee (aided by the facilitator) to
play a greater role in drafting the text of the proposed rule—especially when the rulemaking is statutorily
mandated.
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APPENDIX A
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING BY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SINCE 2007
Thank you to Susan Hattan of National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU) for
pulling this information together.
This is a very rough, unofficial compilation of Department of Education-negotiated rulemaking sessions since
2007. “No consensus” is generally the outcome when the negotiated rulemaking process does not stem from
recently enacted legislation. Examples include Accreditation (2007), Program Integrity (2010), Teacher Preparation (2012), and Gainful Employment (2013).
YEAR
		
TOPIC						
CONSENSUS?
2007				Accreditation						NO
2008				Loans							YES
				TEACH Grants						YES
2009				Loans							YES
				Loans							YES
				Accreditation						YES
				General Provisions					NO
				Outreach Programs					NO
2010				Program Integrity					NO
				Foreign Schools						YES
2012				Loans							YES
				Teacher Preparation					NO
2013				Gainful Employment					NO
2014				VAWA/Clery						YES
				Multiple disparate topics					NO
				[State authorization, PLUS loans,
				cash management, clock-to-credit-hour conversion,
				retaking coursework]
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APPENDIX B
List of Interviewees
Current or Retired Longtime Former Department of Education Officials
• David Bergeron, retired from ED after 34 years, at the Center for American Progress (CAP) for last 18

months.
• Daniel T. Madzelan, Associate Vice President for Government Relations, American Council on Educa-

tion (ACE). Retired from ED after 30 years in 2012.
• Jamienne S. Studley, Deputy Under Secretary of Education since September 26, 2013, deputy General

Counsel and General Counsel of the Department in the Clinton Administration.
• Brian Siegel, Attorney, Office of General Counsel for 27 years.

Non-Federal Participants
• Maureen Budetti, National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU).
• Judith S. Eaton, president of the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA).
• Sarah Flanagan, head of Government Relations, National Association of Independent Colleges and Uni-

versities (NAICU).
• Anne C. Gross, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Advocacy and Issue Analysis, National Ass’n of Col-

lege and University Business Officers (NACUBO).
• Susan Hattan, National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU).
• Leah Matthews, Executive Director at Distance Education and Training Council (DETC).
• Barmak Nassirian, American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU).
• Becky Timmons, retired from American Council on Education (ACE) in January 2014 after 40 years.

Facilitators
• Craig Bagemihl.
• Chip Cameron.
• Charles Pou Jr.
• Also Neil Eisner—Retired DOT regulatory lawyer, active in some DOT reg-negs, and currently active

facilitator for Department of Energy.
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APPENDIX C
CASES AND ARTICLES DISCUSSING ED’S TITLE IV RULEMAKING SINCE 1992
CASES
Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 2014 WL 4923023—F. Supp. —(D.D.C. 2014)
Facts. After the DC Circuit (in Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir.
2012, below) instructed the Department of Education to provide a reasoned explanation for two aspects of the
incentive-based compensation regulation that affect for-profit colleges and universities, the Department supplemented the preamble to its regulations. Plaintiffs complain that the Department has once again failed to support
its regulations with record evidence and substantiated assertions.
Holdings. Plaintiff ’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
• The Department has failed to explain and substantiate its wholesale ban on graduation-based compensa-

tion. In addition, the Department has not furnished an adequate response to the commenters’ concerns
about the impact of its regulations on minority recruitment.
• The Department basically relied on arguments already promulgated that the court had rejected as insuf-

ficient. Further, the Department’s attorneys offered explanation during litigation, but those explanations
were not in the preamble.
Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 930 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D.D.C. 2013)
Facts. In 2012, Association of Private Colleges and Universities successfully challenged (in part and briefed
below) Dept. of Ed.’s rule that tested compliance with “gainful employment” requirement by examining debt,
earnings, and debt repayment of program’s former students and two related rules. After the rules were vacated,
ED. moved to amend.
• In earlier action, the court vacated reporting requirements and debt measure rule. In this action, the

Department argues that the disclosures required by upheld regulations (34 C.F.R. § 668.6(b)(1)(v)) cannot be fully effective without the vacated reporting requirements (34 C.F.R. § 688.6(a)) and portions of
the vacated debt measures (34 C.F.R. § 688.7(a)(2),(b)-(f )).
• The Department argued that 34 C.F.R. § 668.6(b)(1)(v) (upheld) required covered institutions to

disclose to students the median loan debt incurred by graduated students as provided by the Secretary
but the court vacated 34 C.F.R. § 668.6(a)(1)(i)(C)(2), which required the institutions to report to
the Department the amounts that any graduated student received from private education loans and the
amount from institutional financing plans that the student owes the institution. The Dept. argues that
it needs both pieces of information to provide covered schools with the median loan debt data they are
required to disclose.
Holdings.
•

ED’s motion to amend is denied. ED could not expand the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS)
database to include detailed information about every student enrolled in a gainful employment program.
o

The court notes that the Department’s motion depends on the proper interpretation of 20
U.S.C. § 1015c which prohibits the development of federal databases storing personally identifiable information on individuals receiving assistance, except when it is necessary for the operation of programs authorized by subchapter II, IV, or VII.

Thanks to my research assistant, Rose Monahan, Washington College of Law, Class of 2015, for her compilation of this Appendix.
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o

Court finds that the data collection has not been authorized by Congress.

Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2012) [reviewing Career College
Ass’n v. Duncan, 796 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2011), below]
Facts. Three requirements for qualification for Title IV programs are at issue: (1) the school authorization
regulation (2) agreeing not to provide commission or other incentives on the success in securing enrollments or
financial aid; and (3) requirement not to engage in substantial misrepresentation of the nature of its educational
program, its financial charges, or the employability of its graduates.
•

School authorization regulation: state must have a process to review and act on complaints and for online
courses, authorization from all states in which students reside that require authorization.

•

Commission/Compensation Rule: Closes loophole where schools were providing incentive payments.

•

Misrepresentation: redefined to mean any statement that has the likelihood or tendency to deceive or
confuse plus providing the Department with more enforcement options.

Holdings.
•

Compensation Regulations do not exceed the Higher Education Act’s (HEA) limits, but two aspects of
regulations are remanded for want of adequate explanations.
o

Misrepresentation regulations exceed the HEA’s limits because: (1) allows enforcement without
procedural protections; (2) proscribes misrepresentation to subjects not covered by the HEA;
and (3) proscribes statements that are merely confusing.

o

State Authorization Regulations are valid but the online education regulation is not a logical
outgrowth of the Department’s proposed rules.

Ass’n of Private Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012)
Facts. Association of private colleges and universities brought suit against ED challenging rule that tested compliance with gainful employment requirement by examining debt, earnings, and debt repayment of program’s former
students. To assess whether a program provides training that leads to gainful employment, ED proposed two tests:
one based on debt-to-income ratios and the other based on repayment rates (“debt measures”).
•

•

Debt Measure Rule
o

Plaintiffs argued that “gainful employment” simply means “a job that pays” and the Department’s attempt to define the phrase in terms of debt and income exceeds its statutory authority.

o

Plaintiffs also argued that the debt measure rule is not adequately explained, does not actually
assess whether a program prepares a student for gainful employment, is arbitrarily or unconstitutionally retroactive, and lacks a reasoned basis.

Reporting requirements
o

•

Disclosure
o
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Plaintiffs challenge required reporting as in violation of the HEA which prohibits “the development, implementation, or maintenance of a Federal database of personally identifiable information on individuals receiving assistance under this chapter.”
Plaintiffs challenged rule requiring disclosure to students of employment placement rates and
median loan debt for students.
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Holdings.
•

Gainful employment regulations are a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory command.

•

The debt repayment measure lacks a reasoned basis and is vacated as A&C. Because the debt-to-ratio measure and repayment measure were meant to work together, the court cannot sever one from the others.
Therefore, the entire debt measure rule must be vacated and remanded to the Department.

•

The reporting rule is also remanded because the Department was relying on the debt measures rule to satisfy the exception to the information collection prohibition when information collection “is necessary for
the operation of programs authorized” by Title IV. Since the debt measures are remanded, the reporting
rule has no authorized program to rely upon.

•

Disclosure rule is upheld because it is within ED’s regulatory power to “make, promulgate, issue, rescind,
and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of operation of, and governing the applicable
programs administered by, the Department.”

Career College Ass’n v. Duncan, 796 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2011) (aff ’d. in part & rev’d. in part by Ass’n of Private Sector Colleges & Universities v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427 (DC Cir. 2012)).
Facts. Plaintiffs challenged ED’s regulations prohibiting incentive-based compensation, the elimination of compensation “safe harbors,” the misrepresentation regulations, and the state authorization requirement as outside
the scope of the Department’s statutory authority and the Constitution, and as arbitrary and capricious under the
APA.
Holdings.
•

Association had standing to pursue facial challenges, despite ED’s argument that, without any enforcement record, claims were not ripe;

•

New compensation regulations did not violate the HEA through their restrictions on incentive payments
or senior management compensation;

•

New misrepresentation regulations did not contravene the HEA’s command that Secretary provide notice
and opportunity to be heard prior to suspending or terminating school’s eligibility status for Title IV
funding or prior to imposing fine;

•

New misrepresentation regulations did not impermissibly expand scope and type of statement that could
be sanctioned as substantial misrepresentation;

•

New misrepresentation regulations did not, on their face, create chilling effect on school’s free speech
rights;

•

Secretary gave no prior notice of aspect of new state authorization regulations that would require distance
educators to obtain authorization from every state in which they had students, and its adoption in final
regulations violated the APA; and

•

Association was not entitled to injunctive relief pending appeal.

American Ass’n of Cosmetology Schools v. Riley, 170 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1999)
Facts. Plaintiffs challenge ED’s implementing regulations for 20 U.S.C. § 1085, concerning administrative
procedures for hearing and appeal after notice of termination from eligibility for Federal Family Educational
Loan (FFEL) participation, under Title IV. Ineligibility for FFEL is tied to an institution’s “cohort default rate”
(CDR)—the percentage of current and former students that enter repayment on their loans during a given fiscal
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year who default before the end of the following fiscal year. ED promulgated regulations on calculating CDRs,
and then amended those regulations in November, but stated that the calculation that was most favorable to individual institutions would be used in adjudication. Plaintiffs allege:
•

The Secretary in fact has acted in accordance with his statement in only two CDR loan servicing appeal
decisions and has otherwise applied only the standards of the November regulations.

•

That the retroactive application of the November regulations without adequate notice violated due process.

•

The Secretary’s failure to require uniformly a day-specific method of determining the repayment date of
Stafford loans is in violation of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1078(b), 1232(c).

•

The short and strict administrative deadlines do not give institutions that opportunity to review the loan
servicing records of the affected borrowers in CDR appeals.

Holding. District court’s order granting the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment (made on the merits) is
vacated, and case is remanded so that it may enter judgment dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction.
•

Relief plaintiffs were seeking was barred by the anti-injunction provision of 20 U.S.C. § 1082.

Mission Group Kansas, Inc. v. Riley, 146 F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 1998)
Facts. Nonprofit educational organization operating post-secondary vocation institution sought declaratory and
injunction relief against the Sec. of Ed. to enjoin imposition of the 85/15 rule, requiring proprietary institutions
of higher education to derive 15 percent of tuition revenues from nonfederal sources to be eligible for federally
guaranteed financial aid programs. The district court agreed with Mission that the Secretary’s action contravened
the plain language of the HEA, and granted the requested declaratory and injunctive relief against imposition of
the 85/15 rule.
Holding.
•

Contrary to the district court’s view, the statute does not plainly contravene the Secretary’s action in this
case.

•

But the administrative action taken by the Secretary here cannot be regarded as within the legitimate
interpretive scope of the regulations upon which he purports to have acted. Therefore the Secretary is
entitled to no deference under the Seminole Rock–Chevron standard.

•

Even when evaluated under the less deferential Skidmore standard, the record before us appears insufficient to evaluate properly whether the 85/15 rule survives review as a valid statutory “interpretative rule.”
We therefore remand to the district court for further proceedings.

Coalition of New York State Career Schools, Inc. v. Riley, 129 F.3d 276 (2d 1997)
Facts. Association of trade schools brought action challenging refund regulation promulgated by Sec. of Ed.
under the HEA. The district court entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement on the theory that it
represented an impermissible modification of the refund formula set forth in the governing statute.
Holding. Regulation governing refund of federal aid money when student’s program of study ends prematurely
was reasonable although it did not permit institution to retain amounts owed by student when calculating refund
under state law or accrediting agency formula. Overturns district court: injunction vacated and complaint dismissed.
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•

20 U.S.C. § 1091b set forth the minimum amount that must be refunded to a student in order for an institution’s policy to be considered fair and equitable. Nothing in the statute precludes the Secretary from
determining that a larger amount must be refunded in certain instances. Nor does the statute dictate that
the government, rather than the education institution, should bear the risk of student non-payment.

•

Notes that this court is agreeing with the D.C. Circuit and not the 9th Circuit.

California Cosmetology Coalition v. Riley, 110 F.3d 1454 (9th Cir. 1997)
Facts. Association of cosmetology schools sought injunction against ED’s enforcement of amendments to tuition
refund regulations under the HEA. Regulations governed the amount of tuition and other fees postsecondary
schools must refund when a student receiving Title IV federal aid withdraws from classes before completing the
term for which those fees have been charged. District court found that the regulations contradicted 20 U.S.C. §
1091b.
•

Under the Final Regulations, the school would have to include in its reimbursement to the government
the amount still owed by the student. The institution would then have to pursue the student for unpaid
sums. For students receiving full grants, this turns grants into personal debt.

Holding. ED exceeded its authority in promulgating tuition refund regulations; district court affirmed.
•

Congress was unambiguous when it listed three criteria for when an institution’s refund policy will “be
considered fair and equitable.”

•

Disagrees with the D.C. Circuit’s holding on the same issue because the D.C. Circuit assumed that Congress had inadvertently overlooked the problem of unpaid charges.

Career College Ass’n v. Riley, 74 F.3d 1265 (DC Cir. 1996)
Facts. Appellants raise five challenges to regulations promulgated by ED:
•

(1) The regulations amending the Student Assistance General Provisions (34 CFR Part 668) is ineffective
for the award year 1994-95 because it was not promulgated “in final form” by May 1, 1994 as required by
the Master Calendar Provision.

•

(2) The required refund of federal funds when a student withdraws from an institution prematurely (challenging two regulations).

•

(3) The “Cohort Default Rate Rule” as exceeding the Secretary’s authority because it conflicts with various statutory provisions.

•

(4) The “Thirteen Week Rule,” which required that institutions calculate the placement rate for any award
year based on the number of students who, within 180 days of the day they received their degree obtained
gainful employment and on the date of this calculation are employed or have been employed for at least
13 weeks following receipt of the credential from the institution. Challenged at arbitrary and capricious
because it is “virtually impossible to meet.”

•

(5) The “Five Day Rule” which applies to non-term based, credit-hour schools and defines a week of
instruction time to be any week in which at least five days of regularly scheduled instruction, examinations, or prep for exams occurs. Challenged as unsupported by the record and unjustified due to the severe
effect on evening students.

Holdings.

Appendix IV: Enhancing the Use of Negotiated Rulemaking by the Department of Education

117

•

Regulations were promulgated in proper form within time limit set by master calendar provision.

•

Regulation pertaining to refund of “unearned tuition” upon withdrawal of student properly required
institution to add to federal refund amount of student’s unpaid scheduled cash payment.

•

Regulation that determined institution administratively incapable of administering financial aid program
if institution had cohort default rate of more than 25 percent for any of three most recent financial years
was proper.

•

Secretary’s explanation for implementation of the 13-week rule was reasonable.

•

Regulation that defined “week of instructional time” for purposes of vocation school eligibility in student
aid program to be five days of class was not arbitrary or capricious.

Career College Ass’n v. Riley, 82 F.3d 476 (DC Cir. 1996)
Facts. Career College Association petitions for rehearing of court’s determination that the refund regulation (34
C.F.R. § 668.22(g)) is a reasonable interpretation of conflicting statutory mandates. The refund regulation puts
the risk of non-collection on the institution, which must first pay the government and then seek money from the
student.
Holding. Upon withdrawal of student during enrollment, school is to pay the government first and is not allowed
to assume that government will be repaid indirectly by the student; and the Secretary’s explanation of regulations
was not a post-hoc rationalization such as not to be entitled to deference.

Connecticut Student Loan Foundation v. Riley, 948 F. Supp. 156 (D. Conn. 1996)
Facts. State guarantee agency under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program brought declaratory judgment action
challenging ED’s regulation requiring that loans be guaranteed at a rate of 98 percent of their total amount.
Holding: The agency had standing; the statute requiring agencies to insure loans at “no less than 98 percent” was
ambiguous, and the regulation requiring guarantee at no less and no more than 98 percent was reasonable.

Career College Ass’n v. Riley, Civ. A. N. 94-1214, 1994 WL 396294 (D.D.C. July 19, 1994)
Facts. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief arising out of final regulation ED promulgated on April 29, 1994, which
defined a “proprietary institution of higher education” as requiring that institutions derive at least 15 percent of
their revenue from sources that are not derived from funds provided under Title IV. Plaintiffs argued that the
regulations violated the APA. Plaintiffs’ arguments:
•

Secretary’s decision to apply the substantive requirements of the 85 percent rule with no lead-in time was
arbitrary and capricious (A&C).

•

Only allowing revenues to Title IV-eligible programs to be counted in the 85 percent rule was A&C.

•

Requiring institutions to apply a cash method of accounting to report revenue in the denominator was
A&C.

Holding. Injunction denied
•

The 85 percent rule was not arbitrary and capricious.

•

Congress granted the Secretary express discretion to implement the substantive requirements of the 85
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percent rule and it was reasonable to give immediate effect.
•

Secretary’s discussion of the possible limitations on what revenues could be considered provides an adequate basis for the choice he ultimately made.

•

Congress left a clear gap as to which accounting method would be used in calculating the revenue formula
and the Secretary’s cash method is reasonable.

Ponce Paramedical College, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Education, 858 F. Supp. 303 (D.P.R. 1994)
Facts. Proprietary institutions brought action for injunction and declaratory relief challenging new regulations
promulgated by ED for eligibility of Title IV loan funds. Plaintiffs argued that they received insufficient notice
prior to publication of agency’s final rules, that the regulations were not a reasonable interpretation by the agency
of Congress’ intent and therefore A&C. Plaintiffs also argued that a taking of both property and liberty without
due process and violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the nondelegation doctrine.
•

Like Career Colleges Ass’n v. Riley, plaintiffs were challenging the 85 percent rule [15 percent of revenues
had to be from sources other than Title IV funds to qualify as a proprietary institution of higher education]. ED had to define “revenue.” Expert testimony at trial asserted that 14 of the 24 plaintiffs would not
be able to comply with the Department’s 85 percent rule using the revenue definition in the regulations.

Holdings
•

Regulations were not A&C.

•

Regulations were finalized in accordance with notice-and-comment provisions.

•

Secretary was not required to delay implementation date.

•

Regulations did not constitute a taking of liberty and property interests under the Fifth Amendment.

•

Amended statute did not violate Equal Protection Clause, Contract Clause, or nondelegation doctrine.

Career College Ass’n v. Dep’t of Education, 1992 WL 233837 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1992)
Facts. Plaintiffs seek to preliminarily enjoin ED from finding schools with high loan default rates ineligible to
participate in a federal student loan program without pre-termination notice and review, alleging a violation of
the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiffs also allege that disqualifying schools from participating in the program for more than one fiscal year violates the plain language of the statute.
Holding.
•

PI is denied because plaintiffs couldn’t show irreparable injury.

•

Because denial of even “some kind” of pre-termination process violates plaintiffs’ due process rights, plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
o

Although a full evidentiary hearing prior to termination is not required, some kind of process is
required.

Ass’n of Accredited Cosmetology Schools v. Alexander, 979 F. 2d 859 (DC Cir. 1992)
Facts. Plaintiffs challenged ED’s regulations implementing the Student Loan Default Prevention Initiative Act.
The regulations stated that institutions would lose their eligibility to participate in the GSL programs if the
institution’s cohort default rate, for each of the three most recent fiscal years, is equal to or greater than 35 percent
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(for years 1991 and 1992) or 30 percent (all fiscal years after 1992). Termination became effective eight days after
official notice and terminated the school from eligibility for the next two subsequent fiscal years.
Holding.
•

Interpretation of the Student Loan Default Prevention Initiative Act by the Secretary of Education as
permitting application of 35 percent threshold default rate to fiscal years 1987-89 is a permissible one;

•

Act and its implementing regulations are not impermissibly retroactive, even though future eligibility for
participation in Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program depends on schools’ past default rates; and

•

Congress has not waived its power to alter contractual terms with respect to program participation agreements entered into pursuant to the GSL program.

ARTICLES
Kamille Wolff Dean, Foreclosures and Financial Aid: Mind over Mortgages in Closing the Plus Loan Gap, 4
Colum. J. Race & L. 129 (2014)
•

Addresses an array of inherent problems with the current student loan industry, particularly as the student
aid system relates to the federal Parent Loan for Undergraduate Students (PLUS) loan program.

•

Suggests certain best practices including
o

PLUS loan reform, specifically addressing minorities.

o

Financial Aid Eligibility.

o

Bankruptcy Protection.

Mark Andrew Nelson, Note, Never Ascribe to Malice That Which is Adequately Explained by Incompetence: A
Failure to Protect Student Veterans, 40 J. Coll. & Univ. L. 159 (2014)
•

This article specifically focuses how on for-profit educational institutions have engaged in manipulative
and deceitful recruitment practices at the expense of student veterans.

•

It does focus on educational funding programs, including Title IV of the Higher Education Act and ED
regulations.

Jake A. Kasser, Note, Professional Integrity: Why the DOE Should Apply Debt Measures to Law Schools, 43 U.
Mem. L. Rev. 805, 806 (2013)
•

Argues that the debt-burden on students graduating from for-profit institutions that have prompted ED
regulation is not unlike the debt-burden of law graduates. For ED to fulfill its policy initiatives articulated in the most recent rulemaking, the new gainful employment-debt measures should be expanded to
encompass law school institutions.

Julian T. Miller, Note, Program Integrity and the Implications of the Corporate Identity in Higher Education, 7
Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 509, 511 (2013)
•
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Article is organized into five parts: (1) historical emergence of for-profit universities; (2) current context
and practice of for-profit institutions; (3) current legislation and regulatory context of the for-profit
education industry and impetus behind increases in borrowing and default; (4) approach taken by ED to
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address for-profit institutions and the potential impact it could have had on the rise of student default,
reduction of student loan debt, and improvement of institutional performance; (5) illustrate for-profit
institutions contemplated when the industry was granted Title IV eligibility.
•

The article is addressing how the regulations would have played out if not vacated by the DC District
Court.

•

Argues that regulatory reforms were unlikely to make much of a change. For instance, under the “gainful
employment” regulation, it was expected that 97 percent of institutions were providing programs that lead
to gainful employment. Only the worst actors would be addressed – making the game more fair but still
substantially unfair.

Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded Subprime Higher Education, 69 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 439 (2012)
•

This article focuses on the “Gainful Employment Rule” promulgated by ED. The author compares the
bubbles in for-profit higher education and subprime mortgages, arguing that both involve federal encouragement of high risk taking to achieve the American Dream.

•

Spends time outlining the business model of for-profit colleges.

•

Ultimately questions the policy of relying on for-profit higher education as a means to expand to universal
higher education.
o

Questionable whether they produce educated citizens with degrees at lower the cost than alternatives.

o

Debt levels are prohibitively high, especially among for-profit institution graduates.

Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal Reform of the for-Profit Educational Industry, 79 Tenn. L. Rev. 515
(2012)
•

Examines the recent attempts at increased government oversight, on both federal and state levels, as well
as the trends within the litigation involving for-profit colleges and universities.

•

Argues for more effective control measures concerning for-profit institutions, particularly greater transparency, stronger federal and state legislation and regulation, increased accreditation associations reform,
and improved internal self-regulation.

•

Examines the areas of concern that have become the most problematic for the for-profit educational
industry: student recruitment methods, amount of loan debt their students accrue, and the future career
prospects for graduates.

•

Specifically focused on ED’s recruiter compensation regulations, the misrepresentation regulations, and
the gainful employment regulations.

Anthony J. Guida Jr & David Figuli, Higher Education’s Gainful Employment and 90/10 Rules: Unintended “Scarlet Letters” for Minority, Low-Income, and Other at-Risk Students, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 132 (2012)
•

Argues that existing legislative and regulatory policies directed at proprietary institutions due to allegedly
disproportionally higher numbers of student borrowers and defaulters at proprietary institutions have
unwittingly restricted minority and at-risk students’ access to higher education.

•

Takes issue with two ED rules in particular: the new “gainful employment” rule and the “90/10” rule. “If,
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as the data and analysis suggest, it is the type of student enrolled, as opposed to the quality of the program
offered or the institution offering it, that is the primary cause of low graduation rates, excessive debt, and
student defaults, then it is pointless to shift these students from proprietary institutions to nonprofit and
public colleges.” Argues for the elimination for both ED rules in favor of policies that will apply to all
institutions and designed to ensure student access and success, require transparency and comparability,
consider institutional mission where appropriate, measure student outcomes normalized against populations served, and treat at-risk students equitably no matter what institution they choose to attend.
•

The article outlines Title IV of the HEA of 1965, the role of proprietary institutions, regulatory constraints for low-income and minority students, while focusing specifically on how ED rules make things
worse.

Grant MacQueen, Note, Closing Doors: The Gainful Employment Rule As over-Regulation of for-Profit Higher
Education That Will Restrict Access to Higher Education for America’s Poor, 19 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y
309 (2012).
•

Specifically focuses on the “gainful employment” regulation, projecting likely impacts.

•

Argues that the gainful employment rule will adversely affect low-income students and proposes a system
wherein applicants take a placement exam and all institutions of higher education make a series of mandatory disclosures to allow applicants to make informed enrollment decisions.
o

The placement test would be required for all students seeking federal funding in order to gauge
whether particular students are prepared for higher education. Further, there would be a section
measuring individual strengths, in order to create a better fit between students and their chosen
fields.

o

Current disclosure only allows students to compare failing to non-failing schools, which isn’t
particularly useful. Average income ten years after graduation should also be disclosed (does not
address collection issue).

Matthew A. McGuire, Note, Subprime Education: For-Profit Colleges and the Problem with Title IV Federal Student Aid, 62 Duke L.J. 119 (2012)
•

This article focuses on ED’s Title IV regulations and for-profit educational institutions.

•

Examines the interaction between federal student-aid policy and for-profit institutions, arguing that the
noble goals of modern federal student-aid policy enable the very practices that lead to negative outcomes
for many students by creating a lucrative market for “subprime education.”

•

Argues that the problems surrounding federal financial aid and for-profit organizations will only be
resolved by deemphasizing the student-oriented aid model in favor of an institution-center model that is
focused on reducing the price of education.
o

The author supports direct federal funding to the institutions themselves.

Jaclyn Patton, Comment, Encouraging Exploitation of the Military by for-Profit Colleges: The New GI Bill and the
90/10 Rule, 54 S. Tex. L. Rev. 425, 427 (2012)
•

The article is focused on how for-profit institutions have specifically targeted veterans. The author explores
the 90/10 rule and how it incentivizes for-profit institutions to enroll the highest number of military
members possible because for every service member a school enrolls, it may enroll nine students who pay
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for their education with nothing but federal student aid.
•

Ultimately argues that because for-profit schools have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders, they cannot
act in the best interest of students or taxpayers. As a result, for-profit institutions should have minimum
access to GI bill funds.

James Audette, Note, Defining “Gainful Employment” and Other Reforms in Federal Educational Lending, 38 J.
Coll. & Univ. L. 167, 168 (2011)
•

The paper analyzes ED’s recent rule change regarding the definition of “gainful employment.”

•

Addresses criticisms and critiques of the new rule and attempts to predict the rule’s real-world impact.

Cheryl L. Auster, Comment, Promising A Better Future but Delivering Debt: Understanding the Financial and
Social Impact of for-Profit Colleges and the Effect of the New Program Integrity Rules, 13 SCHOLAR 631, 632
(2011)
•

This article focuses on ED’s regulations geared towards transparency and misrepresentations, particularly
addressing: (1) misrepresentation and marketing; (2) fraud in connection with the value of the degree;
and (3) fraud relating to financial matters.

•

Also addresses ED’s regulations which strengthen the ban on incentive compensation for admissions
representatives for for-profit colleges.

•

Notes that ED has not created a private cause of action to respond to misrepresentations and ED has
discretion regarding enforcement, but is generally supportive of ED efforts to require disclosures and
transparency.

Gayland O. Hethcoat II, For-Profits Under Fire: The False Claims Act As A Regulatory Check on the for-Profit Education Sector, 24 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 1, 2 (2011)
•

Recognizing the regulatory reform enacted by ED in response to for-profit educational institutions, the
article advocates for the use of the False Claims Act as another tool aimed at for-profit reform.

•

Acknowledges that the question whether an institution that knowingly breaches its PPA can be liable for
fraud under the False Claims Act has divided the courts.

Nicholas R. Johnson, Phoenix Rising: Default Rates at Proprietary Institutions of Higher Education and What Can
Be Done to Reduce Them, 40 J.L. & Educ. 225 (2011)
•

•

This article is focused on the student loan default rates at for-profit institutions of higher education,
exploring the regulatory scheme and gaps therein. Regulatory issues discussed include:
o

ED’s failure, until recently, to define “gainful employment.”

o

Problems with the calculation of the cohort default rate.

o

Lack of job placement and graduation rate information.

o

Loopholes in federal rules that generally prohibit incentive payments to loan enrollment officers
based on the number of students enrolled.

Discusses ED’s recent regulatory efforts and makes recommendations to “plug the gaps,” mostly focusing
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on greater enforcement and information gathering.
Robert S. Eitel & Kent D. Talbert, The U.S. Department of Education’s Federal Student Aid Program Integrity
Final Regulations, 12 Engage: J. Federalist Soc’y Prac. Groups 16 (2011)
The paper focuses on whether the Department of Education has exceeded its statutory authority under the
HEA concerning the following regulations:

•

o

The misrepresentation regulation—prohibits misleading statements by eligible institutions to students, prospective students, members of the public, any accrediting agency, a state agency, or to the
Secretary.


o

The incentive compensation regulation—expands the kinds of compensation prohibited by the
HEA and the class of compensated persons encompassed within those provisions.


o

Argues that the Department punishing eligible institutions for misrepresentation for even
minor infractions without notice and hearing is not supported by the HEA.

The incentive compensation regulations bar payments that the HEA arguably permits.

The state authorization regulations—a specific framework for authorizing eligible institutions to
provide a postsecondary program of study.


The effort to compel a specific authorization and enforcement scheme is without foundation in the HEA’s provisions governing state responsibilities.

Joseph Sipley, Note, For-Profit Education and Federal Funding: Bad Outcomes for Students and Taxpayers, 64
Rutgers L. Rev. 267 (2011)
•

Argues that the “gainful employment” regulations do not go far enough and that several additional
reforms are needed to rein in for-profit institutions.

•

The article spends time describing the history of federal involvement in higher education and the rise of
for-profit schools.

•

The note mostly focuses on the current regulations, specifically the “gainful employment” regulation and
what more can be done.

Stephen S. Dunham, Government Regulation of Higher Education: The Elephant in the Middle of the Room, 36 J.
Coll. & Univ. L. 749, 750 (2010)
•

This piece has a historical purpose, spending much time discussing the development of higher education
regulation.

•

Discusses the costs and benefits of government regulation of higher education, suggesting that the industry
may do better without regulation.

•

Also discusses in-house compliance at higher education institutions, arguing that the role of counsel is
conflicting: advising and defending the institution on one hand and acting as an in-house regulator to ensure
compliance from that same institution.

For-Profit Colleges: Undercover Testing Finds Colleges Encourages Fraud and Engaged in Deceptive and Questionable
Marketing Practice, U.S. GAO (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf
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•

GAO report discussing undercover tests at fifteen for-profit colleges, finding that four colleges encouraged
fraudulent practices and that all fifteen made deceptive or otherwise questionable statements to GAO’s
undercover applicants, including:
o

Applicants encouraged to falsify their financial aid forms to qualify for financial aid.

o

Exaggeration of potential salary after graduation and failure to provide clear information about
the college’s program duration, costs, or graduation rate.

o

Pressuring contracts for enrollment before the applicant had a chance to talk with a financial
advisor.

Matt G. Smith, Comment, Tuition: $5,000. Textbooks: $600. Having Your Federal Student Aid Applied to December’s Rent in August: Priceless, 43 Idaho L. Rev. 767, 768 (2007)
•

Discusses 34 C.F.R. 668.164(d), ED’s financial aid disbursement regulation that allows institutions of
higher education to require students living on campus to prepay an entire semester’s rental expenses.

•

Argues that the common law—which generally supports the proposition that rent does not accrue as a
debt until the tenant has enjoyed the use of the land for the period for which it is payable—prohibits ED’s
regulation.

•

Argues that Congress did not intend for ED to preempt state law.

Lisa P. Baar, The Higher Education Amendments of 1992: Resolving the Conflict over Diversity Standards and Institutional Eligibility for Title IV Aid, 30 Harv. J. on Legis. 253 (1993)
•

The article discusses the controversy that led Congress to amend the Higher Education Act in 1992 and
discuss possible consequences of the Amendments.

•

Focused on the accreditation requirements, particularly the relationship between the accrediting agencies
and the federal government and the ambiguity regarding the Secretary’s authority to control accrediting
agency standards.
o

•

Discusses the implications of the private accrediting agency relationship to the federal government (inherent tension) and legislative response for continued autonomy of accrediting agencies
and future conflicts between ED and accrediting agencies over standards.

Briefly discusses possible Establishment Clause problems with the allocation of federal funds through
Title IV aid to religiously affiliated schools and the new “Religious Institution Rule.”
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APPENDIX V

The Challenges of Information Collection Burden in Higher Education
Carlo Salerno

October 24, 2014

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper was commissioned as part of the Task Force on Regulation of Higher Education and is one of a series
of white papers looking at regulatory process reform ideas. This paper focuses on the challenges that colleges and
universities may face when information collection burden estimates do not necessarily match reality. The study’s
research questions were designed to evaluate: 1) the extent to which the U.S. Department of Education’s practices
for estimating information collection burden differ from other federal departments and agencies, and 2) how
representative of the actual time, effort, and cost existing estimates may be.
The findings indicate that the Department’s processes for justifying information collection burden are neither
more nor less transparent than those at other federal agencies. They also suggest that agencies provide varied
levels of justification and are inconsistent in terms of both how activities are distinguished as well as in how costs
are measured. The most commonly omitted information in the packages that federal agencies provide to the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) was, in fact, justification for how the estimates themselves
were derived. Even within the Department of Education, information collection justifications were found to be
remarkably diverse.
The findings also indicate that, at least in the case of federal financial aid, the aggregate information collection
burden is highly sensitive to minute adjustments in time-on-task estimates and greatly understates the true effort
needed to maintain compliance as assessed by the relevant institutional staff. When activities like Enrollment Verification and Satisfactory Academic Progress (SAP) were evaluated, rounding error adjustments suggest that the
true effort needed to maintain compliance across all higher education institutions for these two activities alone
could be understated by as much as one million hours of staff time.
When financial aid administrators were asked to review the Department of Education’s (ED) estimates, the findings suggest that the true effort needed to maintain compliance across all higher education institutions for just
these two activities could be understated by as much as 2.2 million staff hours. The bulk of these additional hours
seem to come as a result of much greater time needed to adjust to changing standards, as well greater time needed
to work with and resolve student issues with students.
From these findings come the following recommendations:
1. The Department of Education and other federal agencies should consider adopting more definitive and
activity-based information collection standards that focus on clearly defined activities.
2. OIRA should consider requiring federal departments and agencies to incorporate additional justification
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elements into their information collection request packages, including estimates for data collection and
storage, as well as data validation.
3. The Department of Education should consider exploring ways to foster a more collaborative relationship
with higher education institutions on burden efforts. This could involve a petition-style process that obligates the Department to review and potentially revise information collection burdens when a minimum
threshold of higher education institutions requests it. It could also involve establishing standing panels of
school experts who can assist the Department in making informed burden estimate calculations.
4. OIRA should consider requiring federal departments and agencies to incorporate information collection
standards that require burden measurements based on the size of the public entity being affected.
5. The Department of Education should consider engaging in a thorough review of areas where data that is
already being collected can be re-purposed to reduce information collection burden on higher education
institutions.
6. The Department of Education should consider exploring ways in which private sector technology solutions can help reduce the information collection burden on higher education institutions.
7. Congress should have the U.S. Government Accountability Office conduct a retrospective study of select
ED regulations in order to determine the accuracy of ED’s information collection request estimates.

INTRODUCTION
At the core of regulatory action, at least to those responsible for its execution, is recordkeeping, reporting out
to federal and/or state bodies, or disclosing information to the general public. The extent to which activities like
these permeate the postsecondary education industry landscape was made particularly clear in 2008 with the passage of the most recent reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. That legislation imposed a record number
of new reporting and disclosure requirements on American higher education institutions.1
In light of the growing attention paid to streamlining federal regulations affecting colleges and universities, this
project was designed to help policymakers better understand the challenges that arise when higher education
institutions are tasked with information collection burdens that may not accurately reflect the financial and time
costs expended. The purpose here is to address the transparency of the Department of Education’s process for
calculating burden estimates. It is also to understand the extent to which total burden may be sensitive to minute
increases in activity time as well as consider what kinds of recommendations may improve the process by which
information collection burden estimates are established.

STUDY QUESTIONS
The particular questions this study will address are:
1. To what extent does the Department of Education provide the same type of information/data to the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as other federal departments and agencies when it comes to
estimating the administrative burden of proposed/existing regulations?
2. What is the potential impact on higher education institutions of inaccurate burden estimates from the
1

A comprehensive listing of the various reporting and disclosure requirements, up to and including the most recent reauthorization of
the Higher Education Act, can be found here: http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010831rev.pdf.
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Department of Education?

METHODOLOGY
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the overarching legislation that guides how federal departments and agencies should look to minimize administrative burden.2
As a matter of public service, OIRA maintains a searchable, online Information Collection Review database that
includes all of the documentation that agencies must file in order to get approval for imposing public burdens
related to information recordkeeping, reporting, or disclosure.3
The first question was addressed by creating a cross-agency list of Information Collection Requests (ICRs) from
the database. This list was created by filtering records to include: 1) on-going activities (e.g., those that are currently active and not yet expired), 2) across all federal departments and agencies, 3) applicable to recordkeeping,
reporting, and disclosure activities, 4) that received public comments, and 5) that affect higher education.4 This
limited the review to 34 records, a list of which can be found in Appendix A. From this listing, the information
burden justification documentations each agency provided was retrieved, analyzed, and compared.
Even focusing on just higher education, the Department of Education alone includes a number of separate offices
(e.g., Federal Student Aid, Office of Postsecondary Education, National Center for Education Statistics), each
of which submits ICR packages as part of its own regulatory action. As a secondary check, a random collection
of just Department of Education ICRs was separately analyzed in order to determine the extent to which these
different sub-offices utilized different justification methods when completing ICR packages.
To address the second question, college administrators, national higher education advocacy organizations, and
private sector education service providers were contacted and asked to help identify ongoing ICRs that: 1)
affected most if not all higher education institutions, 2) required substantive effort towards record-keeping or
reporting to the Department of Education, and 3) focused on where school officials believed that burden requests
understated the actual effort needed for compliance. From these discussions it was determined to focus attention
on the Student Aid Verification process as well as the monitoring and reporting related to students maintaining
Satisfactory Academic Progress (SAP).5
The first step involved establishing baseline estimates for Verification and SAP from the documentation that ED
provided to OIRA. The next step involved fractionally adjusting baseline estimates upward for activities where
time-on-task is clearly could not be precisely defined down to the second in order to better understand how
sensitive total burden was to minor changes or adjustments in the estimates. Lastly, the baseline estimates were
adjusted again, this time by reflecting financial aid staff members’ perceptions about the actual time needed to
complete such activities.
In general, it is important to note that the number of ICRs reviewed for this project was small; it may be the case
that another set of filters (e.g., focusing only on ICRs that needed to be adjusted before approval or focusing on
2
3

4

5

See also: http://www.nasfaa.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=3903.
See http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ for further information. The actual database can be found here: http://www.reginfo.gov/public/
do/PRASearch.
Part of the search filter process allows individuals to filter on the type of business entity affected, as well as a particular sub-function. For
this study, “education” was selected as the primary business entity and “higher education” was selected as the relevant sub-function.
See the findings section of this paper for additional references to further information on what these activities involve.

128

Recalibrating Regulation of Colleges and Universities

new requests compared to extensions) could yield altogether different results. In addition, utilizing just federal
financial aid examples may not necessarily capture the breadth and scope of practices that affect all higher education institutions; there is the risk that the issues identified are simply unique to financial aid. What is more, it may
also miss important factors or considerations that could help shape policy going forward.

FINDINGS
Question #1
As part of the package of information submitted to OIRA, all federal agencies must complete a supplementary
statement that is designed to answer a number of questions related to information collection burden and how
it is estimated, as well as additional questions related to other pertinent issues including duplicative data, use of
technology and frequency of collection. Question #12 of this document asks agency respondents the following:
12. Provide estimates of the hour burden of the collection of information. The statement should:
• Indicate the number of respondents by affected public type ( federal government, individuals or house-

holds, private sector–businesses or other for-profit, private sector–not-for-profit institutions, farms, state,
local or tribal governments), frequency of response, annual hour burden, and an explanation of how
the burden was estimated, including identification of burden type: recordkeeping, reporting or third
party disclosure. All narrative should be included in item 12. Unless directed to do so, agencies should
not conduct special surveys to obtain information on which to base hour burden estimates. Consultation
with a sample ( fewer than 10) of potential respondents is desirable. If the hour burden on respondents is
expected to vary widely because of differences in activity, size, or complexity, show the range of estimated
hour burden, and explain the reasons for the variance. Generally, estimates should not include burden
hours for customary and usual business practices.
• If this request for approval covers more than one form, provide separate hour burden estimates for each

form and aggregate the hour burdens in the ROCIS IC Burden Analysis Table. (The table should at
minimum include Respondent types, IC activity, Respondent and Responses, Hours/Response, and
Total Hours)
• Provide estimates of annualized cost to respondents of the hour burdens for collections of informa-

tion, identifying and using appropriate wage rate categories. The cost of contracting out or paying
outside parties for information collection activities should not be included here. Instead, this cost should
be included in Item 14.
The review of ICR documentation for the sample did not reveal any systematic differences between ED and other
federal departments/agencies when it came to providing justification for the amount of burden hours requested.
Instead what was found was a great deal of variability in the type of justification information provided across all
agencies. The ICR packages all provided a minimum level of information listing out the number of respondents,
activity types, hours per response, and total hours incurred. Beyond this though, it was not possible to identify
any particular documentation patterns. Cost estimates were sometimes included and sometimes not. Where costs
were included, some covered labor, some capital (e.g., postage or data entry) and some covered both. What is
more, activity types were almost invariably broken out by task, rather than by any uniform activity standards that
comprised those tasks (e.g., instruction review and document retrieval.)
Surprisingly, even though the instructions are very explicit, the most commonly omitted information was how the
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burden estimates themselves were constructed. The lack of explanation provided by agencies is important because
it is the main inquiry of this study, but it is also important for what it highlights: a lack of federal standards for
units of work. Tasks across agencies are, by design, unique in their needs; still, the activities supporting information collection are basic processes. For example, while many activities require individuals and businesses to review
policy changes or read instructions, there do not seem to be measures of how long activities like this should take
(e.g., how long it should take, in minutes, for an individual to read 100 words and then multiplying that by the
number of words in the instructions). Similarly, while many activities require individuals and institutions to
exchange financial and personal information, here too there do not seem to be agreed upon standards for how
long it should take to retrieve bank, tax or retirement documentation.
Within the Department of Education
Even within the Department of Education ICRs vary considerably in the level of justification provided. Consider,
for example, Appendix B, which documents the Supplementary Statement question #12 answers for two currently
approved requests: the Student Support Services Program (SSSP) Annual Performance Report and the College
Accessibility and Transparency List Explanation Form (CATEF).
The SSSP document simply highlights that it will take 15 hours (or two full business days) and nearly half a
million dollars in just staff costs each year to complete. No further information is offered except that 80 percent
of the work is anticipated to be done by “professionals” (without a definition of what a professional is in this
context) and the remainder is clerical.
Contrast this with the burden estimate in the same appendix for the CATEF. In this case the submitting group
actually documents the time needed to complete each individual section, lists ranges based on how answers are
provided, and offers a cost measure that not only breaks out labor and capital costs, but also includes a cost-of-living adjustment as well.

Question #2
Verification
Each year, as part of the financial aid process, colleges and universities are required to conduct checks on the
information that students provide, which helps determine the amount of federal grant and loan aid they may be
eligible for. This process is known as “verification.” Each year ED selects approximately one-third of all aid applicants for verification. While some schools only verify those students they are asked by the Department to verify,
in some cases an institution will conduct verification activities on all of its students that receive federal financial
aid as a matter of quality assurance.6
Table 1 below shows a comparison between the amount of time that ED estimates schools and students will need
to complete the various verification activities and what financial aid office professionals estimate they need for
the same activities. As the data shows, the expectation from ED is that institutions will need approximately two
hours per year to review new verification items and update their systems to retrieve any information accordingly.
It further estimates that students will spend an additional 7.2 minutes locating the necessary documentation and
an additional 4.8 minutes (10.2 for institutions) actually updating that information. Finally, it estimates that, for
those students selected for verification, the institution will have approximately 2.5 interactions at approximately
7.2 minutes per interaction to collect the necessary information and resolve any issues.

6

For more information on the verification process, please see: http://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/attachments/1415AVGCh4.pdf.
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TABLE 1.—Comparison between Department of Education estimates of the amount of time students and institutions need to complete verification of financial aid information requests and financial aid office professionals’
estimates for the same activities

Source: Supplementary Statement documentation provided by the Department of Education to OIRA for verification
information collection approval

It is unclear based on the documentation provided by ED to OIRA how the minute-per-response estimates
for the individual activities were derived. What is clear, based on the numbers of responses, is how sensitive the
overall burden will be to the minute-per-response estimates that ED employs. Indeed, each of the activities, with
the exception of program updating, involve tasks that are highly variable in terms of time to completion, such as
phone/email communication, but also document review, retrieval, verification, and submission. It is reasonable to
suggest that any one of these activities could take, for example, an additional minute or two minutes to execute.
If an additional two minutes are added to each of the student/school interactions, it would add nearly half a
million additional hours of burden and if all non-updating activities are included, it would require the nation’s
postsecondary institutions to take on nearly 637,000 additional hours of verification activities alone. In more
relatable terms, this means employing an additional 315 individuals every year, or three weeks of additional work
for one full-time staff member at the average institution.7
When financial aid office directors were asked about the reliability of verification burden estimates, there was
widespread agreement that the two hours of reviewing changes and altering programming was several orders of
magnitude off from the reality they experienced. Directors and staff suggested that it typically takes as much as
25 to 50 additional hours in preparation and adjustment plus additional staff hours in training (e.g., a 20-staff
office would incur 20 additional hours of burden simply by all of them attending a one-hour update seminar).
7

This exercise assumes that only institutional burden is increased, not the amount of time it takes students to read instructions and secure
the necessary information.
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While the people interviewed for this project suggested the amount of time needed to update documentation and
interaction times were fair “on average,” there was also near unanimity that it typically takes more than double the
seven minutes that the Department estimates is needed to review requests and locate appropriate documentation.
As can be seen from Table 1, when financial aid office professionals’ estimates of time to complete verification
are considered, the difference between these estimates and those provided by ED across all higher education
institutions adds up to more than one million hours of staff time. To the average institution, this is equivalent to
approximately 4.5 additional weeks of work effort for one full-time equivalent staff member.
Satisfactory Academic Progress
As part of continued federal student aid eligibility, students must maintain minimum academic standards, and
must demonstrate Satisfactory Academic Progress (SAP). Colleges and universities are required to evaluate all
students and counsel those who do not meet the standards.8
Table 2 below shows the amount of time that ED estimates schools will need to meet SAP compliance. This
includes approximately three hours per institution to account for annual changes to SAP policy. It also estimates
that schools spend at least 1.2 minutes per student to identify those in compliance or not, and an additional 10.2
minutes to review cases where students do not meet SAP. It then estimates that a school will spend an additional
15 minutes on a consultative and evaluative basis with those students who do not meet the requirements.

8

For more information on SAP, please see: http://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/attachments/1415Vol1Ch1.pdf.
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TABLE 2.—Comparison between Department of Education estimates of the amount of time students and institutions need to complete Satisfactory Academic Progress activities and financial aid office professionals’ estimates
for the same activities

Source: Supplementary Statement documentation provided by the U.S. Department of Education to OIRA for satisfactory academic progress information collection approval

Again, based on a review of the documentation provided by ED to OIRA it is unclear how the minute-per-response estimates for the individual activities were derived. Similar to the exercise done with verification, to examine the potential impact of even a small error in the Department’s estimates, the SAP responses were adjusted
upward by an additional two minutes, as were the minutes spent resolving SAP with students. The results suggest
that this fractional increase would increase the SAP activities by more than half a million hours, which again
translate into full-time work for more than 255 college staff members every year or just more than two weeks of
additional work for a single full-time staff member at the average institution.
When financial aid office professionals were asked about the reliability of SAP burden estimates, respondents
again pointed out that program updating often requires considerably more staff time, though there was general
agreement that since SAP rules do not change as much from year to year, staff time costs are more dependent on
the financial aid office’s size (e.g., a 20-staff office will likely incur 20 hours of additional time if the entire office
needs to engage in a one-hour “update” seminar).
Second, determining “meets or not meets” burdens are often a function of technology, including how student
reports are stored, filed, and accessed. In some cases, the staff responding to this study believed that this activity
could take up to five minutes per student. In addition, SAP appeals often tend to add a good deal more time,
though the individuals that were interviewed for this project were unable to identify the frequency with which
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this typically occurs.
As can be seen from Table 2, when financial aid office professionals’ estimates of time to complete SAP activities
are considered, the difference between these estimates and those provided by ED across all higher education institutions adds nearly 1.1 million hours of staff time. To the average institution, this is equivalent to approximately
4.6 additional weeks of work effort for one full-time equivalent staff member.

DISCUSSION/RECOMMENDATIONS
The absence of systematic information collection burden reporting across federal agencies would at first glance
suggest that both Congress and OIRA could do more to encourage or even require the kind of measurement standards necessary for accurately determining public burden. While it is evident that different information collection
exercises have different purposes and, at least technically, no two requests are alike, the disparity in how federal
agencies make their case is, for lack of a better phrase, consistently inconsistent. Given the time, effort and rigor
associated with the regulatory process, it is strikingly odd that such an important aspect—the amount of time and
effort needed by the public to comply —seems to be guided by little more than historical practice.
However, it also must be acknowledged that an undertaking like this would be difficult to execute for numerous
reasons. Each year OIRA not only reviews thousands of ICRs, but also accomplishes this one particular task as
part of a much, much larger portfolio of activities. What is more, establishing government-wide reporting standards would not only require a very high level of cross-agency agreement, but the exercise would impose its own
administrative burden on the federal government itself. This cost would have to be weighed against a not-well-defined set of benefits.
Still, this paper reveals that a great deal of effort goes into documenting the amount of burden that information collection creates but practically no effort into actually justifying the underlying calculations. How long does it take to read
a paragraph or a one-page form? How much time does it take to input a single data entry? How long does it take
to find last year’s tax forms? How much time to make a phone call, navigate a voice-mail tree, and discuss an issue
with someone else (be it from the perspective of the student or from a financial aid office)?
These are the factors that shape time and effort spent. They are the activities that either force businesses to bring
on more resources or find ways to do more with less—yet they also seem to be the one aspect of a well-defined
regulatory process that has no reasonable basis. Policymakers need to consider how information collection
burden standards based on a common set of activities can be both created and implemented.
The obvious consequence of not having such standards is minimal reporting that too often omits activities that
impose a great deal of time and financial costs on schools. Many of these information collection and reporting
activities, particularly in the case of federal financial aid, are seasonal. However, compliance is not the kind of
activity that tends to be, nor should be, assigned to temporary work staff. Document collection and retention
pose time/resource commitments that frequently do not get accounted for, such as having to account for the
diversity with which institutions tend to receive information (e.g., fax, email, paper) versus how it eventually must
be stored. Timing is even important as things like study abroad, transient students, and diploma verification can
potentially become flags in automated systems because they do not fall into traditional reporting slots.
What seems to frustrate many financial aid office staff is the serious underestimation of time needed to adjust
when standards change. Adding data points to be collected or reviewed or reported is not limited to the simple

134

Recalibrating Regulation of Colleges and Universities

inclusion of more fields. Schools may be pulling new data in from different sources, which taxes their IT infrastructure. Staff members need to be updated or, in some cases, trained. Forms (electronic and paper) need to be
updated. Most importantly, these processes then need to be tested and validated, especially at institutions that
work with large volumes of information.
The greatest challenge though, according to financial aid professionals, is in providing consumer support. Schools
see ED craft information collection estimates that suggest staff members are capable of resolving issues with
students in mere minutes when the consistent public message from the Department is that financial aid is too
complex and that students and parents are easily confused. In a number of instances, for example, the financial aid
administrators who were contacted for this paper pointed out the challenge of helping students provide the kind
of verification information institutions need without looking like the administrators were actually recommending
responses.
While the intuitive answer is a call for greater automation, individualized interactions will still be needed and
they will slow down the process. In fact, it was actually the financial aid staff in the larger more automated
institutions that were most likely to point out how manual processes that are consequences of data collection,
data reporting, consumer communication and file rejections problems are what create the massive burdens they
experience.
As a matter of best practice and fair standards of regulatory engagement, policymakers should hold federal
departments and agencies more accountable for aspects of information collection burden that receive only
minimal attention. Data collection and storage, data validation, and internal training are all components that
create real financial costs and greatly increase the amount of time that schools need to properly address reporting,
disclosure and record-keeping requirements.
In the absence of standards, the quality of estimates becomes very important and it is evident that, at least in certain cases, a good deal of false precision may exist. Where reporting and recordkeeping efforts can require tens of
thousands of interactions per school, even a fractional increase in time spent on a given activity can quickly create
a resource shortage. This is bound to either adversely affect quality or pull resources away from other, possibly
more important core tasks. A one- or two-minute addition to a phone call with an uninformed borrower is not
unreasonable by any measure, nor is the notion that regulatory burden changes need to be shared with everyone
in a financial aid office.
To the extent that the alternative burden estimates in the findings section of this paper are more apt to reflect
the reality that higher education institutions face, the magnitude of the differences between what ED assumes
and what actually occurs is cause for more than just concern. The available evidence already suggests that college
financial aid offices have borne the brunt of considerable additional work without a commensurate addition in
resources.9
It is logical to conclude that better communication between the Department and higher education institutions
is needed, but so too is greater awareness and action from OIRA when information collection burdens seem to
grossly underestimate actual effort. Policymaking in this area needs to focus more on creating ways for the
Department to more highly value the observations of the institutions that it regulates. Yes, there are options
for higher education institutions to express concern about unfair estimates, including filing public comments and
9

In that study, see Figures 5 and 6, which document the general growth in the number of financial aid applicants and lack of commensurate budget increase during the same time period.
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even petitioning OIRA directly. Nevertheless, casual observation suggests that institutions are not necessarily
aware of their ability to appeal directly to OIRA on such matters and financial aid offices have already indicated
that time constraints make drafting comments to regulatory proposals a very low priority.10
Any number of options could be explored. One, for example, might be to emulate the White House’s “We the
People” petition process and develop a system where, provided that enough comments or concerns are raised, ED
becomes obligated to articulate how it will address any differences between its own estimates and those developed
by institutions. Another alternative could involve the establishment of a standing group of college and university
experts that can inject a formal position into the regulatory process at the point where information collection
burden is being established.
Another area where a policy change could be of great assistance to information collection efforts is accounting
for operational scale economies. Colleges and universities are not single-sized organizations. At their largest, they
can enroll up to 60,000 students at a single campus and have student support offices (like admissions and financial aid) employing up to 40 or 50 individuals. At the other end of the spectrum are many institutions that enroll
less than 1,000 students and where the financial aid director is the financial aid office, with perhaps a part-time
student worker.11
In this regard, the “average” incremental burden increase discussed in the last section can be deceiving, since small
institutions will, by design, be reviewing smaller numbers of applications. Still, this is offset by the fact that smaller
offices do not enjoy the scale economies of automation or data retrieval/validation and may still be doing compliance on an Excel spreadsheet or even by hand. The nominal number of hours needed to meet regulatory compliance may be lower at smaller institutions. But there are thousands of small institutions, and when individuals at
those institutions are also tasked with performing the counseling function and aid disbursement, one can see how
information collection burdens that assume greater resource availability are not capturing the true nature of the
effort. In the same vein, large institutions have the ability to leverage more staff and more technology to meet the
same burden but scale economies can work against them because a much greater up-front investment is necessary.
In some cases these larger offices can have upwards of five to 10 dedicated compliance staff and within this office
maintain an additional degree of hyper-specialization.
In other words, simply disaggregating institutions by public, private nonprofit and for-profit status, as is the
current Department practice, misses a great deal of underlying infrastructure variation that shapes the ability of
colleges and universities to meet regulatory compliance. Policymaking in this area needs to rethink the standards by which affected institutions are grouped. Strategies might include classifying information collection
burden estimates by institution size or by technological capacity. They may also be grouped by the size of the
office affected (e.g., utilizing ratios of financial aid office staff to students served as a baseline for several burden
“buckets”).
On a much larger level, forging a policy focusing on consistent review of existing regulations is warranted.
Efforts to simplify the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) seek to minimize applicant burden
and increase individuals’ ability to get financial resources to support an education. Yet the simplification debate
has not addressed the back-end cost to verification because far less information is flowing to the schools up front.
10

11

See the NASFAA Administrative Burden Survey. Nearly half of all school respondents indicated that office resource shortages greatly
affected their ability to respond to Notices of Proposed Rulemaking.
The more useful metric would be median financial aid office staff size; however, this information is not readily collected. For further
information see NASFAA’s staffing and administrative burden reports, which are available on NASFAA’s website.
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Less information is likely to lead to even more time spent on verification, since schools will need to request more
information from students and families as part of the process. That may actually end up complicating students’
financial aid packages.
Which leads to two very obvious questions: why is verification only done on a third of all aid recipients, and why
is it a school process and not one conducted by ED? Today the Department of Education owns all of the federal
loans currently disbursed. Since verification is technically a loan underwriting process, all recipients should be
verified and it is not entirely clear why schools should still be doing this. Private sector companies such as Campus
Logic already offer solutions that specifically address many of the data collection and reporting challenges behind
verification. They could theoretically save the higher education sector millions of hours of staff time and also do
so for a fraction of the current cost.12 In light of the data collection, storage, validation and transfer challenges,
policymakers should consider how private sector technologies could help reduce information collection
burden.
This paper starts a much-needed conversation on information collection burden by highlighting the challenges
and shortcomings to the existing regulatory framework. A more in-depth and rigorous analysis would do much
to strengthen that conversation and provide policymakers with the kind of analysis that can help craft meaningful
change. To that end, it makes good sense for Congress to consider asking the Government Accountability
Office to conduct more in-depth research on the extent to which the Department of Education’s information
collection request estimates are consistent with the time spent by higher education institutions’ professionals
who perform such activities.

APPENDIX A
List of Information Collection Requests Reviewed
OMB
Control No

Agency/Sub

Title

Date Concluded
Current
Received Date Expiration Date

1405-0138

STATE/AFA

DOS-Sponsored Academic Exchange Program Application

9/20/11

2/5/12

2/28/15

1840-0550

ED/OPE

Application for Grants Under the Upward Bound Program

10/31/11 12/8/11

12/31/14

1840-0744

ED/OPE

Higher Education Act (HEA) Title II Report Cards on
State Teacher Credentialing and Preparation

9/19/12 12/6/12

12/31/15

1840-0821

ED/OPE

GEAR UP Applications for Partnership and State Grants

7/19/12 8/24/12

8/31/15

1840-0826

ED/OPE

Talent Search (TS) Annual Performance Report

7/26/12 10/11/12

10/31/15

1840-0828

ED/OPE

Assessing Program Performance, National Resource Center, Business and International Education, and Undergraduate International Studies and Foreign Language Programs
Phone Interviews

9/5/12

12/6/12

12/31/15

1840-0829

ED/OPE

Survey of Post-Graduate Outcomes for International
Education Fellowship Recipients

10/9/12 12/21/12

12/31/15

1845-0011

ED/FSA

William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program Deferment
5/21/12 7/23/12
Request Forms

7/31/15

12

Campus Logic estimates that it can provide all aspects of the verification process for approximately $1 per student.
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OMB
Control No

Agency/Sub

Date Concluded
Current
Received Date Expiration Date

Title

1845-0015

ED/FSA

Federal Family Education Loan, Direct Loan, and Perkins
10/28/13 12/3/13
Loan Discharge Applications

12/31/14

1845-0018

ED/FSA

William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan)
Program: Internship/Residency and Loan Debt Burden
Forbearance Forms

5/21/12 7/23/12

7/31/15

1845-0035

ED/FSA

National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS)

3/27/13 5/13/13

5/31/16

1845-0052

ED/FSA

Student Assistance General Provision—Subpart I—Immigration Status Confirmation

4/5/13

4/17/13

4/30/15

1845-0059

ED/FSA

Federal Direct Loan Program and Federal Family Education Loan Program Teacher Loan Forgiveness Forms

5/27/14 7/21/14

7/31/17

1845-0083

ED/FSA

Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher
12/19/11 2/16/12
Education (TEACH) Grant Program Agreement to Serve

2/28/15

1845-0102

ED/FSA

Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program Income
Based Repayment (IBR) Plan Request and Alternative
Documentation of Income

2/19/14 3/18/14

11/30/15

1845-0107

ED/FSA

Student Assistance General Provisions—Subpart A—
General

8/19/13 9/10/13

3/31/15

1845-0110

ED/FSA

Employment Certification for Public Service Loan Forgiveness

3/7/12

3/19/12

11/30/14

2900-0073

VA

VA Enrollment Certification

3/8/12

7/5/12

7/31/15

2900-0156

VA

Notice of Change in Student Status

3/13/12 6/19/12

6/30/15

2900-0718

VA

Yellow Ribbon Program Agreement

6/12/12 7/16/12

7/31/15

2900-0794

VA

Post-9/11 GI Bill Longitudinal Study

11/6/12 5/30/13

5/31/16

2900-0797

VA

Principles of Excellence Complaint System Intake

10/28/13 12/13/13

12/31/16

3137-0086

IMLS

Laura Bush 21st Century Librarian Grant Program Evaluation

7/19/12 12/20/12

12/31/15

3145-0035

NSF

National Science Foundation Science Honor Awards

6/24/11 8/10/11

10/31/14

3145-0062

NSF

Survey of Graduate Students and Postdoctorates in Science and Engineering

5/17/13 5/31/13

10/31/14

3145-0100

NSF

Higher Education R&D and FFRDC R&D Surveys

6/25/13 9/16/13

9/30/16

3145-0174

NSF

SRS-Generic Clearance of Survey Improvement Projects
for the Division of Science Resources Statistics

5/30/13 5/31/13

5/31/16

3145-0217

NSF

Evaluation of the Robert Noyce Teacher Scholarship
Program

12/13/11 4/4/12

4/30/15

3145-0223

NSF

Grantee Reporting Requirements for the Graduate
Research Fellowship Program.

9/11/12 12/6/12

12/31/15

3145-0227

NSF

Office of Inspector General Review of Awardee Implementation of NSF’s Requirement for a Responsible
Conduct of Research Program

5/31/13

8/2/13

8/31/16

3145-0229

NSF

Grantee Reporting Requirements for Nanoscale Science
and Engineering Centers (NSECs)

8/20/13 9/19/13

9/30/16
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OMB
Control No

Agency/Sub

Date Concluded
Current
Received Date Expiration Date

Title

3145-0230

NSF

Grantee Reporting Requirements for Materials Research
Science and Engineering Centers (MRSECs)

9/20/13 12/6/13

12/31/16

3145-0233

NSF

Grantee Reporting Request for Emerging Frontiers in
Research and Innovation (EFRI) Program

12/5/13 3/20/14

3/31/17

3145-0234

NSF

Grantee Reporting Requirements for National Facilities
Managed by the NSF Division of Materials Research

12/30/13 3/27/14

3/31/17

APPENDIX B
Supplementary Statement Answers to Question #12 (calculation of burden estimates) for Department of Education’s SSSP and CATEF programs
Student Support Services (SSS) Program Annual Performance Report (APR)
Estimated burden hours for this collection of information are 15,405 hours. We estimate approximately 1,027
respondents x 1 (one) APR each @ 15 hours per respondent. The APR will be submitted once a year (annually).
Estimated number of respondents		

1027

Estimated preparation time			

15 hours

Total estimated burden hours		

15,405		

(Estimated Burden: 15,405 hrs. Total number of hours [preparation time] multiplied by the total number of respondents
equals estimated burden hours).

Most of the costs of this data collection are those of the federal government, since the respondents are project staff
paid for the most part with Federal grant funds. Nonetheless, the annual cost to the grantees to respond to this
data collection is estimated as follows:
Estimated annual costs to respondents:
Professionals (1,027 personnel x 12 hours @ $35 per hour)

$431,340

Clerical

$55,458

(1,027 clerical x 3 hours @ $18 per hour)

Total estimated cost to respondents		$486,798
College Affordability and Transparency List Explanation Form (CATEF)
The estimated time burden to respondents for the College Affordability and Transparency Explanation Form
(CATEF) is three hours on average. The form will be completed by the top 5 percent of institutions in each sector
with the largest increases in tuition and fees and/or net prices to students. Thus, the exact number of institutions
that will be included in the collection may vary slightly from year to year based on the number of institutions
in each sector. The number of respondents may also vary depending on how many institutions are included on
both the tuition and fees and net price increase lists, as that overlap would limit the number of other institutions
included in the top 5 percent that would have to report data. The 2011–12 collection will have 528 institutions,
leading to an estimated total burden of 1,584 hours per year for all respondents.
In all cases, if the data are readily accessible, then the time required is less than the estimated burden hours.
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Estimates include the time for reviewing instructions, gathering and maintaining the institution’s general purpose
financial statements for the two necessary years and completing and reviewing the required information. This
time burden was reviewed by those people noted in section A.8 and B.5 that provided consultation on the survey.
This time amount is the total of the following estimates by section of the proposed survey form:
Table 1: Detailed calculations for the CATEF data collection time burden estimate
Section

1

Time Estimate

Section Requirements

10 to 20 minutes

Two paragraphs of instructions to read. Information on the institution
and respondent are pre-loaded. The respondent has one or two “yes or
no” questions to respond to, depending on which CATC list they were
on. If the institution responds affirmatively they will have to enter an
explanation that is expected to take 10 minutes. For those institutions
that respond affirmatively to either question, this will be the end of the
survey with a total burden estimate of 20 minutes.

2

45 minutes

3

10 to 50 minutes

One paragraph of instructions and up to twenty definitions to read.
The respondent will need to have their financial statements for the first
year and last year of the three-year period covered. The respondent will
need to enter selected amounts for expenses from their financial statement into the survey. The reporting of revenue amounts is optional and
those amounts will be available from the same financial statements as
the expense amounts. The collection system will calculate the percent
change for the amounts and the per FTE student amounts from existing
information.
One sentence of instructions to read. Respondent will need to provide
an explanation for each of the cost increases they indicated in section 2.
It is estimated that each explanation will take 10 minutes. Respondents
will have a minimum of one and a maximum of five explanations to
provide.

10 to 50 minutes

Two sentences of instructions to read. Respondent will need to describe
the steps the institution has taken to reduce the costs for each of the cost
increases they indicated in section 2. It is estimated that each description
will take 10 minutes. Respondents will have a minimum of one and a
maximum of five descriptions to provide.

5

5 to 30 minutes

Up to five sentences of instructions to read. The respondent will need to
respond to a “yes or no” screening question. If the institutions responds
“no” they will have to enter two short responses (expected to take 10
minutes total). The respondent has the option to enter any additional
information they would like to be included in their submission.

6

5 minutes

The respondent answers “yes” or “no” to whether they found the burden
estimate for the survey to be accurate. If they indicate “no,” then they
must enter in how long the survey took them to complete.

20-190 minutes

The variance depends on: 1) whether the respondent enters “yes” to
either of the questions in the first section, which end the survey; 2) the
number of cost areas that have increased over the three year period;
and 3) the amount of additional information the respondent decides to
include

4

Total

The total cost to respondents is based on the estimated response burden (hours) multiplied by $42 (in 2011–12),
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which includes average data analyst and associated computer costs (for running programs to extract data). The
hourly wage is increased by an assumed 2 percent cost-of-living adjustment for subsequent years. Because the
institutions that will be on the College Affordability and Transparency Lists in subsequent years have not yet
been identified, we will use the 2011-12 hour burden estimate for subsequent years. Total estimated costs to
respondents for the 2011–12, 2012–13, and 2013–14 collections are:
Table 2: Estimated costs to respondents, by collection year

Collection year
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14

Number of
Respondents
528
528
528

Average Burden
Hours Per Institution
3
3
3

Estimated Total
Burden Hours for
All Institutions
1,584
1,584
1,584
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Average Estimated Costs Per
Institution
$126
$151
$181

Estimated Cost to
All Institutions
$66,528
$79,728
$95,568
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